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The relationships between evaluation and needs and knowledge, as they are
applied to policy issues, are examined in the context of child health
care programs. The analysis focuses heavily on a detailed study of
social policy evaluation. Definitions of evaluation research, program
evaluation, policy analysis and related terms are presented to indicate
the lack of conceptual clarity in the field. Goal-attainment and
systems models of evaluation theory are defined and the assumptions
underlying them analyzed.
The success of evaluation depends in part on facilitating conditions,
here termed an "infrastructure." These essential building blocks, which
have both cultural and technological dimensions, include: definition of
health, health status indices or indicators, determination of health
needs, professional standards of care, and the social/political/economic
climate.
In the third chapter, after reviewing some models of evaluation, a
tentative framework for health care evaluation is proposed which tries
to both synthesize the best portions of existing models and to incorporate
directly aspects of program operation often neglected. The framework
consists of the following components: organization, process, outcome,
impact, advocacy, and actionability. In so far as possible, examples
have been drawn from child health care issues.
Chapter Four examines major health needs of children and current
knowledge about alleviating those needs through social programs. Very
little is in fact known about many of the needs. The review focuses on
critical needs which affect groups of children, especially those clustered
risks which are associated with poverty, high-risk pregnancies, infant
mortality, malnutrition, and a continuum of insult and damage to the
child. The implications of this continuum for child development models
of intervention are discussed. Finally, federal health service programs
for children are described; in general we know too little to say if they
are really working or not.
The issues raised seem to come together around a concept of
boundaries: of health care, of evaluation, and of scientific knowledge.
The limitations of all three, which if not respected can convert them
from beneficent, useful, and progressive enterprises into meaningless or
detrimental ones, are explored in the final chapter. Greater aware-
ness of these boundaries, both analytically and ethically, is advocated,
in order that planning and humanitarian goals may be jointly fostered.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Hollister
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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6Chapter One.
Introducti on
Long ago Machiavelli observed that one cannot be both a good
Christian and a good prince. In our secular and democratic society
the dilemma persists--can one be both a humanitarian and a good planner?
This thesis applies the question to one specific area of social policy:
planning health programs for children. I do not know if 1achiavelli's
cynicism is true today; I do know that the problem is serious, and
that it deserves more attention than it now receives.
The heart of the modern conflict between moral action and planning
lies in our increasing faith in the power of reason to analyze and solve
complex social problems such as poverty, ill-health, and poor education.
More precisely, we have faith in technical competence and objectivity
to solve these problems. We often forget that these terms are not
synonymous. "Reason," which is essentially the core of our humanness
and of our commonsensical ways of communicating with each other, has
been gradually confined to mean "rationality," a term connoting belief
in the superiority of reason over all other means of knowing, and
finally to mean "scientific rationality," an even more restricted concept
originally appropriate only to matters of scientific inquiry and technology.
The scientific method of research, hypothesis testing, validation,
and replication has been gradually but steadily incorporated into
first the theories and then the practice of the social sciences.
Today, social research methodology and policy science are well-
established and respected fields of academic and professional endeavor.
7They meet and achieve crucial dimensions in social policy evaluation,
a term that, however ambiguous, implies a rational and usually
scientifically demonstrable process of analyzing social institutions
and programs in order to improve their future performance. Being a
good planner implies having a certain amount of faith in that
rationality and methodology. Indeed the whole profession of planning
is predicated on concepts of the rational determination of problems,
the conscious consideration of alternative solutions and the implemen-
tation of orderly, planned change.
Yet neither democracy nor social planning is an entirely pragmatic
proposition. There are "self-evident truths," "inalienable rights,"
necessities of life, basic human dignity and worth, and a sincere
desire to improve the quality of life--for us and our posterity.
Attitudes toward children reflect this humanitarian, moral belief.
We value children in a special way as the future of the poli-ty and
the society. Not yet capable of full democratic participation or
independence, they require special protection and nurturance in order
to grow up to be free, healthy, and responsible citizens.
A heterogeneous populace, however, may not have clear consensual
notions about the meaning of health, responsibility, or freedom.
Functional definitions of these terms must be negotiated. As size
makes town meetings and even representative government unwieldy for the
bulk of day-to-day policy decisions, the interplay between rationality
and ethics becomes more complex. Legislative intent, for example, may
indicate that the goal of an act is to better the health and nutrition
8of pregnant women, young mothers and infants. In order to judge the
effectiveness of the legislation, and to monitor projects arising out
of it, bureaucratic guidelines and regulations will "translate" these
qualitative goals into less subjective, quantifiable objectives (e.g.,
to reduce rates of infant and maternal mortality over five years, to
train pediatric nurse practitioners or nurse midwives, to provide
comprehensive medical and nutritional care to certain groups of women
and children, etc.). These objectives are finally combined, constrained
by budgetary factors and a desire "to get the most for our money," into
cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit measures. And suddenly the self-evident
truth of the inalienable right of the infant to life has a price tag on
it. We want to guarantee the unalienable right, but we want even more
to do it at the lowest cost. We try to show that,while it costs so much
to save a child, if healthy that child will eventually generate a
certain amount of income, GNP, and purchasing power, to the benefit
of us all.
Do we feel concern for children and want to help them because they
cannot themselves protect their rights to good health, freedom from
hunger, and protection from environmental risks? Or do we act on
their behalf because prevention is better (and cheaper) than cure;
because healthy children will not require special schools, rehabilitative
centers, welfare, hospitalization for long stretches, etc.; and because
they will be able to serve in the amed forces, work full time, and pay
their own way? Clearly both motivations move us; but the ways in which
they are intermingled and the methods by which we reconcile them are
not self-apparent. In fact, we need to ask if the values behind them
are in basic conflict.
9In a book detailing the disappointments and troubles of certain
community action poverty programs of the 60's, Marris and Rein capture
the essence of this uneasy intermingling by characterizing the "dilemmas
of social reform" as the creation of "strategies of action at once
politically viable, radically democratic, and scientifically rational."
(Marris and Rein, 1969, p. 9).
The political climate has altered dramatically since the heyday
of buoyant and reckless optimism of the early War on Poverty. Radical
democracy sometimes seems more feared than the old images of China and
Russia. But concern with scientific rationality in social policy is
not in the least abated. Unlike the New Deal, which was planned by
economists (Rossi & Williams, 1972, pp. 12-13), the War on Poverty had
battalions of all types of social scientists--psychologists, sociolo-
gists, urban planners; policy analysts, operations researchers, etc.--
with postwar weapons ready to try social evaluation research, quasi-
experimental designs, advanced statistical techniques, survey methodol-
ogies, theories of social intervention, etc. Behind all of the jargons
and formulations was an underlying confidence that science, social
science, planning and political theory could be used in powerful
combination to generate policies and programs directly responsive
to- the most urgent social priorities, to target those policies at the
people and places most in needand to unequivocally demonstrate to
disbelievers and to budget-makers the effectiveness and benefits of
the policies. Unlike the New Deal, this era of social reform
consciously has what Marris and Rein tem an "argument":
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Reform needs an argument, as well as political and democratic
support. In a secular society, where .religion is treated as a
matter of private conscience, morality is an uneasy ground from
which to argue any specific proposal. The sense of shared
beliefs begins to dissolve in the light of intellectual analysis.
Even though some moral commitment must lie at the foundation of
any social policy, it is wiser to pursue, as long as possible, a
more dispassionate line of argument. A technologically sophisticated
culture promotes, besides, the prestige of scientific problem-solving.
Analysis, expert planning, experiment begin to be as much a con-
vention of social policy, as of industrial development or defence
strategy. (Marris and Rein, 1969, p. 9)
Thus the enabling legislation of virtually all the health, education,
welfare, and community development legislation of the Sixties mandated
evaluation and close monitoring both to assure compliance with legis-
lative intent and to measure and document the real-life effectiveness of
these previously untried strategies of social reform.*
The history of this new interest in evaluation and effectiveness
studies cannot be fully documented here. Among the most significant
highpoints were the direct earmarking of program funds for evaluation;
the establishment of departmental evaluation, policy analysis and
program planning staffs; and especially, the extension of the "Planning-
Programming-Budgeting" system (PPBS) from the Department of Defense,
where McNamara had used it to completely revamp and trim the defense
budget,. to the social policy departments (HUD, HEW, and Labor). PPBS,
a systems-analysis methodology tying together program planning and
budgeting through cost-benefit analysis, is a vastly complex phenomenon
*This is not to imply that specific strategies such as neighborhood
health centers, manpower training, or educational reforms had not
been tried before; but the social science arguments supporting them
were new and more self-conscious. See, for example, Stoekle and
Candib's (1969) article on the history of the neighborhood health center
as a reform movement.
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which cannot be dealt with here. However, as will be .evident in some
of the discussion which follows, it represents to many people the
current best attempt at achieving rational social policy. (c.f.
Rivlin, 1970 ,passim, for probably the best and least excessive
formulation of that position; for general history of PPBS and
descriptions of its use in the federal government, see Lyden & Miller,
1972; Iglehart, 1972; Rossi, in Rossi & Williams, 1972; and the
Proxmire Joint Economic Committee hearings on the subject, U. S.
Congress, 1969.)
Concern with "systematic thinking for social action" (Rivlin's
title) is increasingly being linked with management science, as the
recent appointment of Caspar Weinberger as Secretary of HEW testifies.
The question raised by these developments is: to what extent can we
transfer to social policy the techniques and assumptions developed to
sell products and to manage large-scale enterprises whose purposes are
not predicated on evidence of human need but on market demand, profit-
ability, and competition?
I should stress here that I am not trying to make a neo-Luddite,
anti-sciences, anti-rational, anti-systems argument. Even the best
of ethical and humanitarian programs are better if they are administered
fairly, efficiently, and with accountability. But the confidence
frequently expressed that scientific methods will eventually remove
the messiness and uncertainty from hard choices about policy and
human welfare is frightening to me in its hubris.
Needs, Knowledge, Evaluation, and Policy
The complex interplay between desires for social reforms and
12
scientifically rational ways of achieving those reforms will be
examined in the context of child health programs. I have broken
down that context into four parts, which provide a structural framework
for the analysis to follow. These parts, and the questions which they
highlight are presented below.
Needs
Apparent or discovered needs are the basis of social policy.
Traditionally needs come to attention through scandal, investigations
by individuals (Harrington, Rachel Carson, Upton Sinclair), publicity
by political. figures (RFK & hunger), public demands (Welfare Rights,
civil rights), the publicized success of new ideas (free schools,
midwifery, etc.), and other episodic, individualistic, and non-systematic
occurrences. They also surface as effective intervention methods are
developed to deal with "needs" previously not defined as pressing because
there was no solution. Need implies inequality of some sort. When we
all suffer without an adequate cure (e.g.,. from the common cold), or
when .the risk of susceptibility is apparently random (e.g., many types
of cancer), then we are all equal and can be defined in need only in
reference to some ideal of health. But, once there were vaccines for
polio and rubella, once renal diseases could be controlled via organ
transplants and dialysis machines, once amniocentesis could detect inborn
metabolic and hereditary errors and made genetic counselling possible,
or once mass screening techniques were possible for sickle cell anemia,
certain cancers and TB--then we could define those in need as those
potential users or beneficiaries of the services who do not receive
them or have access to them. Need can also be defined in terms of the
13
resources necessary on the supply side to meet this demand need (e.g.,
organs for transplantation, health personnel to staff screening centers,
legal clarifications on rights to abortion, euthanasia).
Finally, need may be determined deliberately and synthetically as
existing social institutions are examined (evaluated) in order to
determine whether they are performing as ccmmon knowledge says they are
and whether there are unnoticed gaps or inequities being perpetrated.
Thus the Coleman report and its apparently endless offspring have created
a self-conscious examination of the assumptions behind universal public
education and compensatory education. Similarly, the current interest
in HMO's and other models of organized, prepaid group health care arises
from longstanding, but only recently widely acknowledged, challenges
to the tenets of private fee-for-service medicine and. from experiments
with alternate. schemes. In this sense, the "crisis in health care' is
indeed a manufactured one. The same analytic studies and conclusions
were reached 40 years ago by the Committee on the Costs of Medical
Care for the American People (1927-32).
Clearly the definitions outlined above are overlapping. But they
do suggest that the proportions of passion and analysis in the determination
of need are quite variable. In the end, as I shall discuss in the next
chapter, scientific rationality (via tools like epidemiology, statis-
tical procedures, and surveys) must in some way quantify or at least
objectify even the most i'mpassioned cries of need. How many kidney
machines are enough? How many migrant children never get adequate
medical care? What sorts of services do a handicapped child and his
family need?
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Question: What do we know, from all of these sources, about
the health needs of American children?
Question: Are there ways in which social needs can be more
systematically reviewed and assessed, without concentrating on those
which are merely more obvious or more easily quantified?
Knowledge
Knowledge here refers to:
1) Specific responses effective to meet certain needs. These
generally arise from small-scale, demonstration, or experimental projects
or research. In the health field, such responses range from medical
techniques and drugs to strategies of service delivery and intervention.
They range also from well-tested and verified knowledge (e.g., drug
efficacy after human trials) to questionable extensions of theory into
practice and untested transfers from allegedly comparable situations,
and to traditional "time-tested" responses (e.g., private physicians).
2) Theories of social behavior or medical etiology. These usually
form the basis of proposals to meet wider sets of needs. For example,
theories of familial and environmental stress as causal factors in
mental illness influenced the "argument" fbr community mental health
and preventive psychiatry; similar theories now influence new broadly-
based approaches to child abuse and neglect. Here the important role
of knowledge is to resynthesize or reorganize isolated pieces of
intervention strategies into new matrices. While the parts are
important, the whole is the heart of the argument. These matrices
can range from new approaches to the organization of hospitals to
such massive programs as the community action ones of the War on Poverty.
vll l . . . I
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(Model Cities, for example, was supposed to reverse urban decay, social
disintegration, and racial tensions.) In health, important examples
are the arguments linking good prenatal and infant care with cognitive
and physical devel opment and school performance; arguments for family-
oriented and organized health care; and ecological models of the
relationship between the child's health and his environment (accidents,
lead paint poisoning, child abuse, malnutrition, rat bites, family
stress, etc.).
3) Finally, there are the overarching theories, the dominant modes
of analysis in the society, those key concepts and beliefs which almost
unconsciously influence behavior and policy. "Child development" is
such a model of particular interest here. The old Children's Bureau
is dead, the Office of Child Development its reincarnation. This is
more than renaming; the focus is different, the stress on cognitive
development, stages (a la Piaget and Erikson), and calculated inter-
vention. Much of HEW and OEO's research money is going into child
development-oriented inquiries.
Question: What do we know about programs for child health?
What kinds of things are possible? What models of child health are
useful?
Question: How do health and health care relate to child develop-
ment? Is this latter concept useful or limiting in structuring strategies
to meet the health needs of children?
Evaluation and Policy
Public policy ideally should be the application of knowledge of
many kinds to the most pressing needs of the society. The activities
16
associated with it are synthesizing and reviewing data on needs and
knowledge, making priority rankings, creating programs or strategies
to bring about desired changes, and implementing these strategies.
Fundamentally it is a process of resource .allocation.
Evaluation means many things to many people. The International
Encyclopedia of Social Science defines the purpose of evaluation
research:
to provide objective, systematic and comprehensive evidence
on the degree to which the program achieves its intended
objectives plus the degree to which it produces other un-
anticipated consequences, which when recognized would also
be regarded as relevant. (IESS, 1968, vol. 5, p. 198)
Evaluation here means the planned and organized gatheri-ng of knowledge
about social action. That is, evaluation adds to our store of knowledge
about what interventions work and to some extent, about how they work.
Other definitions of evaluation stress its more direct feedback
potential into the policy-making apparatus which created the program
under study.
In order to influence social policy, findings from social-action
experiments must provide a basis for the efficient allocation of
financial and human resources in the solution of social problems.
It is this notion of the efficient allocation of resources that
is the key to the whole problem of planning and choosing among
social-action programs. (Freeman & Sherwood, 1965; reprinted
in Schulberg et al., 1969, p. 80)
Evaluation here is seen as an integral component of the social
policy process, a critical means of assessing priorities in the
allocation of resources. The definition also introduces the criterion
of efficiency as the key to planning, an assessment not universally
shared. Both this definition and the previous one strongly suggest
the rationality and scientific methodology of evaluation ("objective,"
4
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"systematic," "evidence," "degree," "experiments," "solution,"
"efficient allocation").
A third definition, from a study committee on educational evalu-
ation, offers a significantly different perspective:
Evaluation is the process of delineating, obtaining, and providing
useful information for judging decision alternatives.
(Stufflebeam et al., 1971, p. 40)
Here evaluation is defined as a broad process providing the basis
for making social policy decisions. It does not single out the usual
"compare performance with intended objectives" as its main function.
As I will discuss in Chapter 3, that function is difficult to perform
and of ambiguous meaning, although such evaluation (the IESS definition)
would certainly be one kind of "useful information." But "useful" is
a non-scientific word which can also encompass many other types of "data."
Most importantly, this last definition explicitly acknowledges the
subjective nature of evaluation policy-making, that it means "judging,"
not "planning and choosing." As Weckworth, a prominent evaluator of
health programs has said, evaluation "ultimately becomes judgment, i.e.
the opinion of the person with the right to decide." (Weckworth, 1969,
p. 12). If this is true, then we need to examine carefully how evaluation
is done, what types of information are gathered, to whom it is given,
and in what types of decisions it is instrumental.
This judgment returns us to Machiavelli. Can the argument of
social reform encompass both the scientifically rational, the known,
the. demonstrated, the measured--and the ethically sound, the toughest
of issues, the coronsensically important, the unquantifiable?
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According to what criteria is it decided which of the multitude
of issues in medical care, biomedical research, psychosocial aspects
of health and health care delivery, special needs of special groups,
organizational problems, etc. shall be examined? If evaluation, and
ultimately policy action, depends on knowledge, certain reforms may
be foreclosed because problems are ignored and basic questions never
asked.* In a society that is affluent, relatively healthy, and well
supplied with medical resources, very few new programs or treatments
will result in rapid, startling, massive changes in health status or
levels of access.
Social science methodologies of evaluative research are the major
evaluation tool; yet they have many serious shortcomings. They are
not well developed either to measure and verify rather small changes in
complex milieus or to apportion the effect of each of many causal factors
on such measures of health outcome as infant mortality, reduced community
illness, or family intactness. There are a multitude of statistical
techniques available, and reality rarely fully matches the needs of
any of them; methodology can always be challenged by critics of the
conclusions.
In view of this, how do we decide whether programs are in fact
effective or not? Having once entered the arena of evaluative research,
experimental designs and scientifically rational arguments, where do
we draw the line? If everyone serving and being served feels a program
*For example, sickle cell anemia is not a new disease, nor only recently
widespread; but because it afflicts mainly blacks, it has never been
much studied by white-dominated NIH or other researchers; hence we did
not know much about its extent, treatment or detection.
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is useful and of high quality, do we continue to question it if we
can't document impressive changes? Why were the revelations of hunger
by the Citizens Board of Inquiry discounted because they were only
testimony and case studies? How often do we challenge the social
scientist's findings of "no significant difference" by saying, "When
a technique continually produces findings that are at variance with
experience and cormion observation, it is time to call that technique
into question." (Stufflebeam et al., 1971, p. 8) And, if we must
have some policy, for health or children, how do we act in the face
of incomplete and confusing knowledge while maintaining belief in our
ability, and indeed our responsibility, to act reasonably, on the basis
of explicable argument?
Plan of the Thesis
In closing this introduction, I should briefly lay out the circu~i-
stances under which this thesis came to be in its present shape. Most
of the research was done as part of my work for the Huron Institute of
Cambridge, Massachusetts on a major project, under contract to the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, HEW,
originally entitled "Federal Child Development Programs for Disadvantaged
Children." The program analysis, which lasted over a year (Sumer/1971
to September/1972) under the direction of Sheldon H. White of Harvard,
was originally designed to systematically review the literature in five
areas believed critical to child development: elementary education,
preschool education, day care, family intervention, and health. I was
responsible for developing the health section of the report. The
report was intended to synthesize the literature into critical periods
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for intervention and sets of critical needs of disadvantaged children
(having first developed a comprehensive definition of disadvantage); to
review existing evaluative tools and standards of measurement; to survey
findings from existing programs (federal and non-federal); to then combine
these sets of data so that we could derive conclusive recommendations
for future policy (short-, intermediate-, and long-term) based on critical
needs, periods, and performance evidence; and finally, to cost out a
range of these recommendations.
The project was a retrenchment from the overblown, untried theories
of the Sixties, a rigorously scientific and methodologically self-
conscious enterprise, infused with the current interest in child develop-
ment and hoping to establish the latter's validity as an operational policy
construct, one with much greater power and truth than. the more political
or vaguely humanitarian arguments of the Great Society. There was a
real belief at the beginning that if only we studied it carefully and
comprehensively enough, the literature would reveal solid knowledge and
unarguable bases for action. And yet, the overwhelming--and to many,
deeply disillusioning--finding was that we could recormend virtually
nothing (and certainly nothing major or comprehensive) on the basis of
conclusive evidence. And we could certainly not cost out ranges of
possible programs. But the project (retitled "Federal Programs for
Young Children") did come up with recommendations--150 pages of them.
There was little evidence, we decided, that we should not attempt
intervention in processes of child development, health, or education,
and therefore recommendations were developed inductively from experience,
testimony, trends in data, pieces of evidence, and values--and then
21
buttressed by organized presentations of the data previously amassed.
I found myself torn between wanting to argue the cases on unassailable
grounds of "hard data" (particularly since I had a sense of writing for
a basically hostile or at least budget-cutting administration), but also
wanting not to let go of deeply held beliefs (such as the importance
of consumer control or of services as rights rather than as welfare)
simply because they did not fit the organizing framework of child develop-
ment theories or lacked evidence of previous success. The tensions
created by the situation were strong enough to make me reject the validity
of any of the work I had done for several months afterwards. Finally I
realized that the complexities of the issues raised, my own dissatisfaction
with either the conclusions or the whole process of the work went beyond
the immediate situation or my own despair of doing better. This thesis,
then, represents a first attempt on my part to apply my own analysis
and value judgments to the questions not addressed in that report: how
do we go about deciding what is knowledge and how do we use it or act
on the basis of it.
As I have presented them, needs, knowledge, evaluation and policy
are a looped system which can be viewed as beginning with any one of the
components. For my purposes, evaluation is central both as an organizing
framework and as a constraint upon the dimensions of the other components.
For these reasons, I am devoting the bulk of this thesis to an examination
of evaluation in health care programs.
Chapter Two will present a range of definitions of evaluation,
discuss the most common assumptions underlying these definitions and
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theories, and explore a set of prerequisite conditions (termed an
"infrastructure") necessary for meaningful evaluations to be carried
out. Reference will be made specifically to definitions and conditions
for health program evaluation and to issues of direct impact on children
whenever possible, .although more general observations will often be
necessary.
Chapter Three deals-with the content and process of evaluation itself.
The first part of the chapter presents current models, theories, and
frameworks of evaluation (primarily designed specifically for health
evaluation) to suggest the range of variables considered relevant for
evaluation methodologies. The second part of the chapter is a tentative
framework for evaluating health programs which I have developed by
synthesizing existing models and incorporating some aspects of concern
which they frequently ignore. The purpose of these two chapters is both
to reveal the confused state of theories of evaluations and the even more
dismal general record of practice, and to provide evidence for my con-:
viction that better practice and theory are possible given the constraints
of current tools and beliefs.
In Chapter Four, I return to the specific issue of child health,
to explore the outlines of our knowledge about the needs of children and
about the effects of existing federal programs on child health. The
origins of concern in preventive medicine, child development theories,
and in the unfinished business of the Sixties will be briefly presented.
In looking at the critical health needs of children--both individually
and as users (or nonusers) of health care services--I stress epidemiological,
sociological, and politico-economic issues rather than those of basic
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medical research or expertise. Hence the discussion slights specific
-treatment needs but goes into depth on the effects of the health care
system itself on the health chances of children. The final part of
the chapter summarizes findings from some major federal health service
programs for children, examining both the methods by which they have
been evaluated and the evidence they have generated on useful and proper
intervention techniques. Because the number of such evaluations is
small and the number of well-designed or broadly significant ones smaller
still, the discussion will be supplemented with evidence (both clinical
and programmatic) and testiriony from some non-federal efforts to improve
child health. This is not a comprehensive review of efforts in child
-health and related fields but rather an example of the types of infor-
mation available for policy decisions and of potentially useful ways of or-
ganizing it to feed back into policy and planning processes.
Policy and planning methods are not dealt with directly in the
thesis. Originally, a fifth chapter was to present several examples of
policy recommendations based on sets of evaluation findings, to study
the assumptions under which these recommendations were made, and to
evaluate the validity or the scientific rationality of those decisions.
This has proven to be a topic worthy of a lengthy'paper in its own right.
Throughout this paper, however, issues of policy are constantly raised
and related to the issues of evaluation methodology, highlighting the
complexities of the issues and the dangers of seeking quick or simple
answers to them.
A final chapter draws some tentative conclusions about the relation-
ship of values to knowledge in evaluation and planning, assesses the extent
to which the questions raised in this Introduction have been answered,
and raises some further questions still unanswered.
. i
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Chapter 2.
Evaluation: Definitions and Preconditions
This chapter has a dual purpose. First, it will present current
theoretical and programmatic definitions of evaluation. Second, it will
examine the contextual assumptions behind these definitions and will
discuss in detail the preconditions required for those assumptions to
be met.
Part 1.
Definitions of Evaluation
In-reviewing the literature on-social policy evaluation, one is
immediately struck by the fact that there is virtually no agreement on
even basic definitions or terminology. A certain amount of "saying things
your own way" and creating new categories is to be expected just to add
the appearance, or reality, of originality to one's work, to correct the
less developed theories of the past. But many writers on the subject of
evaluation research or evaluation of social programs do not seem aware of
each other's writings. Because they have not been brought together before,
the collection of definitions below, which might otherwise be a rather
pedestrian, routine task, has proven to be both time-consuming and reveal-
ing.
To begin, there is one clearly defined concept of evaluation
research, the only entry related to evaluation in the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. (1968) That definition reads: "A
scientific approach to the assessment of a program's achievements is the
hallmark of modern research evaluation...The primary purpose of evaluation
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is 'to provide objective, systematic, and comprehensive evidence on the
degree to which it produces other unanticipated consequences, which when
recognized would also be regarded as relevant to the agency'". (IESS,
1968, Vol. 5, p. 198) Evaluation research is then contrasted with other
types of social research, such as exploratory studies to formulate new
problems. and hypotheses (corresponding to my use of the word "knowledge"
as learning about needs), explanatory research, and descriptive social
research. -Inherent in this definition are the following five methodo-
logical steps:
1) Conceptualization and measurement of objectives of the
program and other unanticipated relevant outcomes;
2) Formulation of a research design and the criteria for
proof of effectiveness of the program, including consider-
ation of control groups or alternatives to them;
3) The development and application of research procedures,
including provisions for the estimation or reduction of
errors in measurement;
4) Problems of index construction and the proper evaluation
of effectiveness; and
5) Procedures for understanding and explaining the findings
on effectiveness or ineffectiveness. (IESS, Vol. 5, p. 199)
Evaluation research is similarly -defined by Suchman, probably the
single most influential and important writer in the field, as "the use
of the scientific method for collecting data concerning the degree to
which. some specified activity achieves some desired effect." (Suchman,
1969, p. 15) Suchman differentiates it from evaluation which he defines
as a "general social process of making judgments of worth regardless of
the basis for such judgments," and from basic research because it is
applied to problems with administrative consequences rather than theo-
retical significance. (c.f. Caro, 1971, p. 8; James, 1962; similar
definitions and distinctions are common in the mental health field, c.f.
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NIMH; 1955, MacMahon, Pugh & Hutchison, 1961; Edgerton, 1971)
In a discussion of evaluation at the federal level, Wholey et al.
(1970) define evaluation operationally as that process which
1) assesses the effectiveness of an on-going program in
achicving its objectives,
2) relies on the principles of research design to distinguish
a program's effects from those of other forces working in a
situation, and
3) aims at program improvement through a modification of current
operations. (Wholey, et al., 1970, p. 23; emphasis in original)
The authors contrast evaluation with program efficiency studies, which
focuses on input rather than output or goals as evaluation does, and with
program analysis and policy analysis which usually compare both existing
and hypothetical programs designed to solve the same problems. They
further note two alternatives to evaluation for gaining information about
on-going programs: field experiments (designed with control groups) and
experimental demonstrations (designed without control groups).
Wholey himself, in a later piece, uses the term program evaluation
in an apparently analogous manner, defining it as "assessment of the im-
pact of past and present programs, projects, and project components
('treatments')." (Wholey, undated, p. I.1)
For a definition directly related to health programs, one can use
the American Public Health Association's definition of evaluation as the
"process of determining the value or amount of success in achieving a
predetermined objective." (APHA, 1960) Schulberg, Sheldon, and Baker
(1969), in the introduction to their reader on evaluation in the health
fields, state that this is the sense in which "program evaluation" is
usually used and that it has the following four steps inherent in it
(c.f. steps noted above in IESS definition):
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1) formulating the objective;
2) identifying proper criteria to be used in measuring success;
3) determining and explaining the program's degree of success;
4) and recommending further program activity.
The authors at this point also attempt a definition of program, a
central term rarely discussed. They say:
In the field of organizational study, programs generally are
defined as a set of activities occurring within a social enter-
prise which have specific inputs of resources and conditions,
techniques for establishing relations among them, and certain
outputs which can be evaluated against given standards. Addi-
tionally, aspects of the organization's patterned activities
occur not only within its own structure but also in relation
to other organizations as well. (p. 5)
We will return later to the immense difficulty, which Schulberg et al. go
on to discuss, of actually finding health programs with such clearcut
boundaries, goals, and objectives.
Schulberg et al. show that some authors distinguish program evaluation
from other research by its attempts to mark progress toward prestated goals
instead of seeking new knowledge (c.f. IESS's "exploratory studies" and
Suchman's "basic research"; also James, 1962; Edgerton, 1971), and from
program reviews or demonstrations, by its more rigorous methodological re-
quirements. They make an important comment on the arbitrary nature of some
of these distinctions.
The information obtained by assessing a program's ability, or
inability, to meet prestated objectives can be useful not only
for pragmatic reasons but also for generating new knowledge
about the disease entity being treated. (Schulberg, et aI., 1969,p.6)
To summarize to this point: there seems to be some basic distinction
being made among three levels of endeavor. First, there is something called
basic research, be it medical, sociological, or psychological, which examines
questions of knowledge which are not tied directly to the operations of any
human services or social action program according to scientific, experimental
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methodologies. Second,. there is something which we will call evaluation
research which meets the IESS, Suchman, and APHA definitions of using
experimental research methodology to assess the effectiveness of a program
in meeting stated goals or objectives. The IESS definition is the only
one of these which also requires evaluation research to consciously look
for unanticipated effects. Third, there is what we will call program
evaluation, which focuses on program change as the basis of evaluation
research. This administrative feedback mechanism is explicit in the defi-
nition of Wholey et al., in the steps which Schulberg et al. tie to the
APHA definition, and in the more narrow distinction drawn by two evaluators
of the OEO Neighborhood Health Centers:
While program evaluation draws on the technology of research,
it is clearly distinguished from research by its relevance to'
annual policy, legislative and budgetary concerns,. and to
program planning. (Sparer and Johnson, 1970, p. 4)
One can push the distinctions between these categories only so far.
Qualitatively there is an obvious difference in level of analysis and purpose
between an academic research study on the effects of a new drug for renal
disease involving 15 elderly patients, and an HEW study comparing rates of
infant mortality and levels of infant health among all the projects of a
federal Maternal and Infant Care program, due for completion in time for
annual budget review procedures. But both studies influence both our store
of knowledge and the eventual path of social action programs. Succinctly
put, the critical characteristic of both evaluation research and program
evaluations "is that decisions as to resource allocation or program change
are likely to hinge on [their] outcomes." (Edgerton, 1971, p. 94)
Although, since the "unanticipated" results must be anticipated in design-
ing the methodology, this distinction may be rather arbitrary and reflect
only a priority ranking of the importance of expected effects or of those
of greatest policy interest.
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Distinctions between evaluation research and program evaluation
stem mainly from the background and professional positions of the eval-
uators, not from the nature of the evaluation itself. The term "program
evaluation" seems to be used more frequently by those in positions of ad-
ministering or studying a variety of programs aimed at the same problems
(e.g., federal bureaucrats, mental health or public health department
administrators, or academic researchers interested in a field of social
intervention, such as maternal and infant care, community mental health
or health education). In the remainder of the paper, we shall use evalua-
tion research and program evaluation interchangeably, unless otherwise
noted in reference to the terminology of a specific author.
Evaluation, Value Judgments and the Scientific Method
All of the definitions and methodologies discussed above refer to or
implicitly suggest the importance of the scientific method (i.e. experimental
design) in the conduct of evaluation. They reflect one of the origins of
evaluation, in social science research methodology. Viewed in this way,
evaluation of human service programs is the culmination of. a slow extension
of experimental methods from physicial science to biological science to
economics, psychology, and to the other social sciences (sociology, political
science, and planning). It reflects a growing competence and confidence
in understanding reality by explicitly testing hypotheses and observing ,out-
comes in complex social situations as well as in refined, highly controlled
laboratory settings.
Evaluation, however, can also be viewed as part of the most recent
paradigm of organizatiolhal and decision-making theory. This history also
involves many of the disciplines mentioned above, but did not originate
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entirely in the "hard" sciences. Thus it has never placed primary emphasis
on scientific or experimental methods, but rather has sought a wide variety
of explanatory modes to analyze how social organizations begin, define
goals, operate, change, and make decisions. It emphasizes interpersonal
relations as much as it does game theory and computerized decision-making
trees. From this perspective, there are a conceptually completely differ-
ent set of definitions of evaluation. It is the set which Suchman terms
evaluation, "a general social process of making judgments of worth regard-
less of the basis for such judgments." (Suchman, 1969) Similarly, a Study
Committee on Educational Evaluation defined evaluation as "the process of
delineating, obtaining, and providing useful information for judging decision
alternatives." (Stufflebeam et al., 1971, p. 40) In their discussion, which
we shall examine in greater detail below, they make clear that this defini-
tion deliberately extends the parameters of "useful information" beyond the
usual research methodologies, measurement criteria, and comparisons of
performance with stated objectives.
The two sets of definitions suggest a crucial qualitative distinction
directly related to a conception of the dichotomy between social value or
humanitarian grounds of argument and scientifically rational ones. It is
not trivial that some evaluators define evaluation research as requiring
a rigorous methodology, and then note a residual category, suggestively
untrustworthy ("regardless of the basis"), while others define evaluation
in a broad, qualitative way with scientific methodology evaluation being
a sub-category. These latter definitions recognize explicitly that
evaluation (in any formulation) "ultimately becomes judgment, i.e. the
opinion of the person with the right to decide." (Weckworth, 1969, p. 12)
The dictionary definition of evaluation is "to determine or fix a value of"
I
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or "to examine and judge". there are many ways in which this power can
be exercised: by deciding which social activities will be evaluated, by
setting the ground rules for the evaluation (who will be interviewed or
observed, whose records studied), by determining the methods of evaluation
and the measures of objectives to be used, -and by having power over dis-
semination and utilization of the findings.
In -attempts to reconcile the methodologic demands of scientific
evaluation .research with the realities of political decision-making, at
least two approaches seem common. One adds a concern with administrative
constraints onto the evaluator's work plan; the other shifts the basic
parameters of evaluation away from its traditional goal-oriented thinking.
The first augments the previous definitions of good evaluation, the second
changes them significantly. A discussion of each follows.
Evaluation and the Power to Decide
Virtually all social policy evaluators who have done any real-life
evaluations discuss the problem of implementing the policy recommendations
of completed evaluations or indeed of achieving enough administrative trust
to do well-designed and thorough evaluations. (c.f. the introductions in
Caro, 1971, and Schulberg, Sheldon & Baker, 1969; and Rossi & Williams,
1972 (Chap. I) for excellent summaries of the usual problems and references
to appropriate readings). From the viewpoint of both program administrators
and proponents of specific social reforms, the problem is that there is
"political vulnerability from knowing outcomes." (Campbell, 1969, in Caro,
1971, p. 234) In a direct and personal sense, administrators feel threaten-
ed by the possibility of negative or even no-effect findings. This fear
is realistic given that most research designs can demonstrate lack of
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correlations but cannot prove causal relationships. And methodologies,
whether they reveal positive or negative results, are always open to attack
by a program's critics. (E.g., the furor raised in OEO and elsewhere
by the Westinghouse-Ohio State study of Head Start; c.f. Williams & Evans,
1969; Campbell & Erlebacher, 1970) Evaluation techniques often succeed
only in stripping the scientific facade off programs to reveal the value
conflicts beneath, value conflicts which evaluation itself cannot resolve.
In a society which likes to pretend that it is modern, scientific, and
one big happy consensual family, these facades of goals and explanations
of intended effects are often vital in permitting progress past (or at
least around) value log jams. While weepound scientific rationalism
and rules of evidence and proof, we know we can't really wait to act on
such bases. When confronted with the possibility of evaluation studies
which take scientific rigor seriously and are quite content to measure
only those variables capable of quantification, almost everyone but the
Office of Management and Budget retreats a little.
The methodological implications of this over-rationality will be
discussed later. Here we want to illustrate some of the ways proposed
to systematically consider "the consequences of the evaluation and how
these will or should affect the evaluation." (Harper & Babigan, 1971,
p. 151)
Harper and Babigan (1971) propose that "the range of possible recom-
mendations, that is, those which have some chance of being implemented,
should be arrayed before the evaluation and should, in fact, influence
the evaluation." (p. 152) While this reeks of "fudging the results" to
a strict researcher, it seems both plausible and necessary in policy-
oriented work. As the authors illustrate, finding out beforehand that
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there are no funds to substantially increase a program even if it is work-
ing or that the program will not be defunded no matter what because the
governor's sister suffers from the disease it treats means that the
evaluator can focus his design on gathering.information on the most
successful subparts of the program in order to accomplish more with the
same money or on how to restructure the program to make it more responsive
without destroying it. This certainly doesn't solve any dilemmas for the
evaluator if he in fact finds no evidence of impact, but at least he won't
waste all his energy beating dead issues.
This approach may sound unnecessarily defeatist until one reads enough
sad tales of evaluators who never gained access to key people or records
in a program because the administrator wouldn't let them, of studies which
never got finished, and even worse of the final studies which were never
read by anyone except the next generation of planners or evaluators.
Marris and Rein's Dilemmas of Social Reform (1969) provides an excellent
insightful discussion of some of these problems in the community action
programs of the 60's. (See also Weiss & Rein, 1969; and Section V.,
"Implementing Research Findings", passimin Schulberg, Sheldon & Baker, 1969)
Putting the same issue in a more positive light, Rossi (Chap. 2 in
Rossi & Williams, 1972) argues strongly that evaluators have an obligation
to "pay some attention" to the outcomes of their activities. He calls this
duty a. "commitment to evaluation".
By commitment to evaluation is meant that it should be worked
out in advance what are the policy changes that will flow from
each of the set of possible findings...Commitment does not
necessarily mean that evaluation research should take the place
of the traditional decision-making process, but it does mean
that at least the parties involved will have thought through
in advance how they might respond under various likely contin-
gencies. (Rossi, in Rossi & Williams, 1972, p. 45)
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Freeman and Sherwood (1965) note that demands for evaluation of
major social programs are frequently only a formality and studies initiated
are often left undone.
As a consequence, adequately conceived efforts have in fact
been undertaken rarely and the sheer infrequency of completed
investigation is a major reason for the minimal impact of
evaluation research on social policy. Certainly it is difficult
to point to many instances in which programs actually have been
modified, expanded or terminated because of evaluation findings.
(In Schulberg, et al., p.74)
Their definition of evaluation cited in the Introduction stresses that its
link to social policy is in providing a basis for "the efficient allocation
of financial and human resources in the solution of social problems."
(Ibid, p.80) One important parameter-of that allocation process is
knowledge of acceptable outer bounds for the choices.
Finally, a study committee on evaluation has noted that one consequence
of the lack of an adequate theory of evaluation is a concomitant lack of:
any specification of the kind of evaluative information which
could be most useful. Since the amount and kind of information
which could be collected is infinitely large, this lack can be
crucial. (Stufflebeam et al., 1971, p.8)
A closer, more discriminating consideration of possible evaluation
findings and implementations, and the information most useful for each
is perhaps the most reasonable response to the impossibility of achiev-
ing complete knowledge or apolitical policy-making.
Systems vs. Goal-Attainment Evaluation
Some critics of typical evaluation research feel that the addition
of techniques for dealing with feedback into policy and with adminis-
trative hostility is not the best answer to the evident limitations of
evaluation. They believe that there is a more fundamental reason why
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evaluation does not "work" very often. Evaluation designs which direct
.their attention solely to the comparison of performance with stated
objectives have, no matter how complex and sensitive the process, a
false conception of how programs work.
The alternative usually proposed is a systems orientation to replace
the typical goal-attainment one. Some generally excellent analysts of
evaluation, such as Suchman (1969), never even mention systems evalua-
tion. The fullest comparison of the two approaches I found was Schulberg,
Sheldon and Baker (1969). All of the definitions presented so far are
variations on the goal-attainment model. In contrast, proponents of a
systems model, of which Amitai Etzioni is the foremost, feel that the
starting point for evaluation should not be a specific goal or objec-
tive, "but rather a working model of the social unit which is capable
of achieving a goal". (Etzioni, 1960, in Schulberg, et al., 1969,
p. 10) Since real life systems must devote resources to functions
other than goal-attainment, this framework enables one to ask the basic
question:
"How close does the organization's allocation of resources
approach an optimum distribution?" (Ibid.)
In other words, needs and functions such as service and custodial
activities need to be balanced against goal-achievement activities.
In a manner analogous to economic resource allocation models, there
may be a "diminishing return on investment" of focusing too much
'effort on a single organizational goal. Intuitively this reasoning
is obvious; but it is not always recognized in practice that evaluating
-only one aspect of performance will not provide answers as to whether
that performance is optimal for. that organization, or for the country.
36
Systems models of evaluation emphasize the multipurpose nature of health
care institutions or programs and the organizational context both of'
service delivery and of evaluation. This later consideration is
basically the same as the issues of implementation and feedback raised
in the last section.
Among other reasons, Etzioni (1960) gives the two following
explanations of why the goal model may not be the best frame for
judging effectiveness of social programs. First:
It compares the ideal with the real, as a result of which
most levels of performance look alike - quite low. (In
Schulberg, et al, 1969, p. 103)
This consideration is important both because research methodology
is not very good at measuring and verifying small changes in outcomes
and because, as people like Dubos (1959) have shown, the days of major
dramatic breakthroughs in health due to single program efforts may be
gone. The predominance of chronic diseases and mental illness over
infectious, acute diseases, the universal leveling off of the infant
mortality curves at a residual rate in all advanced countries, and
the increasing problems with iatrogenic illnesses all lend support
to the notion that only trivial objectives may show great performance
outcomes. In discussing the obligation of evaluators to be aware of
the impact of their studies, Rossi has noted:
It is part of our responsibility as social scientists and
as researchers to make everyone aware that in this period
even the best of social action programs are not likely to
produce spectacular results. The age of miracles is long
over. New programs can be expected when they are success-
Program impact evaluations which compare the success of several projects
in the same program may be able to do this if the projects are adminis-
tratively and contextually similar.
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ful to be only somewhat better than existing programs. Any
new program is not, likely to produce spectacular changes,
and a good proportion are likely to fail to produce any
detectable changes. (Rossi, in Rossi & Williams, 1972,
p. 45)
Second, Etzioni warns against too great an emphasis on prestated
goals, especially public ones:
Public goals fail to be realized not because of poor planning,
unancicipated consequences, or hostile environment. They are
not meant to be realized. (Ibid, emphasis in original)
Being used less frequently in social program evaluations, method-
ologies applicable to the systems model are less agreed upon. Basically
they are those which are able to handle sets variables, all of which
are dependent and reciprocal, in true feedback systems constructs.
Techniques .such as multivariate analysis and path analysis are
appropriate. There are problems, however, both with the complex,
expensive and time-consuming nature of these techniques and with the
limits of such *an ambitious approach to knowledge.
In contrast to the goal-attainment model which simply requires
the researcher specify the particular organizational goal which
he wishes to study, the systems model requires the evaluator to
determine what he considers a highly effective allocation of
means and then to study the organization's degree of success in
achieving this optimal distribution. (Schulberg, Sheldon & Baker,
1969, p. 11)
I am of divided mind about the importance of systems evaluation.
On the one hand, from a limited knowledge of organizational theory and
its applications, I do.not have the impression that it is really more
useful for making policy decisions (as opposed to providing an aware-
ness of the complex context of those decisions) than more limited
evaluations which test specific service/outcome linkages. Too much
attention to the many other functions of organizations and to the
enormous homeostatic and inertial tendencies they possess may bias
*the evaluator too early as to the impossibility of change. Further-
more, without clear prior knowledge about those organizational patterns
accessible to change, the evaluator may still be faced with interest-
ing and well-documented recommendations about non-policy variables.
On the other hand, systems evaluation designs which can accommodate
multi-objective programs and their contextual relationships may be
particularly appropriate for free-standing, innovative programs where
the whole process proposed is part of the rationale of the venture.
For example, neighborhood health centers, maternal and infant care
projects, freely accessible abortion services, or even prepaid group
practice are qualitatively different from redesigned emergency rooms,
introduction of a new screening procedure for diabetes, or expanded
availability of food stamps as health policy decisions. The latter
are additions to or incremental changes in existing programs and
systems of health and nutrition services while the former are in
effect new systems and approaches to health care. Because of the
overlap between these categories neither model of evaluation should
be used exclusively, but the pay-off from the additional effort required
for systems evaluation should be far greater for the former programs.
The only systems-model study of a current major federal health program
It would'seem axiomati c that those values underlying any so-called "value-
f,ree" theory of social functioning reveal the unexamined assumptions of
that theory. It is no accident that Parsonian structural-functional
analysis is not a revolutionary mode of analysis or that traditional
micro-economic theory views conglomerates and the military-industrial
complex as aberrations of the capitalist system, while Marxist or
political economic analysis begin with their inevitability. Thus it
is worthy of comment that Etzioni feels obliged to argue rather defens-
ively why his model is not inherently conservative. (In Schulberg, 1969)
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I am aware of is the Geomet evaluation of Neighborhood Health Centers
(Geomet, 1971) which not only examines the interactions between project
structure and process and outcome measures but also makes a serious
attempt to develop a conceptual framework for evaluating the effects
of NHC's on poverty, one of the "public goals" of the programs.
Evaluation and Policy Analysis
To complete this anthology of definitions, policy analysis should be
differentiated from evaluation research. As noted in the Introduction,
this distinction is clearest at the federal level. Walter Williams, one
of the best known writers on the application of social policy evaluation
to government programs, has defined policy analysis as
a policy-oriented approach, method, and collection of techniques
of synthesizing information including the results of research:
(a) to specify alternative policy and program choices and pre-
ferred alternatives in comparable, predicted qualitative and
quantitative cost/benefit type terms as a format for decision
making; (b) to assess organizational goals in terms of value
inputs and to specify the requisite output criteria for organ-
izational goals as a basis of goal determination and measure-
ment of outcome performance; and (c) to determine needed addi-
tional information in support of policy analysis as a guide for
future decisions concerning analytical and research activities.
(Williams, 1971, pp. 12-13)
Williams distinguishes evaluation research (meaning outcome evalua-
tion and field experiments) by its direct information-gathering, rather
than -utilizing, function. The reason for the. careful distinction is
to highlight the fact that "the results of research are an input to
analysis that may limit severely its successful application." (Williams,
in Rossi & Williams, 1972, p. 4) Analysts can only stretch incomplete
socio-economic data, cost estimates, and program alternatives so far
before policy analysis becomes only a pretense. In the years since the
initial interest in PPBS and other scientifically rational policy
j
analysis tools in social policy, optimism in their utility and power
has not proved realistic. Williams offers the following explanation:
As time passed it became clear that the critical missing
element was research treating specifically issues of program
conceptualization, design, operation and measurement. In
short, the central analyst in social agencies could not show
to policy makers evaluative research results indicating that
a current program worked or that an alternative to that pro-
gram was likely to work better. (Williams, in Rossi & Williams,
1972, p. 5)
The remainder of this chapter and all of the next will be devoted
to an analysis of how far evaluation can and cannot be expected to go
in providing such results. I will not attempt to analyze policy analysis
or cost-benefit analysis in similar detail, but there are other possible
explanations for the indifferent success of policy analysis than the
inadequacies of evaluation research. Williams' definition (a typical
one, by the way) in almost a classical- example of absolute faith in
rationality and plannerly competence to control environments. Not even
by implication are the immense moral and value judgments inherent in
the definition acknowledged. Whose "preferred" alternatives? Whose
"value inputs"? As if values were something one injected at precise
moments and in exact amounts in the production process of policy. How
do qualitative matters get translated into "cost benefit type terms"?
Perhaps it is unfair to fault an argument on the basis of the quality
of the language in which it is couched, but Williams' definition is both
inelegant and lacking in substance under close examination. The
simplistic definition "compare performance with stated objectives"
suggests more. of what both the process and product of evaluation might
be than this elaborate, but contentless formulation.
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Conclusion
I have presented what seem to me the major definitions of evaluation
research and evaluation along with some responses to the limitations of
those definitions. Some major issues remain unresolved:
1) The extent to which the validity of "evaluation" is
dependent on or shaped by social science research
methodology;
2) The emphasis which evaluation places on goal-achievement
as a criterion for program effectiveness, the core con-
cern of all the definitions;
3) The possibility of making the linkages between evaluation
and policy part of evaluation design; and
4) The degree to which evaluation is both acknowledged to be
and designed as an exercise of human judgment (i.e. value-
laden, ethical, or indeed amoral) on the course of social
policy.
I will attempt to pay particular attention in the pages to follow
to the difference between goal-oriented and .systems models of evalua-
tion, since this seems the most concrete and programmatically signifi-
cant distinction drawn in the definitions. However, because of the
preponderance of goal-attainment models in both theory and practice,
most of my examples have had to be drawn from that school. Hence, a
synopsis of the assumptions implicit in the simple core definition of
evaluation-"Compare accomplishments with stated objectives"-may be useful
here. This analysis is indebted to that of Weckworth (1969) in which he
notes five implicit assumptions beneath the definition:
1. objectives are stated
2. in measurable terms;
3. accomplishments are demonstrable
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4. in the same measurable terms as the objectives;
5. one knows what "compare" means, i.e., what is to be done
on the basis of the findings.
A quick look at the deficiencies of these assumptions will lay the
groundwork for the presentation to follow.
1) Lack of clear and/or consistent objectives in operating health
programs and in new federal social legislation is the rule rather than
the exception. Even if legislative intent is clear and internally
consistent (an extremely difficult condition for broad-aim social
programs), such intent is expressed in terms of long-term goals instead
of specific, measurable objectives. There is also the problem of sort-
ing out those public goals not meant to be accomplished.
2) Two difficulties exist in measurement: 1) interrelated objectives
often conflict in such a way that achievement- of one results in diminua-
tion of progress toward the other; and 2) methods adequate to measure
health status and social value objectives are not always ava.ilable.
3) The complexity, tediousness, or cost of appropriate measures
may make demonstration of national or large scale program accomplishments
counterproductive or impossible. See, for example, Sullivan's (1966)
discussion of the vast practical difficulties encountered in translating
some logically valid and reasonable measures of health status developed
at an experimental level into a universal health index capable of being
generated from data collected on a national basis.
4) What we can measure may not be translatable into progress toward
an objective. What we can usually measure is some aspect of health care
_and what we are usually concerned about is individual or population health
status. Discrete improvements in health care do not always translate
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simply and directly into improvements in health status either for the
individual or for population groups. In addition, there is a problem
of weighing the importance of measurable vs. unmeasurable objectives
or outcomes as critical overall program effectiveness.
5) Most importantly, what do any findings eventually obtained
mean? How do we move from program evaluation to decisions about
programs? For example, if a Maternal and Infant Care project does
not meet an objective of having all mothers seen by a specialist
before the third trimester of pregnancy, should it be penalized or
should it receive increased resources to extend its outreach activities?
If a neighborhood health center reports an increase in prevalence of
chronic disease, is this a good sign or a bad one? Health conditions
could be deteriorating; or people could be surviving longer and hence
becoming susceptible to degenerative diseases; or the project may have
developed the first accurate method of data collection and case counting
in the community. If programs are doing well, will more resources
increase effectiveness or will they lead to negative rates of return?
And to push the issue even further, could the resources be even more
productive in a non-health program? For example, even the most success-
ful lead poisoning detection and treatment program may not be as valuable
as a national housing policy or anti-lead air pollution laws.
In the next section, some of the preconditions which can either
stimulate or limit evaluation research will be explored.
Part 2.
The 'Infrastructure of Evaluation
There is a striking difference between the high quality and
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sophistication of the theoretical papers in this field
[health evaluation] and the lower quality research
emerging from actual studies of programs. Many of the
evaluations reported in the literature suffer, unfor-
tunately, from a variety of shortcomings which reflect
either lack of awareness of relevant conceptual and
methodological principles or an inability to apply them
properly. (Shulberg, Sheldon & Baker, 1969, p. 20)
Having established a broad concept of what evaluation can mean,
I begin consideration of the frameworks within which evaluation studies
are or could be designed. The details of those frameworks and of the
specific content of those studies in health care will be the subject
of the next chapter. But prior to any individual design are a group
of conditions. which may account for the frequent failure of practice
so accurately depicted by Schulberg, Sheldon & Baker.
One of the most common shortcomings is insufficient attention to
the assumptions underlying evaluation designs and the demands which
those assumptions place on the context in which evaluation can be
successfully carried out. We have already examined definitional
assumptions as to the value-free or value-laden nature 'of evaluation
and of the goal-attainment or systems model of the programs under study.
In this section I want to examine a set of contextual assumptions.
In development economics, the term "infrastructure" is often used to
denote those underlying conditions, not part of the economic model
itself, which enable the process of modernization and industrialization
to take place. The infrastructure (also called social overhead capital)
includes such things as power sources and water supplies (public utilities),
transportation, communications systems, and education. Likewise, there
is an infrastructure of evaluation, a set of pre-existing conditions
and social and technical capacities which permit evaluation studies to
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"take-off" into effective policy tools.
The following five elements, I would argue, are the prerequisites
for effective evaluation (be it "evaluation", "evaluation research",
"program evaluation", goal-oriented, or systems-oriented):
--definition of health
--health status index or indicators
-- determination of health needs
--professional standards of care
--facilitating social/economic/political climate
There are two dimensions, of equal weight, to each of these elements:
a cultural one and a technological one. By cultural we mean that health,
health needs, patterns of care, notions of medical practice, and accepted
methods of evaluation are all culturally-derived values; their use as
independent variables, program objectives, or scientific techniques
cannot escape being a value-laden and culture-bound process. By tech-
nological, we mean the knowledge and capacity of the system to generate
data in quantifiable or evaluative form--in other words to make the
cultural infrastructure accessible to the methods of evaluation research.
These dimensions are interrelated; technology is itself a part of
the cultural web. But one or the other may dominate in a certain
situation. Some examples may help to clarify this interdependence.
--Advances in health care and social conditions have caused
morbidity to replace crude mortality as a preferred index
of health status, either of an individual or the country.
Technical difficulties in operationally defining morbidity
(which is conceptually not the clear entity that death is)
have slowed development of equally useful new national
health index measures. In this case there is no cultural
barrier to such development, only a technological and
conceptual one. (c.f. HEW, Towards a Social Report, 1969)
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--Attempts to implement water fluoridation, as a powerful
dental health measure to reduce cavities in children's
teeth, have been frequently thwarted because the socio-
political system in some communities has not reached a
facilitating consensus on the distinction between public
health/public welfare and Communist plots/personal liberty.
In this case, the technologies both to implement the program
and to develop extremely clear and convincing evaluations
exists, but the cultural environment is not always ready
to accept them.
--According to research methodology, the best evaluations
should be controlled experiments or quasi-experiments in
design. However, ethical prohibitions against deliberately
withholding a technique or drug of known or highly probable
efficacy in order to create the necessary control group
make such designs highly political and easily attacked.
Similarly, the political process into which evaluation
feeds may not have the patience to wait the years often
required to do a thorough evaluation. In these cases,
two subcultures (political and research) are at odds.
Let us look now at each element of infrastructure in detail and
attempt to analyze their cultural and technical components.
Definition of Health
The World Health Organization definition is most frequently cited
in the current literature and legislative debates:
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social
well being and not merely the absence of disease and
illness.
This definition is probably without serious opposition anywhere, but
because of its universality, it is also not operational. It represents
only a goal for health efforts.
The importance of the definition is that it provides a basic ethical
base upon which to justify efforts to improve health. As one commentator
on evaluation and community mental health puts it, "We begin with the
value that it is good to have good mental health." (Edgerton, 1971,
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p. 92) One can understand the rhetoric of "a right to health care"
as an elliptical expression of belief that health is an inextricable,
although variable, part of "life", which we regard as a fundamental
political right. Societies in which either life itself were not highly
valued, or in which health were overwhelmingly bad or beyond human inter-
vention, might not have basic definitions of health which would in any
way lend themselves to social action, or to rational evaluation (e.g.,
if health were entirely a supernatural gift or curse). This definition,
however, implicitly reflects belief in progress, in amelioration of
social ills, indeed in social utopias.
That is why we believe this is a question for cultural anthropologists
and philosophers. For our purposes, we need only establish that in
general our society values health and, as we become more affluent and
medically competent, that the definition of health is -extended to mean
more than freedom from death, pestilence and starvation.
Health Status Index or Indicators
Health status indices and indicators are an attempt to operationally
define and measure health. "At present, there are no practical quantita-
tive measures of health despite numerous attempts to develop such a
measure." (Thorner, 1971, p. 526) Sullivan (1966) presents an excellent
review of past and present attempts at health status indices. There is
quite a bit of work being done now on more sophisticated morbidity-based
indicators and indices, utilizing such formulations as disability continua,
activity-restriction-days, and function. (c.f. Moriyama, 1968; Fanshel and
Bush, 1970; Shapiro, 1967; de Geyndt, 1970) None of these have been
-- . i
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widely utilized; some of the problems they cause in policy-oriented
evaluation are discussed later in connection with outcome evaluations.
Underlying concern with the development of these indicators is
the belief that social and environmental conditions in some way inter-
vene in the health status and process of the individual. One thing on
which all writers in this non-paradigmatic field agree is that such
linkages, while intuitively appealing, are not supported by much hard
data. We know little either about how the environment causes or
effects disease nor how health services influence health status.
Probably no more fundamental information would facilitate
the.conduct of end-result studies than knowledge of the
natural history of disease, the physical, social and
economic consequences of disease du'ring well-defined
intervals following onset, and the role of preventive
and therapeutic medical care in altering the course of
disease. (Shapiro, 1967, p. 21)
It is my opinion that an overemphasis has been placed in
the past on the linkage between medical services and
health. Although many of these services contribute
directly to health, in some cases use of the most accepted
medical knowledge and techniques yield negative results.
(Bailey, 1970, p. 37)
The absence of solid evidence of the existence, direction, and
extent of the causal relationships between health care and the health
either of individuals or of communities has a special significance
for evaluation attempts in the public domain. Too often, individual
evaluation projects are saddled with the burden of developing such
evidence if they are expected to document outcomes related to inputs
in some program-effectiveness study. Unnecessarily negative or
ambiguous results are encouraged by the conservatism of techniques
of evaluation research stressing statistical significance and the
rejection of null hypotheses, an approach which may be "inappropriate
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in the formulation of decision criteria in evaluative research...
regarding innovative programs." (Caro, 1971, p. 24) Sparer and
Johnson have nicely summarized the issue in their evaluation of
OEO neighborhood health centers.
...While we can be hopeful that health status will be
improved because of increased use of health services,
...we should prudently resist the temptation to
"evaluate" program success by [this measure].
These are research questions basic to the whole
field of medical care for which basic studies have
yet to be initiated on a community-wide scale and
for which analytic methods or models are not available.
(Sparer and Johnson, 1971, p.3)
Their response to this problem is to assume the linkage until proven
otherwise, based on conventional wisdom:
In the absence of research data which relates medical
care inputs to health or family functioning outcomes a
program assumption can be made consistent with current
social values, and indeed the values expressed by
practitioners of public health, medical care, and*
social services. (Sparer and Johnson, 1971, p.4)
In much the same way that Thorner rather abruptly assumes the existence
of a model function of health:
In concept, most health and medical care programs are
predicated on the assumption that the level of health
is related to the level of effort expended in providing
health services, although the exact nature and strength
of this relationship are usually poorly established.
It is possible to express the relationship using symbolic
language in the following simplified model.
H= f(H s
That is, health (H) is a function (f) of the effort
expended on health services (H s). (Thorner, 1971,
p. 525)
In terms of the "goal-attainment" model defined earlier, this is
a shift from ultimate (accomplishment) objectives, such as reducing
-morbidity, to intermediate (technique) ones in which cause and effect
50
are not at issue. Schulberg, et al. (1969) agree that this could
require prior basic studies demonstrating the linkage of inter-
mediate to ultimate objectives (the studies referred to above by
Sparer and Johnson), but that in reality, ."most health programs
could never be undertaken if assumptions were not made about the
validity of intermediate objectives and,...in the absence of facts,
the public expects health professionals to use expert opinion."
(Schulberg, Sheldon and Baker, 1969, p. 7)
Such a shift from an attempt to measure health to an attempt
to measure effectiveness in terms of pre-existing proxy indicators
can be seen in this description of the evaluation design for
Children and Youth projects.
We believe that health is ultimately only a judgment of
whoever has the right to decide. And our society has vested
that right to decide in a select group of professional
disciplines. Therefore, we wanted data to document what
the outcomes or progress toward outcome of health were--
as the judges said it was. Pragmatically, even the
totality of all hard data measures of health and health
service delivery cannot equal the summary judgment of
the professional with the right to decide. (Weckworth,
1971, p. 87)
Another type of response to the dilemma of developing practical
yet meaningful indicators of health is a special use of the "systems"
model (Schulberg, et al., 1969; Etzioni, 1960) For example, de Geyndt
(1970) argues that the heailth outcome approach is handicapped since
non-medical variables can affect outcome in uncertain ratios with the
medical ones usually measured. He then argues that "in order to over-
come this methodological roadblock, a broader framework for the
assessment of quality of care should be adopted." (de Geyndt, 1970,
p. 33) Attention should be paid to macro-level target population or
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community impact studies, in order to open up evaluation to areas
not even considered when the focus is on individual micro-level
analysis. This means not only evaluation which encompasses more
of the relevant aspects of program outcome; it also means that
when measures of individual health status may be either impossible
to derive or impractical to think of performing (e.g., physical
examination), probabilistic, population measures may be workable
and valuable. Infant mortality rates are not used to assess the
health of the deceased infants but as measures of the general
health of the population group from which they came. Recent work
in epidemiology has moved toward extension of those methods to
chronic diseases, morbidity conditioris, etc.
De Geyndt is still operating within the goal-attainment model,
but proposes expanding indicators or intermediate goals to cover
more of the systematic effects of health care. The benefit is that
methodological designs which analyze many variables i.n some multi-
variate, factor analysis, or path analysis way may both capture more
of what people intuitively mean when they talk of "good health" and
also may demonstrate the interrelated dynamics of these variables.
The big drawback to the technique is that we can measure "community
health", "family functioning", "stress", "emotional health", "healthy
environment" only through the same kinds of intermediate objectives
that we do health--and we must also assume the linkages.
A more complex and authentic "systems" model avoids or rather
transcends this particular difficulty since it can study the processes
of goal-selection and objective-definition as social processes, with
differential results in the allocation of resources and social policy.
I'
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One could show, for example, that certain types of health status
indicators or intermediate objectives were associated with politically
popular, comprehensive, or radical programs while others were not.
A final type of response to the dilemma of inadequate indices is
predicated on operational directedness and focuses the value assumptions
(i.e. between health and health care), on areas of greatest apparent
need. It is exemplified by the approach of a federal program analysis
group on child health in the mid-60's:
There is no universal index of good or bad health among
children. Therefore, in looking at the problem of
assuring needed health care, we necessarily primarily
concern ourselves with some particular health problems
which are highly prevalent, which are highly adverse,
and which can be mitigated or even avoided given proper
health care. (Wholey, undated, p. 11.3)
This response is significant for several reasons. First, it recognizes
the gross inequity inherent in any approach which, given the current
quantity and quality of evaluation studies, advocates program
decisions based solely or even primarily on the evidence of such
studies. Second, it interjects the intermediate level of professional
judgments and values into health care policy explicitly: it utilizes
what evaluation research data are available, synthesizes and enlarges
them into a universe of health programs, and then selects targets on
the basis of need and potential for impact. It has a great potential
for misuse, from influence by too narrow definitions of problems or
solutions, and from the capriciousness of the bureaucratic and
legislative decision-making processes. In particular, it would seem
to provide no mechanism to systematically consider disguised or
undetected health needs, especially of the disadvantaged or powerless
groups.
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However, we find it a valuable tool for planning child health
programs not only because, as will be discussed below, some of the
accountability priorities and needs in child health are better
defined than most, but also because it introduces the notion of
risk or uneven need. That is, it recognizes the hard reality that
not even in America are all--or nearly all--people in the enviable
position of requiring assessment only by increasingly sophisticated
and enlarged measures of positive health. As Sullivan has stated,
For large populations as they exist today, however,
disease, illness, and death are still ever-present
problems. The occurance of these events is a more
compelling guide for allocation of resources than
variations in positive health. (Sullivan, 1966,
p. 7)
Freeman and Sherwood (1965, p. 85) use the term "accountability"
(as one of three requirements for evaluation research in large-
scale intervention programs) in a similar way to mean that one
should look for evidence that an important target population (by
nature of its size or intensity of need) exists and that the program
is in fact implemented and implemented for that group.
Most program evaluation studies, then, will make some kind of
assumptions about health which justify the proclaimed value of
health services and will then choose intermediate objectives such
as morbidity levels, function scales, or meeting needs by which
to measure effectiveness.
Determining Health Needs
If we accept in general the value of health services, we next
need to know the universe of needs to assess how many services we
need and whether services are being targeted properly. One analysis
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of the health needs of children has identified four needs currently
recognized in federal programs: (Minnesota Systems Research, Inc.,
1972)
---deficits in health status
---deficits in health facilities and manpower
---specific diseases and health condition needs (e.g.,
Crippled Children programs, Maternal and Infant Care
program, Medicaid for the blind and disabled)
---access to services (i.e. income or other barriers to
care leading to deficits or potential deficits)
Need is a highly value-laden concept. It is one aspect of the
judgmental nature of evaluation and cannot be said to exist in any
a priori or apolitical/acultural sense. To achieve some uniformity
of dimensions, the group mentioned above used proxy indicators for
need which represent a set of risk factors which "are associated in
a probability sense with the presence of health problems:"
(1) selected demographic measures,
(2) measures of poverty,
(3) infant mortality,
(4) immunization levels,
(5) selected disease conditions, and
(6) nutritional indicators.
The processes by which needs are selected as important ones,
processes reflecting underlying assumptions about health, are rarely
transparent or explicit. For example, note the abrupt opening of the
Maternal and Child Health Care Program Analysis (HEW, 1966) laying the
groundwork for the cost-effectiveness analysis to follow.
This chapter introduces the notion of a "health-depressed"
area, proposes objectives, and reviews national needs in
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child health... Infant mortality has long been used as
the best single indicator of the health status of the
community. Generally speaking, infant mortality rates
are highest in areas characterized by low incomes and
poor housing. Health-depressed areas could probably
be best defined in terms of the variables infant
mortality rate, proportion of families who are in
poverty, and proportion of housing that is substandard.
For simplicity, we here define a health-depressed area
as an area within which the infant mortality rate is
high. (emphasis in original) HEW, Maternal and Child
Health Programs, 1966, p. II.1)
Not only have the authors foregone the opportunity to analyze
even some limited interactions among health, health care and socio-
economic variables by eliminating the poverty and housing determinants
as soon as they introduced them, but they also offer no evidence (or
even argument) why infant mortality rates alone will be sensitive
enough to target the programs they later propose in the most "account-
able" (in Freeman and Sherwood's sense) fashion possible.
The six factors proposed by the Minnesota Systems group reflect
a fuller picture of community or child health status. They do not,
however, reflect rising concern with the health delivery system and
the interface between the individual and this system. To correct
this, we can add two interrelated proxy measures of the need for
comprehensive care, what Weckworth has termed the "simultaneous
dimensions" of
(7) continuity in the flow of services, and
(8) completeness in the spectrum of services. (Weckworth, 1971,
p. 80)
And finally, to reflect growing awareness of the interaction of
patients' psycho-social needs with their health needs, we can add a
measure of
I
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(9) patient satisfaction (this indicator is suggested
by de Geyndt, 1970, p. 31).
With the exception of infant mortality, which is, as mentioned,
the primary determinant of need on a community-wide basis, the nine
indicators listed are in rough order of the universality of their
cultural and political acceptance as legitimate indicators of need.
Likewise, the technical precision and validity of .specific measures
associated with these indicators are in rough descending order.
The first five are relatively sound, given general difficulties
with morbidity indices (although, since children are generally the
healthiest and least disabled portion of the population, even gross
measures of reduced function or disability may have a greater than
normal power of discrimination). Nutrition indicators are infre-
quently used, both because inexpensive, quick methods of wide-scale
testing are neither available nor reliable and also because the
linkages between such findings (based on clinical examinations,
laboratory tests, food intake observations or food intake diaries)
and nutritional status have not been investigated with any great
precision at the level of subclinical malnutrition. The last three
indicators are dependent for their significance on some societal
or professional belief in the efficacy of health services and of
certain delivery modes. They are receiving increasing attention
from health policy analysts and evaluators, and if developed should
prove a great step forward in expanding the value and completeness
of evaluation studies.
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Professional Standards
The content of medical care, its quality control, and establish-
ment of the value of specific procedures or treatments are outside
the scope of this analysis. While we will not evaluate them directly,
professional standards, as reflected in the content of medical care,
can still be valuable as independent variables in comparing different
systems of care. For example,.such criteria as the number of Board-
certified physicians in a system, the percentage of women receiving
annual Pap smears, or rates of elective surgery such as appendectomies,
have been used to demonstrate clear differences in patterns of care
between prepaid group practice and usual private fee-for-service care,
with the underlying assumption being that having more of things which
are professionally defined as being "good things" is.an indication of
better quality of care and hence of better health status among users
(c.f. Donabedian, 1969).
Social/Political/Economic Climate
Health is not solely determined by use of medical services:
Health and well-being result not only from the use of
medical services but from the operation of many biological,
psychological, social and economic factors as well. Under
ordinary circumstances it is difficult to isolate the
effect of medical care from among the many interacting
factors that affect health. (Donabedian, 1969, p. 23)
In general, we have as little hard data on the causal relationships
between these factors and health as we do on the health services/
health linkage. In fact, the data are even rarer, since the strength
of our cultural belief in the supremacy of medical care for dealing
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with health problems has infrequently been seriously questioned and
has stiffled serious research in other directions. Only in the field
of public health have strong non-medical linkages occasionally been
shown; in fact it has been argued that virtually all of the improve-
ment in general health status over time has been due to improved
sanitation, water supplies, shelter, and general economic well-being.
This view, for example, is supported by the marginal evidence of
impact by many health service program changes.
In my opinion, changes in health or medical care programs,
except in some instances where a major technological or
organizational change is introduced, are unlikely to
produce effects on health which are easily measurable...
The effects of the other variables in the model [educational
level, economic level, physical environment, political
situation, and others] and measurement errors are usually
stronger or as strong as the effects produced by the change
in the health or medical care program, and the difficulty
of controlling these variables and errors may vitiate any
attempt to measure the program's effects, whatever method
is used. (Thorner, 1971, p. 529)
Rene Dubos has put this issue in historical perspective and
addressed it more eloquently than anyone else. It is worth quoting
at length from his book Mirage of Health to gain some perspective
on our emphasis on medical care and scientific knowledge in our
evaluations of effectiveness in improving our health and the health
of our children.
The most effective techniques to avoid disease came out
of the attempts to correct by social measures the injustices
and the ugliness brought about by industrialization... .This
achievement cannot be credited to the type of laboratory
science with which we are familiar today. Rather, it was
the expression of an attitude which is almost completely
foreign to the modern laboratory scientist. The nineteenth-
century reformers naively but firmly believed that, since
disease always accompanied the want, dirt, pollution, and
ugliness so common in the industrial world, health could
be restored simply by bringing back to the multitudes pure
air, pure water, pure food, and pleasant surroundings--the
qualities of life in direct contact with nature....
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In reality,...the monstrous specter of infection had
become but an enfeebled shadow of its former self by the
time serums, vaccines, and drugs became available to combat
microbes. Indeed, many of the most terrifying microbial
diseases--leprosy, plague, typhus, and the sweating sick-
ness, for example--had all but disappeared from Europe long
before the advent of the germ theory. Similarly, the general
state of nutrition began to improve and the size of children
in the labor classes to increase even before 1900 in most
of Europe and. North America. The change became noticeable long
before calories, balanced diets, and vitamins had become the
pride of nutrition experts, the obsession of mothers, and a
source of large revenues to the manufacturers of colored
packages for advertised food products....
Their [the humanitarian and social reformers of the 19th
century] romantic doctrine that nature is holy and healthful
was scientifically naive but proved highly effective in
dealing with the most important health problems of their
age. When the tide is receding from the beach it is easy
to have the illusion that one can empty the ocean by removing
water with a pail. The tide of infectious and nutritional
diseases was rapidly receding when the laboratory scientist
moved into action at the end of the past century.
The great increase in over-all expectancy of life during
the past hundred years in the Western world is properly
quoted as objective evidence of improvement in the general
health condition. It is often overlooked, however, that
this increase has been due not so much to better health in
the adult years of life as to the spectacular decrease in
infant mortality. The control of childhood diseases, in
turn, resulted more from better nutrition and sanitary
practices than from the introduction of new drugs. It is
remarkable, in contrast, that little practical progress
has been made toward controlling the diseases that were
not dealt with by the nineteenth century reformers.. .The
Sanitary Revolution.. .has had no counterpart in dealing with
with ailments of the adult years and of old age. (Dubos, 1959,
pp. 28-31)
In view of our concern with potential conflicts between scientif-
ically rational planning and moral or humanitarian values, it is
important to note the differences in emphasis between Thorner and
Donabedian and Dubos. While Dubos' open framework for attributing
causal effects and for pondering questions without conclusive
evidence enables him to entertain both medical and non-medical inter-
ventions, Thorner seems to see non-medical variables as non-controllable
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annoyances, vitiating the continued attempt to measure the effects of
health programs. Donabedian too sees his primary goal as isolating
the medical care effects. Science is difficult to put second.
To return to the pragmatic world, and to summarize: social,
political and economic factors influence evaluation at three levels.
First, since they are among the determinants of health status and
health behavior (defining illness, seeking care, following treatment,
etc.), but in generally unspecified ways, they need to be considered
in evaluating the impact and process of health care delivery. Second,
they act as external and internal constraints on program viability;
here the political realm on which Dubos is silent becomes critical.
A very effective program in health terms may not maintain its relative
funding level if it does not have or build a block of influential
support in Congress, HEW, or the public. For example, the develop-
ment, expansion, and power of the National Institutes of Health had
as much to do with the political alliance of Mary Lasker, Lister Hill
and John Fogarty as it did with the usefulness of such organizations
in doing socially valuable basic medical research. (Drew, 1967)
The third and final level considers this context as an alternative
to direct provision of health services for intervention to improve
health status. Consideration of even a few of the possible trade-offs
between intervention modes is impossible here, but in the long-run full
examination of such trade-offs and alternative explanatory theories
is absolutely essential. As one example, it seems perfectly plausible
that we could do the most to improve children's cognitive skills and
achievement levels by investing money now put in public education in
universal prenatal and infant care, and assuring good nutrition for
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everyone; and then using schools as screening and treatment centers.
Or perhaps putting it into a guaranteed annual income for all
Americans. Technical capacity to actually make such trade-offs
on the basis of cost/benefit analysis or other "scientific" criteria
does not yet exist. (c.f. Rivlin, 1971, pp. 51-63)
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Chapter Three.
The Evaluation Process:
Existing Frameworks and a Tentative Model for Health Services Evaluation
Into the dynamic cultural milieu, whose important variables we
have described under the term "infrastructure," the undaunted planner
interjects the structure and process of evaluation; be it evaluation
research, program evaluation, or just plain evaluation. Abstracting
from the multiple, and often conflicting, definitions discussed in the
last chapter, I would like to examine the substance of evaluation as it
gets practiced--or rather as it is proposed to be practiced.
As in the section on infrastructure, I will try to illuminate some
of the differences between goal-attainment and systems models of
evaluation. Also of concern will be the ways in which value judgments
are assumed, incorporated or ignored in various types of evaluation
and the openness of those types to qualitative issues.
Agreement on the essential parts of a good evaluation or on the
words used to describe different types of evaluation is no greater than
it is on basic definitions. This has presented some difficulties in
organizing this section. I did not wish to merely describe each
author's scheme separately, both because they are not sufficiently
different conceptually, and also because I wanted to attempt to synthesize
them into a comprehensive model of evaluation which would at least
theoretically bridge the gaps between rigorous scientific experimental
designs (i.e. true evaluative research) and designs focused on processes
of policy making, value judgments, and so on. But, since much of the
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literature is abstract'and does not give concrete examples of the types
of evaluation described, it is very hard to be sure that two people are
in fact talking about the same thing. Given the relatively low intellectual
quality of many of the pieces, particularly those specifically dealing
with health program evaluation, it would be an arid exercise to rigorously
catalogue the various schema. What I have done, therefore, is to begin
with brief explications of the major formulations I have found to indicate
the types of vocabulary and levels of analysis used. Then I have gone
directly to the framework of six components that I believe essential to
an ideal evaluation of child health programs. In discussing these
components at some length, I refer to'the previously mentioned constructs
as they seem to be either synonymous, parallel, or contradictory.
There was one further difficulty in combining the various studies.
There are large. gaps in terminology, methodology, and in level of
analysis among three groups of authors:
1) people who consider themselves evaluation researchers or
program evaluators. They usually do non-federal studies or models,
focused on institutional reform and social change but from the vantage
point of one program (e.g., venereal disease education; anti-smoking
campaign; new type of health manpower) or one discipline (e.g., community
mental health; hospital operations; prepaid medical care). The published
studies tend to be heavily concerned with methodology, use of experimental,
quasi-experimental, or field trial designs and with the problems of
evaluator/program operator interations and the ways in which evaluation
studies can be best and most widely utilized.
2) People who are basically policy analysts focused on program
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evaluation as one level of the governmental decision-making process.
Frequently although not always from the PPBS school, the authors are
concerned with interprogram trade-offs (e.g., Headstart vs. Homestart;
family planning versus intensive newborn care). They tend to discuss
not research methodology, which they often seem either to be ignorant
of or to assume to be adequate to provide raw evaluation data of high
quality, but rather with cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit and efficiency
studies, the role of evaluation in policy making, and so on.
3) People who are writing directly about health programs and
evaluations. This work may be.at either of those foci mentioned above;
there seem to be few health studies, other than in mental health or
health education. Given their greater specificity, health evaluation
articles tend to give more details on the content of the evaluation,
but in doing so, they often seem to forget some wider issues. In
addition, many of these studies have been done at levels of analysis
which we are omitting here, namely of the content of medical care,
i.e. the efficacy of specific treatments or procedures in curing or
alleviating specific disease conditions. This type of research
resembles basic biomedical research and generally involves greater
attention to experimental design or to clinical study procedures than
do the broader-based studies in which we are interested. I mention
this because the picture I paint of the state of the art of evaluation
may seem overly dismal if one does not consider the underlying research
which may someday influence program action by finding cures or better
treatment methods.
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Some Frameworks of Evaluation
- In this section, I will try to give some indication of what sorts
of things people study when they do evaluation, what categories of
knowledge they consider useful or necessary to the process. I
particularly want to present some of the fuller schemes for evaluation,
since they are not identical with the one which I will propose and thus
I will need to refer back to compare their terminology and categories
with mine. Writings which deal with only one or two types of evaluation
can be more easily and understandably incorporated into that later
discussion and will not be referred to here.
Schulberg, Sheldon and Baker (1969), in their reader on health
evaluation studies, suggest that evaluation research can be performed
at several levels:
1. evaluation of effort: comparing a local or individual program
against local or national standards
2. evaluation of performance: documenting outcomes of program;
assumes services correctly delivered
3. adequacy of performance: to what extent was total problem
solved
4. evaluation of efficiency: can identical result be achieved at
lower cost (Schulberg, Sheldon & Baker, 1969, p. 8)
In all these cases, the underlying model is the goal-attainment one of
comparing performance with stated objectives.. This model "presents an
easily conceived relationship between a specific service and an ultimate
effect, while the methodology to be used in assessing outcome generally
is drawn from the well-established designs of researchers." (Ibid., p. 9)
Wholey et al. (1970) discuss four types of evaluation pertinent
to the analysis of federal social programs:
66
1) Program impact evaluation: assessment of overall effectiveness
of a national program or the relative effectiveness of two or
more programs aimed at the same goal. Defining and measuring
output variables and comparison groups are critical.
2) Program strategy evaluation: Assessment of relative effectiveness
of different techniques used in a national program. Defining
and measuring appropriate environmental, input, process, and output
variables, as well as suitable analytic models, are critical.
3) Project evaluation: assessment of effectiveness of individual
project in achieving objectives. Like program impact studies,
output variables are measured against either comparison groups
or against baseline conditions.
4) Project rating: assessment of relative effectiveness of different
local projects in achieving program objectives. Defining and
measuring environmental variables and quick, short-term output
measures are usually used.
This analysis done at the federal level does not stress methodologic
issues, but clearly makes large assumptions about the ability of
subsidiary systems and institutions to generate data and to provide
operational analytic models. The authors, in contrast to Schulberg
et al., do not consider cost analysis as a part of evaluation itself.
They differentiate it, along with other evaluation-related activities,
because it is concerned with program inputs, not outputs. They do
view it as essential to good evaluation but do not make clear at what
steps in the process it should be the critical factor in decisions
about program effectiveness. (Wholey et al., 1970, p. 27)
In one of the most fully developed programmatic proposals for
health program evaluation, de Geyndt (1969) and Weckworth (1971)
present a framework which is specifically "descriptive" conceptually.
The Systems Development Project (now called Minnesota Systems Research,
Inc.) which eckworth directs and de Geyndt works with makes
elaborate distinctions between prescriptive models which involve value
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conflicts (and are hence inappropriate for studying the effectiveness
of a total health care program) and descriptive, explanatory, and
predictive ones. (de Geyndt, 1969). The model they developed is,
they believe, basically a descriptive one with some explanatory powers,
fewer predictive ones, and no prescriptive intentions. It owes much
to organizational theory and can be represented graphically as follows:
C~  ofJ' t ~ o es0Otq
De Geyndt goes into great detail on the types of variables one could
analyze in each of these categories. In later sections, some of these
will be listed; at this point, only his basic definitions of the
categories are presented:
1)- Context: the setting; the internal and external environment
in which a project functions. Includes political, economic,
and social dimensions of the environment. Context is important
because it acts to constrain the program's achievement of
objectives, to limit its effects, and to bound its rationality.
2) Content: program elements provided, services rendered, or
activities carried out by the project.
3) Process: describes the actual functioning and operation of
project. Represents the transformation of the inputs of
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context and content into outputs. Or, "process documents the
throughputs, or the combination of the different flows and
their relationships." Differentiates the "anatomy" of process
(static elements) from the "physiology" of process (the
interrelationships and degrees of interconnectedness).
4) Output: the result of the performance of an activity (e.g.,
a filTed tooth, a social worker's visit, an X-ray, etc.)
Distinguishes intermediate and final outputs, then notes that
the former are actually inputs (e.g., all of the above examples
except perhaps the filled tooth).
5) Outcome: attainment of a level of health by the patient. Can
be the result'of one output, of a logical sequence of outputs,
or a combination of widely different outputs. A time horizon
needs to be introduced since one measures health along a time
continuum (i.e. a negative chest X-ray would be considered a
current good health outcome, with no further process of care
needed; but if it were not repeated yearly or so, then in five
years the outcome meaning of the test would no longer be clear).
Individual health outcomes are distinguished from non-individual
ones, such as the spin-off effects of the program itself on the
community, on health education, on pay scales for health workers,
etc.
6) Benefit: interrelates the effects of provision of health services
with other aspects of the total environment towards achievement
of a state of positive well-being. This enterprise is closely
related to the development of social indicators.
This framework, which was proposed to study the federal Children
and Youth Program, is both confused and insightful. De Geyndt notes
that the methodology would not incorporate any attempt to measure
benefit. That methodology, by the way, is heavily reliant on data-
collection techniques and multivariant and correlational analyses. The
framework suggests the difficulties one encounters when one tries to
encompass everything under one evaluative roof. The notion of "output"
is particularly unclear. Part of the problem is that to achieve clarity
within your own model, you must violate traditional usage in so many
ways that no one may understand what you mean. As de Geyndt notes
about the ambiguous meaning of "intermediate outputs": "In the health
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field we have a long standing tradition of using inputs as outputs
and documenting our activities by counting inputs." (p. 11)
In a later article, de Geyndt proposes a similar framework, this
time a more general discussion of approaches for assessing the quality
of care (de Geyndt, 1970). First, he notes that care can be analyzed
at three, increasingly comprehensive and complex levels: patient care
(episodic disease care), medical care (preventive medicine and episodic
disease care), and health care (comprehensive care, quality of life).
Then he discusses five approaches for assessing the quality of care,
which may be more or less appropriate or useful at those different levels
of analysis:
1) Assessment of Content: usual meaning of "quality of care"--
is medicine practiced properly. Relies on quality control
committees (in hospitals or group practice), medical audits,
tissue review, etc. Quality is defined as the degree of
conformity with preset standards and focuses almost entirely
on patient care.
2) Assessment of Process: evaluates the total management of the
patient (preventive, diagnostic, curative, rehabilitative).
Stress on coordination of care and care-givers, logical sequence
of elements of care.
3) Assessment of Structure: analysis of organization of facilities
and equipment and manpower.
4) Assessment of Outcome: attempt to find measurable aspect of
health status of individual or group and to determine change
in this status as result of content, process, and structure of
care. (corresponds to earlier category "outcome")
5) Impact: measurement of the impact of health care and health
services system on the health of the community or the nation.
(Roughly corresponds to earlier category of "benefit" and to
analytic level of "health care")
In this second formulation, de Geyndt has omitted "context" as a
level of evaluation and it is only implied. This is in keeping with my
formulation of the infrastructure of evaluation, since de Geyndt's termi
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was analagous to my element of socio/economic/political context. In this
-second piece, what he first called the "anatomy" of process is now termed
"structure" and the ambiguous term "output" has been subsumed under both
"process" and "outcome."
Freeman and Sherwood (1965) define evaluation as the process of
using findings from social action experiments as the basis of efficient
resource allocation. They note three requirements for evaluation
research in order to perform this function.
1) Determination of efficacy. For this purpose, they stress the
need for expe.rimental or quasi-experimental design, direct behavioral
measures (instead of more easily assessed attitude measures) for the
impact model, randomization of study groups when feasible (more often
than many suggest), etc.
2) Accountability. This refers to the determination that there
is in fact "a target population that can be dealt with by means of a
program; that this population is important either because of its size
or the intensity of pathology; and that the project program for the
target population actually is undertaken with them." (Freeman & Sherwood,
1965; reprinted in Schulberg, et al., 1969, p. 85)
3) Determination of efficiency. "In terms of all programs, the
efficient one is that which yields the greatest per unit change, not
the one that can be run at the least cost per recipient." (Ibid., .p. 86)
Efficacy here is roughly synonymous with "outcome" (de Geyndt) or
"performance" (Schulberg et a1.) while accountability incorporates both
measures of "process" (are people actually being served as the plan
proposed) and of "impact" (what effect does the program have on the
71
total health of the community). Efficiency is usually thought of
as identical with cost analysis (Wholey) or cost-effectiveness (Schulberg),
but Freeman and Sherman are the only ones who specifically state that
their criterien for efficiency is cost per unit change rather than cost
per unit treatment or cost per person eligible. This is a critical
distinction which should be made explicit more often (the measure one
chooses being clearly a matter of value judgment).
Finally, let us look at the criteria for acceptable evaluation
which Stufflebeam et al. (1970) propose. Their definition of evaluation
is a broad one, viewing it as a process of gathering and organizing
information useful for judging decision alternatives. This information
needs to have representational "goodness," practical "utility," and to
be prudent. (Stufflebeam et al., 1970, p. 26) Goodness here refers to
scientific criteria.
1. Scientific Criteria
a) internal validity
b) external validity
c) reliability (consistency of information)
d) objectivity (publicness of information)
2. Practical Criteria
a) relevance
b) importance
c scope
d credibility*(a function of trust or belief in evaluator)
.e) timeliness
f) pervasiveness (of findings)
3. Prudential Criterion
a) efficiency (i.e. cost-effectiveness)
The scientific criteria are, interestingly enough, like those generally
thought of in connection with evaluation research design (c.f. Campbell
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and Stanley, 1963, for the authoritative discussion of requirements
for internal and external validity). What Stufflebeam et al. seem to
suggest, then, is that this rigorous design must be coupled with broader,
non-scientific criteria. "Importance" and "scope" are similar to "impact"
(de Geyndt) and "accountability" (Freeman and Sherman). The issues of
relevance, credibility, and timeliness are discussed by most writers
although not directly incorporated into their conceptual frameworks.
For example, de Geyndt (1969) concludes with a paraphrasing of a
paradox expressed earlier by Marris and Rein (1967, p. 3):
"The evaluation. .. becomes more specific and more accurate the
longer we wait, but this waiting period and the search for
accuracy conflicts with the urgency of decision-making. Therein
lies the dilemma of the social researcher: to say something to
the point, before it is too late, and the need to make sure that
what he says is true." (de Geyndt, 1969, p. 16)
A Tentative Model of Health Services Evaluation
None of the constructs presented above incorporate all of the
elements necessary to do evaluation in such a way that scientific
reliability, ethical integrity, and policy-making practicality are
equally and fully respected. I do not pretend to have that model.
What follows is a first attempt: a pulling together of the content of
and the gaps in present models in order to suggest the outlines of the
types of information, methodology, and analytic concepts which I
believe should inform good evaluation.
There are six components to this tentative model. I will discuss
each one at some length, documenting the ways in which this type of
evaluation has been tried, the aspects of health care and health
services delivery for which it is most useful or essential as an
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analytical tool, and s.ome estimates of the potential for further
development and refinement of the techniques requisite for it.
There is a seventh aspect of health care which, while absolutely
essential, seems to me to lie outside the purview of evaluation research
or program research. This is the content of care at a medical or
biological level. First, the content of care is in many ways part
of the infrastructure of evaluation. The level of biomedical knowledge,
the technological ability to build heart/lung machines or complicated
monitoring systems for intensive care, and the cultural beliefs which
put faith in vaccines, tranquilizers, and surgery, but not in acupuncture,
herbal remedies, or witch doctors--all of these are usually taken as
givens in assessing the performance of a health prograrri at any one point
in time. Certainly these levels of knowledge, degrees of technical
competence, and cultural beliefs change over time, sometimes quite
dramatically and quickly. But the research and activity which lead to
these changes usually take place in settings other than social action
programs with direct service objectives. They are evaluated by clinical
trials, biomedical research (either basic or applied), or by the weight
of public opinion. In this sense, the content of medical care is
reflected in the professional standards (including not only those of the
AMA but other more liberal or iconoclastic values) of the infrastructure.
Evaluation of the extent to which an on-going program meets these
standards is an important part of program evaluation and could be
considered a subcategory of process evaluation. There are special
evaluation tools for such process studies, such as peer review committees,
medical audits, record reviews, etc. These are beyond the scope of the
I
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discussion here, primarily because critically analyzing the methodology
of such studies presumes more detailed medical knowledge than I possess.
Some examples of this type of evaluation are the work of Morehead et al.
on the neighborhood health centers (Morehead, Donaldson, & Seravalli,
1971) and of Donabedian (1966, 1968). In a strict sense, "quality of
care" evaluation begins, and in limited studies ends, with this type of
analysis of adherence to professional standards.
The following six components, then, seem essential to a complete
evaluation of health programs beyond the level of content of care:
-- Organization
-- Process
-- Outcome
--Impact
--Advocacy
--Actionability
The first four components are those most commonly found in evaluation
designs; the last two reflect the criteria most frequently lacking or
considered only peripherially. Outcome (or "end-result" or "accomplishment")
and process measures predominate (c.f. Shapiro, 1967; Donabedian, 1968;
Strauss & Sparer, 1970; Freeman & Sherwood, 1965; Fanshel & Bush, 1970),
while some designs incorporate three or four (Weckworth, 1971; De Geyndt,
1969, 1970; Schulberg, Sheldon & Baker, 1969; Wholey et a1., 1970).
Organization
Evaluation of organizational variables is similar to de Geyndt's
term "the anatomy of process," which includes the static elements of
1) specialization or division of labor, 2) standardization (of treatment
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patterns), 3) formalization (of criteria and standards), and 4)
centralization (degree of delegation of authority). (de Geyndt, 1969,
p. 10) In general, organizational variables include facilities and
equipment, manpower and staffing patterns, organizational arrangements
(formal and informal), and financial mechanisms (c.f.-de Geyndt, 1970).
Organizational or structural analysis is a rather encapsulated
branch of program evaluation with stronger links to sociology and to
organizational theory than to health care research. The methodologies
used are also generally better developed and more uniform than most
types of health care evaluation, and thus the evaluation process is
more likely to be comprehensive, comparable to other studies, and
accepted by outside critics (c.f. Stufflebeam's criteria of "credibility").
This type of evaluation has been particularly popular in the study of
hospital operations (to be expectal since the focus is on an institution
rather than a type of service or a group of people) and in the mental
health field. In the latter area, this reflects a traditional emphasis
in mental health on hospitalization and professional care as modes of
treatment; hence elaborate studies of the effects of ward management,
staff relationships, intake procedures, or use of different types of care-
givers are frequent in the field. I will not go into detail in either
of-these areas however, as they extend too far afield from my concern
with direct service programs. Hospital studies tend to focus around
institutional goals (growth, efficiency, modernization, solvency)
rather than patient goals, and I have reluctantly excluded mental health
programs in general because of time and space limitations.
The methodologies used in these areas, however, can be applied to
I
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different settings with beneficial results. For example, in their
attempts to devise a conceptual framework for the evaluation of the
Children and Youth Program, Weckworth and his colleagues (de Geyndt,
1969, pp. 3-6) found that studies of business firms and institutional
operations provided them with the most useful insights. Organizational
analysis has much in common with a systems orientation to evaluation in
general. Etzioni, as we noted earlier, states that the starting point
of evaluation should.be a "working model of the social unit which is
capable of achieving a goal." (Etzioni, 1960). Etzioni's ideas are
rarely integrated into health program evaluation. This may be due in
part to the general lack of intellectual depth of many writers in the
field of evaluation, who tend to stress one perspective at the expense
(and often apparently in ignorance) of others. But it may also be due
to more pragmatic concerns. Organizational analysis is a rich field,
but its techniques are not particularly well designed to demonstrate
the causal linkages between organizational patterns and health status.
Certainly any outcome or process study of necessity tests certain
organizational patterns; but it is not necessary to explicate the full
dynamics of a system each time one studies an outcome. Or is it? One
thing which should be done, and which unfortunately is frequently omitted,
is an explicit description of organizational patterns under which other
types of evaluation are done, so that later critics can make their own
value judgments as to whether any of those factors might be the real
causes of demonstrated effectiveness or negative results. For example,
studies of the health and health behavior of the poor in this country
all too often draw conclusions from utilization rates or amounts of
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money spent on health care or make comparisons with British utilization
data without acknowledging that under our system of health care access
is not guaranteed. Hence utilization is a function of income, geography,
or other barriers as well as of the individual's attitudes or health.
There are few studies which directly link organizational factors
to the special needs of children. One area in which work has been done
is the effects of hospitalization on young children. Although this work
grew out of psychological and psychiatric interest in the severe damage
which often was done to children's psychological functioning (c.f. the
term "hospitalism"), the results of the work have had major impact on
practice. Pediatric hospitalization rates have been declining for years
and current hospital planning stresses shortness of stay, living-in
arrangements for parents, day-hospitalization, and other such procedures.
(c.f. Spitz, 1945, 1946; Shaeffer & Callender, 1959; Dimock, 1960; and
Bergman, 1965, for discussions of the psychological bases for the concern,
and Shore (Ed), 1967, for one example of how this knowledge is influencing
planning decisions about pediatric hospitalization). Broader studies
which examine the ways in which the national health care delivery system
impacts on children will be discussed in a later chapter.
Process
Process evaluation examines the technical aspects of quality of
care (content) in a sequential context of interaction between a patient
and.the delivery of health services.
The process view tends towards the. concept of the "whole patient"
and evaluates not only the work of the physician but also the
contributions of other health workers. Total management of the
patient encompasses the prevention of illness, the arrest of
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pathological processes, and physical rehabilitation...
Coordination of the process becomes important and the enabling
role of administration is crucial...Patient care is supplemented
by medical care, and the term "delivery" is a decisive part of
the quality for it is the system which enables the process to
take place. (de Geyndt, 1970, p. 26)
Process evaluation is analogous to what Wholey et al. (1970)
call program strategy evaluation and what Schulberg et al. (1969)
term evaluation of "effort." Suchman appears to suggest that process
analysis is the addition to strict "evaluation research" which produces
program evaluation (c.f. Wholey et al., pp. 15 & 94), by providing
enough insight into which components of the program are causing the
results measured so that policy decisions can be made.
Existing criteria for process evaluation are not the complete,
coordinated set s'tggested by de Geyndt's rather utopian model of the
care process. In a descriptive sense, there are the elements which de
Geyndt (1969) classifies under "content":
-- program elements covered and their priority (preventive,
diagnostic, curative, ameliorative, restorative, rehabili-
tative, and emergency care)
-- to whom provided (eligibility criteria, catchment.area)
--by whom rendered (types of personnel)
-- formal and informal linkages to other health or social services
providers
For young children, for example, one would expect to see priority placed
on preventive and diagnostic services either available to all children
or targeted to high risk groups, provided by pediatricians or other
specially trained personnel, in ambulatory settings, with close ties to
schools, social services,etc.
Second, there are the dynamic elements of process, what de Geyndt
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terms the "physiology" of process, "the interrelationships or the
degree of interconnectedness of the variables and attributes subsumed
under context, content, and the anatomy [static] part of process."
(de Geyndt, 1969, p. 10) These interrelationships include:
-- staff referral mechanisms
-- interchangeability of skills
--innovations in delegation of tasks (e.g., pediatric nurse
practitioner, community health aides or outreach workers)
--actual patterns of treatment ("who does what, when, and to
whom")
--decision-making process.
Process dynamics can also take a patient-oriented approach and focus
on the progress of the patient through the system, and on the elements in
the system as they affect the patient. The reporting system developed
by the Systems Development Project for the Children and Youth program (and
now being extended to the Maternal and Infant Care program) is a good
example of this type of evaluation. The system tracks registrant cohorts
from intake to health assessment, any ordered treatments, and to health
supervision (long-term care management, routine preventive services) in
several functional areas (medical, dental, nursing, psychology, nutrition,
social service, speech and hearing, physical therapy, and occupational
therapy). While requiring the generation of substantial quarterly data
by the individual projects, it appears to be a very sensitive instrument
to track the actual progress (and regressions or returns for care) of
the patients and of registered persons who require no immediate health
care. (Weckworth, 1971)
More selectively, some process evaluation studies have used specific
9
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procedures in the process of care delivery as proxy measures for the
effectiveness of that process. The occurrence of such a procedure is
taken as an indication of a certain amount of health care, and hence an
improvement in health status. This approach has appeal because it
greatly simplifies data collection and reporting systems (compared to,
say, the complexity and extent of the data required to support Weckworth's
model). On the other hand, such simplicity may be achieved at the
expense of validity. Typical process "output" measures include visits
per years (broken down into types), immunizations, diagnostic screenings,
dental visits, number of registrants, hospitalization rates and length
of stay, etc. The measures are basically equivalent to utilization
measures. But process outputs have to be related to need and to medical
practice standards to be meaningful. For example, a system can generate
a large number of visits per year per registrant because initial screening
and assessment is inadequate and professional care rushed and symptomatic
only; hence registrants use the facility frequently, as an emergency room.
Or visits may be the result of excellent initial screening, followed by
an extended program of rehabilitation services, health education, and
community outreach. Without data on the content of process itself,
crude utilization data is virtually impossible to interpret correctly.
Only for very specific, completely standardized procedures such as
vaccinations can we be sure that different programs or systems mean the
same thing by the same term.
Utilization data are fairly easy to assemble and compare but very
difficult to interpret. In the first instance, utilization of
services depends on the occurence of a condition which must be
recognized by the patient, or by those responsible for him, to
require medical attention. Once care is initiated by the patient,
further use of service is largely determined by the manner in
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which the physician manages the case, subject, of course,
to continuing cooperation by the patient. (Donabedian, 1969, p. 10)
Unfortunately, few analysts are even slowed by this caveat. In
particular, use of utilization data to determine underlying need (e.g.,
are the poor sicker; do they need education to use services in a more
appropriate way) will generally both underestimate need and misinterpret
behavior if not controlled for process variables--especially eligibility,
place and time of care provision, and program linkages.
There is professional disagreement as to the value of process
evaluation per se. Donabedian has stressed its vital function for the
feedback of evaluation into program change and planning.
Outcomes...provide the most conven-ient and valid indicator of
whether the allocation of resources under one system of care
(or in the practice of a given provider) is more or less effective
or efficient. But more detailed analysis of the medical care
process itself is necessary if the reasons for lack of effective-
ness or low efficiency are to be pinpointed and corrected.
(Donabedian, 1968, p. 184)
On the negative side, there is the continuing struggle to find
dynamic process measures which are both valid and obtainable on a
systematic basis.
The development of measuring instruments to express the inter-
relationships between the dynamic elements of the care process
and the interactions among participants represents a major
difficulty. (de Geyndt, 1970, p. 27)
Wholey et al. (1972) go even further and note that
the description of the treatment to which individuals have been
exposed can be complex and very expensive...Precise evaluation
of the effectiveness of more complex treatments within an
operating program, especially evaluation that would tell jwhy
a particular local project worked, are beyond existing evaluation
methodology. (p. 99)
In the next section, a new methodology, devised by the Institute
of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences (National Academy of Sciences,
1972) which incorporates both process and outcome analysis will be
presented in some detail. This technique, currently being tested on
evaluations of ambulatory care in neighborhood health centers, is an
extremely promising, carefully thought out, and justified approach
which may eventually temper the pessimism of current observers.
Outcome
Outcome evaluation is usually considered the ideal model, since it
attempts
to determine the change that has taken place in.. .a measurable
aspect of the health status of an individual or of a group
of individuals...as a result of the conditions that effect the
content, the process, and the structure of health care. It
posits that the ultimate criterion to judge the quality of
health care rendered lies in an alteration of the health of the
recipient of this care. (de Geyndt, 1970, p. 29)
Otcome evaluation is what Schulberg, Sheldon & Baker (1969) call
evaluation of performance, Wholey et al. (1970) term program impact
evaluation (or project evaluation), and Freeman and Sherman (1965) call
efficacy.
Since outcome evaluation can be seen as a programmatic attempt
to validate our conventional wisdom that medical care has a non-random
effect on health status (of individuals or communities), it Is not
surprising that this "ultimate criterion" is more easily conceived of
than established.
There are problems, suggested by our discussion of infrastructure,
with indicators and measures of change.
The desirability of determining quality of medical care
by its effect on some measurable aspect of health is matched
by the pessimism among researchers about the possibility of
success in dealing with the issue. (Shapiro, 1967, p. 7)
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But this is a relatively new field, almost all of the work in the area
having been done in the last fifteen years (de Geyndt, 1970, p. 32),
and continues to be very popular. Shapiro (1967), in a review of past
and on-going ::tudies of end-result evaluation concludes with measured
optimism on progress toward the development of more adequate measures
and more comprehensive end-result studies.
De Geyndt (1970) in a review of outcome studies, found five main
types of measures used:
--mortality
-- morbidity
-- disability
--physical functioning (e.g. rehabilitation)
-- social functioning
Other measures used for certain types of studies include surgical procedures*
and birthweight and Apgar scores. De Geyndt also notes the important
measures suggested by Donabedian of patient and provider satisfaction.
In his review and synthesis of health status indicators, Sullivan
(1966) reduces the diversity of attempted morbidity measures into three
categories:
--clinical evidence
--subjective evidence (e.g., health surveys which ask respondents
to report illnesses and utilization behavior)
--behavioral evidence (reported evidence with more corroborative
*Rates of appendectomy and hysterectomy, while really utilization rates,
because of their control by physicians are good quality measures for
hospitals and some systems of medical care.
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bases: loss of time from work or school, institutional
confinement, activity restriction, medical expenditures).
Fanshel and Bush (1970) report some promising work in developing function,
which they find from a review of the literature as "central to any
generalized notion of well-being," as an operational, quantifiable
indicator of changes in population health status over time. They
formulate their index function as a continuum, divided into a range of
mutually exclusive categories. Every member of a population group can be
classified as belonging to one and only one category at any point in time;
movement through these categories (positive or negative) can then be
observed and measured. The extent and duration of variance from the
positive pole of complete well-being becomes a measure of the subopti-
mality of the health status of the group or individual. This index
is conceptually similar to the process assessment methodology designed
by Systems Development Inc. (de Geyndt, 1969; Weckworth, 1971) for the
Children and Youth Program, in which patients are charted as they move
through clearly delineated parts of a health service. One could imagine
a combination of these continuum scales which would attempt to directly
establish the correlations between progress (or regress) through health
care and levels of health.
There is one major problem with any disability or function scale
which will not be solved through even such careful, mathematically
precise work as that of Fanshel and Bush. This has to do with the
behavioral basis of the measures and the difficulty in obtaining
reliable assessments of them. For example, Fanshel and Bush's scale
includes "well-being, dissatisfaction, discomfort, minor disability,
major disability, disabled, confined, confined-bedridden, isolated,
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coma and death"; only the last four or five would be non-behavioral
in determination. As Sullivan points out:
... while a period of restricted activity is a more objective
event than a report of "feeling ill" it also has a subjective
aspect which must be recognized. The decision to reduce his
usual activities reflects the individual's attitude toward
illness and self-care, the expectations or demands of his
family, his employer and his associates, his knowledge or
beliefs about the symptoms present, and other social and
cultural factors...Disability occurs in a social setting and,
like other social phenomena, cannot be measured in isolation
from the setting. It has social consequences regardless of
the nonmedical factors which may influence its occurrence. A
condition which disables a salaried worker may not disable a
person paid on a daily basis--this makes the disability no less
real for the salaried worker and his employer. Disability
measures reflect the impact of morbid conditions as they in-
fluence the social participation of members of the population.
In this respect they measure an aspect of morbidity important
in any evaluation of the health status of a population.(Sullivan, 1966, p. 18)
These types of measures are powerful in that they reflect the
human reality that the same objective health status may have different
meanings for two different people. The loss of a leg would be a
disabling event for an athlete or a policeman; it might be only a
disability for a sedentary person. Cervical cancer which necessitates
removal of the reproductive organs may have stunningly different impacts
on the lives of a young woman planning to have children and a post-
menopausal woman. What the measures don't equitably reflect, however,
is the extent to which individual health status is not a personal,
behavioral "choice" but a social one. Ability to.take sick days,
adequacy of health insurance, housing suitable for bedrest or re-
cuperation (e.g., not having to walk up several flights after a
heart attack or with a heart condition)--these and other variables
intervene in the functioning of us all as healthy beings. None of
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the work which I have seen on disability or function scales seriously
deal with these biases.
Even putting aside behavioral scales, outcome evaluation depends
on the infrastructure of health status indices. The general lack of
operational concepts in that area has already been discussed at length.
Although Shapiro (1967) also discusses methodological problems of
outcome research as adequate controT groups, selectivity bias, and
sources of observational data, both he and de Geyndt (1970) agree that
the "major deterrent has been the difficulty in defining the measures to
be used." (Shapiro, 1967, p. 28)* De Geyndt also mentions a temporal
aspect of the problem: measures other than mortality or acute morbidity
cannot be made at the time care is rendered. Thus they cannot be used
for cross-sectional comparisons of outcomes, except retrospectively in
longitudinal studies. 'Such studies require a long "lead-time" (c.f.
20 years for the Framingham heart disease study). The costliness of
this methodology, as well as the problems with relating evaluation to
program planning cycles, are apparent.
To counteract some of the pessimism suggested so far, there is
one promising innovative methodology which combines content, process,
and outcome evaluation with which I am familiar and which I would like
to describe in some detail.
Institute of Medicine Methodology for Evaluation
Under contract to HEW, the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academy of Sciences started a program in 1969 called "Contrasts in
*We will discuss methodological issues separately later.
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Health Status: A Comparative Inquiry into the Health Needs, Barriers
and Resources of Selected Population Groups," which had three objectives:
1. To analyze differences in the health status of contrasting,
population groups.
2. To relate differences in health status to demographic,
environmental, biological, medical care, economic, and
behavioral characteristics.
3. To compare the effect of various models of health care
delivery on selected population groups. (National Academy
of Sciences, 1972, p. 1)
The basis of the study design by which differences in health status
were to be measured was the premise that "specific morbidity conditions
...or health problems can be used as indicators of health status and
outcome, which, in turn, can be related to the type and quality of care
rendered." (Ibid) NAS termed these conditions or problems tracers, and
developed a methodology based on them relevant to an evaluation of
ambulatory health services. This involved both conceptual tasks
(defining criteria for selecting tracers, selecting a set of tracers
for ambulatory care, fully describing criteria for primary care associ-
ated with each tracer, and adapting the general methodology for a
practice setting, specifically neighborhood health centers) and field
activities to test the design. Only the conceptual tasks have been
both completed and reported on; results from the completed field study
should be available soon.
The process of defining tracers is worth examining in depth. The
study group explicitly states that the traditional use of morbidity
conditions as indicators of process or outcome variables needs to be
expanded to include concurrent "assessment of provider and recipient
behavior and their interaction." (p. 8)
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The ultimate outcome of health care is not only a reflection
of the type of care delivered by the provider, but also a
mirror of the characteristics and behavior of the patient
population. (Ibid.)
A formalized decision-making tree was developed containing the
criteria by which tracers were chosen. Those criteria, in order of
their application are:
1. The functional impact on those affected should be significant.
2. A tracer should be relatively well-defined and easy to diagnose
in both field and practice settings.
3. Prevalence rates should be high enough to permit the collection
of adequate data from a limited population sample.
4. The natural history of the condition should vary with utilization
and effectiveness of medical care.
5. The techniques of medical management of the condition should
be well defined for at least one of the following processes:
prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and/or rehabilitation.
6. The effects of nonmedical factors on the tracer should be
understood.(i.e. its epidemiology) (Ibid., pp. 10-13)
These criteria represent an attempt to systematically screen health
knowledge to choose those areas in which we are more certain of finding
need, less uncertain about the influence of nonmedical factors, more
concerned about severity of need, and less hesitant about asserting the
usefulness of medical intervention. This selective confidence is a
value judgment of the best kind--one which pushes knowledge and
scientific veracity as far as possible but which in the end does not
refuse to. make reasoned choices on the basis of incomplete evidence.
We know too much to select morbidity conditions at random, but we know
too little to use them all as indicators. I do not know enough about
medicine to know how good the tracers selected are or if the choices
considered were wide enough. But the report provides extensive
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documentation on the etiology, epidemiology, functional impact, and
-medical management of the tracers selected so that one could review
the case independently.*
Of the seven tracers selected, four are judged to be relevant
for evaluating health care to young people:
--Middle ear infection: ages under 5 and 5-24, both sexes
--Associated hearing loss: ages 5-24, both sexes
--Visual disorders: ages 5-24, both sexes
--Iron deficiency anemia: ages under 5, 25 and over, both sexes
--Hypertension: 25 and over, both sexes
--Urinary tract infections: 25 and over (female); 65 and over (male)
-- Cervical cancer: 25-64 (female)
Although the real effectiveness of the methodology (which does
make heavy data demands on local centers) must await results of the
field trials, the examples cited in the preliminary report suggest it
can be a sensitive and extensive reflector of health needs and of the
interactions of a health system with them.
Outcome Evaluation and Child Health Care. There are several aspects
of child health and health care services for children which make an
assessment of the value of outcome evaluations different from what it
might be for adult services. In general, possibilities for outcome
evaluations which would be usable for policy purposes are in many ways
*Later we will discuss an HEW Program Analysis of maternal and child
health care programs which is a starkly contrasting example of undocu-
mented procedural issues and unsubstantiated value judgments, although
its general intent and even conclusions are similar.
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better than average. The major reasons for this optimism are discussed
below.
1) Infant mortality (along with maternal mortality) is not only the
best general cormiunity health indicator we have, but it is a direct
indicator of risk to children--both of death and of impairments and
deficits only marginally non-fatal (e.g., severe brain damage, extreme
prematurity). (Knobloch & Pasamanick, 1966; Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1960,
1966; Birch & Gussow, 1970; Shapiro, Schlesinger & Nesbitt, 1968)
2) The measures of low birth weight and newborn Apgar scores (Apgar,
1953) can be unambiguously made and appear to have high correlations and
causal linkages with health deficits of various kinds (Birch & Gussow, 1970;
Drillien, 1964, 1961; Glass, Kolko & Evans, 1971; Illsley, 1966; Robinson
& Robinson, 1965; Schachter & Apgar, 1959). However, a reliable direct
measure of prematurity instead of the proxy measure low birth weight
would improve the precision of the relationships found. For example,
the very careful epidemiologic study done on all pregnant women and
their offspring for 10 years on the island of Kauai (Werner, Bierman
& French, 1971) shows that there are distinct differences in health
status and health and behavior at 10 between low birth weight full-term
babies, premature (i.e. not fully developed) babies of any weight, and
babies of extreme low birth weight (less than 1500 grams). It is the
last group which shows the most severe and irremediable handicaps (in
health, size, and even IQ).
3) Morbidity in infants and young children is frequently due to
infectious diseases which, because of their acute characteristics, are
the most accurately measured type of morbidity, given current morbidity
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indices. (AAP, 1971)
4) It also appears that dental health deficits can be quite
accurately predicted by the simple negative measure of lack of an annual
visit to a dentist. (Richmond & Weinberger, 1970) Furthermore, in
carefully designed and controlled studies, fluoridation of public water
supplies has been shown to consistently reduce the numbers of caries
in children under 18 by 50 to 60%. (Ast, 1962; Arnold, et al., 1956)
The major problem in child health outcome evaluation is that other
critical aspects of child health, functioning, and development, which are
clinically obvious and publicly recognized, have not proven quantifiable
with the same degree of reliability. In particular, chronic conditions,
malnutrition, child abuse or neglect, and sensory/neurological deficits
are difficult to measure and to relate to health services received.
There are still many unmet problems in the field of child abuse
and neglect, for even the terms are not yet clearly defined.
(Rowe, et al., 1970, p. 952)
The present nomenclature of the social illnesses of childhood
describes groups of manifest symptoms; it defines neither
pathophysiologic mechanisms nor the specific causes of disease
because little is known about them...Clinical practice, to the
extent that it is documented in the literature, seems to bear
no consistent relation to case outcome for this group of illnesses.
(Newberger, 1971, pp. 4, 8)
Except for data from studies of congenital malformations,
little hard data exist on the incidence and prevalence of
chronic conditions in childhood. Populations examined (and
conditions counted) in the major studies are usually not
comparable. Neither are definitive data available on the
extent of disability caused by chronic illness. (Wholey,
undated, p. 11.6)
As noted in the definitions of outcome evaluation, only "measurable
aspects of health" can be evaluated. While it probably is a good thing
to go ahead and measure and assess all those elements of health which
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one is able, there is a grave danger in so doing that those variables
which are supported by quantified data fare better during program
analysis and funding. While the approach of Wholey's group is a
hopeful sign that clinical evidence and professional judgment are not
slaves to evaluation data, the fact remains that there is much more
money these days in maternal and infant care than there is in
nutritional programs, chronic disease detection and treatment,
prevention of child abuse, or the treatment of handicapping conditions
and sensory and neurological deficits not prevented by prenatal care.
The case remains intuitively open that in fact certain patterns of
diagnosis and care do make a difference in the sequelae of these problems,
but that we are not able to document them. It is also possible, of course,
that we don't know what to do about child abuse or chronic handicaps and
that no program would be successful, even if we could measure the outcomes.
Impact
Impact evaluation is an attempt to extend the concept of outcome
evaluation to encompass the psycho-social and socio-economic variables that
influence health status and the success of health programs. This concept,
advocated, for example, by de Geyndt, Weckworth, and the Systems Development
Project, deals with the "impact of the health services system on the lives
of the recipients and on their contribution to society. This means
thinking in terms of total target populations or total communities."
(de Geyndt, 1970, p. 33) From a different perspective, Suchman (1967)
uses the term to mean the degree to which effective performance (effective-
ness being a measure of efforts meeting stated objectives) is adequate to
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the total amount of need. The concept corresponds to Freeman and
Sherwood's (1965) term "accountability," and Stufflebeam et al.'s
(1971) terms "importance" and "scope," all defined previously.
In fact both perspectives are closely interrelated. Any attempt
to focus on the effects of programs on people must address the question
of what difference does the program make. There are several ways in
which programs can make a difference; impact evaluation is a method
of analytically separating those different levels of effect. For
example, a program to provide intensive care for high-risk newborns
is medically innovative and successful in 80% of the cases it handles,
but makes no dent in national infant mortality figures since it can
cover so few children because of its cost and demands for the
technologic capacity of a major medical school complex. On the other
hand, another program may concentrate on providing only traditional,
basic prenatal care, nutritional counselling and perhaps child care
classes for pregnant women but emphasizes outreach and community
participation in order to find thehigh-risk mothers who rarely obtain
care until delivery. It is likely that much more medical research money
and professional interest will be put into the first program without
public intervention, since it is more suitable to the needs of the
delivery system itself: staff positions for professionals, research
opportunities, high and clear-cut "cure" rate, medical control. But if
the impact of programs on social needs becomes a criterion, then the
implicit trade-off between less spectacular (but positive ) improvements
for many people versus miracle cures for a few is brought out
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explicitly.*
Impact evaluation cannot resolve these issues since they involve
very basic value-judgments and philosophic beliefs on the mutability of
human behavior, the role of expertise and scientific research in society,
and so on. But it can provide fuller pictures of the programs to
facilitate such judgments.
Impact evaluation .need not operate only at this rather lofty, above-
the-fray level. One well-developed model of an impact evaluation
methodology is currently being used to analyze the gaps in the system of
child health care, i. e. to measure the real versus the ideal according
to some fairly well-agreed-upon criteria. (Minnesota Systems Research,
Inc., 1972) Those criteria, in the alliterative style popular among
health planners, consist of six A's:
1) Appropriateness. This criterion has two dimensions: a measure
of need (measured by proxy indicators of risk
factors; see infrastructure discussion, supra.)
and program elements with priority rankings
possible (e.g., preventive, diagnostic, thera-
peutic, rehabilitative, educational)
2) Availability. This criterion contains factors of
--eligibility
--services, by eligibility category
--standards
-- financial mechanisms
*It can also be seen as a trade-off between curative and preventive
medicine or as between medical care and health education in a broad
sense. Another example which highlights these multi-dimensional
policy issues is the contrast between investment in expensive (but
life-saving) heart-lung machines and heart transplant teams versus
massive research and educational campaigns on the ties between heart
disease and smoking, air pollution, eating habits, and other social
variables.
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3) Accessibility. This criterion examines
--how care is delivered
--sequencing of service (to what degree is
continuity of care reached within the program)
4) Acceptibility.
--to seekers of care
-- to providers of care
--to payors
5) Accountability. This criterion evaluates two forms of accountability:
--dollar expenditures
--accomplishment or outcome of program (such
accountability being shared by creators,
implementors, and users)
6) Adaptability. This criterion is the dynamic linkage of the first
five criteria over time.
The first four A's are seen as a dependent sequence, "a sequence of
progressively more involved commitment to specifying programs of service."
(MSR, Inc., 1972, p. 47) This concept of sequencing evaluation, i.e.
looking at appropriateness before studying availability, etc., is a major
innovation. For example, it recognizes the potential value of utilization
data, but only within a previously specified context:
Within the constraints of both availability and acceptibility,
the utilization of the services of programs, when choices do
exist, is the ultimate reflection of acceptance. (i4SR, Inc., p. 46)
In many ways, impact evaluation incorporates many of the components
of evaluation already mentioned--content, process, organization, and
outcome--into a conceptual framework relating them to each other. A
determination of appropriateness assures some correlation between health
needs and program elements and hence requires prior outcome evaluation
studies or assumptions. Acceptibility factors are clearly process variables.
Accountability, while very sketchily developed by MSR in the design,
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could include both cost-effectiveness studies and efforts to allocate
professional and patient responsibilities for health care and health,
thus enlarging the parameters of traditional auditing, PPBS, or cost-
benefi t concerns.
The major independent significance of impact evaluation is the
measuring of program effect in relation to total need. This presumably
helps avoid elegant, drop-in-the-bucket program designs; it is also a
critical input for any sort of comprehensive health planning, where the
major concern is in summing up the totality of health and health-related
activities in an area and comparing them with some picture of the total
health needs of the community. (c.f. Kerr and Trantow (1970) for a
fuller explanation of this use of assessment or evaluation) In this
sense, many reviews of "present strengths and weaknesses in current
systems of comprehensive health services for children and youth"
(Haggerty, 1970a), and such are really informal impact evaluations of
the health system as it serves a particular group. Haggerty's definition
of adequate care, which he equates with comprehensive health care, in-
cludes many of the same criteria (and in much the same order) as MSR's:
"complete, competent, continuous, coordinated, compassionate, and
community-oriented." (p. 74) He implicitly links the importance of
impact evaluation to the increasing stress on preventive care and mentions
the American Academy of Pediatrics' goal of concern for the welfare of
all children. These make it "necessary to identify the population for
which a physician is responsible, especially those at high risk, and
ensure that they receive care." (Ibid., p. 84) He quotes Dr. Kerr L.
White's comments at a conference on child health evaluation:
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This shift in concern and responsibility from that of the
individual clinician confronting the individual patient to
the concern of all clinicians for whole communities or large
groups of physicians for large groups of individuals represents
a fundamental shift in orientation in medical education and
practice. In epidemiologic terms the denominator changes from
that of the physician's practice, or the hospitals' lists of
visits and admissions to that of a population in. a catchment
area, a geographic territory, a prepaid group insurance scheme,
or a community. (In Haggerty, 1970a, pp. 84-85)
Impact evaluation, then, is basically a means of making evaluation
studies directly relevant for and more transferable to planning and policy-
making.
Advocacy
Advocacy is used here to mean those goals and objectives to which.
health programs are addressed, both explicitly and implicitly. This
is an area which is rarely analyzed in discussions of program evaluation.
When it is mentioned, the aspect dealt with is the ambiguous or contra-
dictory nature of stated program intent, in legislation, in guidelines,
or in practice. Since evaluation of any kind requires stated objectives
of some sort as a focus, there are imnense difficulties in designing an
evaluation study for federal programs whose enabling legislation is
usually vague and the result of compromises of various types to begin
with and whose nature is then altered, often beyond recognition, through
the process of administration and regulation. Thus it should be part
of any program evaluation to trace the legislative history of the program,
to identify some of the hidden agenda items to which it was addressed,
to relate those goals or objectives to actual priorities as reflected
in agency guidelines, and to relate those priorities to the needs,
objectives, and constituencies which the projects in the program
98
themselves feel that they are addressing. Another function of advocacy
studies should be to examine the extent to which the public goals of
the program were not meant to be fulfilled. (c.f. Etzioni, 1962) In fact,
a systems model of evaluation is in general much more likely to consider
such questions as the real intent of goals, their interrelated context,
and their functional reality.
Such an analysis .is not only fascinating and instructive in its own
right as a study of the process. of social policy implementation, but it
also is essential to a meaningful (and equitable) evaluation of program
outcomes or process. One of the most valuable results of evaluation of
advocacy is the making explicit of the non-health goals of purportedly
health-directed programs, since, "the true purpose of a health program
may be only peripherally related to health." (Thorner, 1971, p. 531)
Elinson and Herr (1970), for example, characterize the neighborhood
health center movement as largely a political and social reform
movement, not a health movement. The latent objectives they found
included:
1) improving the image of the black male in poverty communities;
2) stimulating and maintaining solidarity among migrant Chicano
farmworkers;
3) pacification of hostile comunities by colonial powers;
4) discharging missionary service obligations of the medical-
hospital establishment;
5) filling a political void in social and economic action; and
6) politicization or radicalization of youth. (pp. 98-9)
Another hidden agenda frequently found is an economy motive to
save public funds. (c.f. Thorner, 1971) Much of the current fuss .about
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national health insurance, H1M's, and peer review is due to a growing
crisis in medical care prices and federal and private expenditures for
health. Such economic objectives need not be at odds with health ones.
Prepaid group practice appears to have many. values in terms of quality
of care and patient satisfaction as well as its demonstrated effects
on hospitalization rates and premium prices. (Donabedian, 1969) Early
screening and treatment for handicapping and chronic conditions in
children not only may save the state substantial investment in later
hospitalization, institutionalization, and special education, but also
enables those children to either escape serious handicapping or to grow
up as more completely independent and normal adults.
On the other hand, national nutrition programs, which could be
advocated for the alleviation of hunger for children and families, are
administered by' the Department of Agriculture and have been generally
advocated instead as farm-support programs. The concern of the
Department with not allowing the programs to in any way enable people
to get free what they would otherwise have purchased has meant that
the programs, particularly food stamps and commodity distribution, have
always been more concerned with fluctuation in agricultural prices and
keeping costs down than with feeding people. (See, for example, Segal,
1970; Kotz, 1969; Citizens' Board of Inquiry, 1968, 1972; also, discussion
of nutrition programs in Chapter 4.)
Another dimension of advocacy, one even more neglected in the
literature, is the correspondence between program goals and objectives
(diverse a set as they may be) and other national, local, and individual
goals and priorities. Fanshel and Bush (1970, p. 1022) seem to have this
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in mind when they formulate complete performance analysis as including
a measure of conformation to "society's rules of ethical and rational
behavior."
This measure is clearly related to impact evaluation: one aspect
of correspondence is the extent to which government programs, singly or
together, are an adequate and appropriate response to total social needs.
This is what programs are "accountable" to.
This approach also enables one to assess whether, even though
individually effective, a program may not be counterproductive in the
light of other concurrent efforts. For example, from the standpoint of
a community with tremendous perceived health needs and desires to meet
them, the current array of categorical federal programs with incompatible
eligibility, reporting systems, and control requirements seems not so
much beneficent as an example of irrational program planning. Similarly,
as the social values of "health care as a right," consumer participation
or community control, and comprehensive care become more widely accepted,
existing and planned programs need to be examined in light of those values,
even if not designed to directly implement them. In this sense, advocacy
questions can serve to point out anachronistic or inappropriate policy
philosophies as the social and political situation changes.
And finally, Fanshel and Bush's measure provides a framework in
which one can directly face the potential conflicts between society's
ethical norms and its rational ones. Why should food programs be designed
to serve the poor rather than the farm lobby? Or should they serve as
health care programs, under medical direction? How do we deal with
program goals which express moral commitment (at least on paper) but have
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no clear, rational way of being administratively carried out?
The best examples of evaluations of advocacy which I have found
have been by people in the journalistic and radical muckraking school,
not by health planners, policy analysts, or program directors. For
example, there are several excellent analyses of hunger in America
which clearly reveal the hidden agendas of the federal agencies and
the failure to define the problem in ethical terms. (Kotz, 1969; Segal,
1970; Citizens' Board of Inquiry, 1968, 1972) In a more provocative and
less well-supported argument, The American Health Empire: Power, Profits,
and Politics (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1970) examines the non-humanitarian
side of "big health":insurance companies, medical schools, and government
programs.
Actionability
Actionability refers to the vitality of a program as a program. It
is a measure of viability, of flexibility, of life force. It is an
ambiguous measure, one which I have formulated because this dimension
of program effectiveness is so rarely addressed directly or seriously
in evaluation; or else it is presented as the entire story in "why-we-
went-wrong" articles. This is a true systems-oriented measure, which ideally
could combine those two extremes.
Actionability is in some ways very similar to advocacy evaluation:
a program clearly at odds with prevalent cultural or political trends
(e.g., federally funded abortion clinics or serious massive attempts at
community control of health facilities) does not stand much chance of
survival or success, regardless of the logical and medical soundness of
102
its structure and operation.*
Actionability, however, includes several other factors:
--funding: its adequacy and stability; strings attached
--factors outside program control: their power, areas of impact,
chances for by-passing or winning over (e.g., local board of
health vs. free clinic; medical society-controlled licensing
laws vs. new professionals training programs)
--political climate (e.g., election year hesitancy to innovate
or raise budgets; dismantling of OEO under hostile Republican
administration)
--internal feasibility of achieving objectives (e.g., expecting
medical schools to work closely with community groups in co-
sponsoring a program without extensive preliminary preparations)
In other words, it is not fair to judge a program a success or failure
Without examining the environment into'which it was placed and the basic
nurturance it was given. This component of evaluation can be seen as an
attempt to evaluate programs as one input into an existent s Weiss
and Rein (1969) have characterized this approach as a "non-experimental
methodology for evaluation research" appropriate for broad-aim social
programs. They call first for a more descriptive, inductive methodology,
concerned more "with learning than measuring;" the approach has much in
common with the case study method of evaluation and analysis. Second,
they note the systems perspective which can address "such issues as the
way in which the program makes a place for itself, the new stresses it
introduces, and the way the system accommodates itself to the program, as
well as...the issue of what individual and institutional benefits the
program brought into being. (Weiss and Rein, 1969, reprinted in Caro,
*The recent Supreme Court ruling on the unconstitutionality of anti-
abortion laws, however, may have radically shifted the potential actiona-
bility of federally-funded abortion services.
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1971, p. 296)
Not only can such a -systems perspective provide a richer and more
dynamic understanding of innovative health programs, but it can also
increase their influence and ability to survive political or cultural
battles, in. which they rarely figure as principle figures.
It is obvious that the decisions are made in the political
arena, in a broad social and economic context, influenced by
unstated objectives often unrelated directly to health.
These program objectives, if recognized and overtly stated, could
be evaluated by appropriate techniques. However, an evaluation
which is constrained solely to the effects of the program on
health can be expected to have only a partial influence on
the decision process, and quite often a minimal influence,
depending on the relative strength of the influence of the
nonhealth factors. (Thorner, 1971, pp. 531-2)
Of particular importance is a consideration of how a program fits into and
changes the administrative structure to which it is attached. As Williams
and Evans have commented in an analysis of evaluation of Head Start:
In thinking about the development of evaluations, it must
be remembered that after a decision is reached, the further
hurdle remains of translating the decision into effective
operating policy so as to improve the performance of the agency's
programs. Thosewho plan evaluations need to be sensitive to
an agency's administrative structure through which policy
decisions are implemented for, in the final analysis, the
test of the effectiveness of outcome data is its impact on
implemented policy. (Williams and Evans, 1969)
An excellent example of the difficulties of survival of even the
most carefully researched, documented, and agency-supported health pro-
grams is that of the major program analysis on child health carried out
by a high level HEW task force in 1966 (HEW, 1966; W4holey, undated;
Levin, 1968). In reviewing the fate of this analysis, designed to be
both directly usable for and convincing as policy, Wholey notes that
while the 1967 Child Care Act proposed by President Johnson and later
rewritten by Congress still included the major elements reconmended
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by the program analysis group, "the new legislation was not supported by
increased fiscal year 1968 funding....In a very tight budget year,
Congress took a general position of not funding new programs." (Wholey,
undated, p. 111.4) Even more discouragingly, "by fiscal year 1970, except
for continued emphasis on family planning programs, the new thrusts in
the Child Health Act of 1967 had largely disappeared from the Administration's
program requests." (p. 111.5)
Finally, we should briefly mention the importance of actionability
(and advocacy) evaluation as a way to analyze and evaluate evaluation
studies themselves. It should be clear from the vast array of issues
mentioned in this discussion of evaluation, and with the great difficulties
and limitations associated with each, that no one program could possibly
afford to do this type of complete evaluation. Decisions need to be
made on when, where, how, and by whom evaluations should be done.
[One] way to look at evaluation is as a programming input, which
may be subject to evaluation just like other inputs. In cost-
benefit terms, the cost of evaluation should be related to the
benefits that evaluative data and judgments contribute to
programming efficiency or effectiveness. A heavy investment
in formal evaluation is most likely to be justified when a
program is expensive, when its impact is potentially great but
uncertain, and when there is a great potential for diffusion
of programming concepts. (Caro, 1971, p. 7)
Rossi (Chapter 2 in Rossi & Williams, 1972) advocates program evaluation,
especially with a research design, when the rates of change in outcomes
are expected to be rather small and thus careful study will be needed to
demonstrate them. Thorner likewise suggests that studies of outcome
or effectiveness should be carried out in carefully selected situations,
with concern for transferability of results to other places and situations,
"so that end results in service programs can be inferred from the study
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of process or intermediate goals, in the manner indicated by Shapiro
(1967)." (Thorner, 1971, p. 532)
The HEW program analysis group found in 1966 that the "Federal
Government had no system for managing evaluation of the effectiveness of
its programs...there was no system for planning what research and
evaluation studies were required to measure the overall effectiveness
of Federal maternal and child health programs or the relative effective-
ness of different projects within these programs; and there was no system
for review and use of program evaluation and project evaluation studies
in reaching policy decisions." (Wholey, undated, p. IV.)
Despite the subsequent beefing up of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the increase in evaluation
funds directly under its control (via the earmarking of up to 1% of
appropriated funds under several pieces of legislation), there is little
evidence that the- situation is substantial-ly different today. (For an
excellent and more optimistic discussion of the growing HEW coordination
of planning and budgeting see Iglehart, 1971.) One important attempt
to bring together a comprehensive review of federal evaluation efforts
and recommendations toward development of an actual "federal evaluation
policy" is the recent work by Wholey and others (Wholey et al., 1972).
Their model has been discussed earlier. The ultimate usefulness of these
recommendations, however, is limited by their overly optimistic, rather
narrow, PPBS-oriented attitude toward evaluation methodology. The review
of the politiics of evaluation and general reconmendations for more
planning, funding, and accountability for evaluation are very pertinent,
however.
106
This concludes the discussion of my tentative framework for child
health program evaluation. The components of advocacy and actionability
are still only sketchy and need further abstraction and clarification.
Some of the other more traditional components need reduction and reassess-
ment. And especially, the whole framework needs to be applied, either
to sets of previous evaluations to see if their results can be synthesized
or to new and better designed evaluations to see how far this technique
can actually go in deepening our understanding of social processes and
in shaping our policy decisions.
In the next chapter, I return to the world of child health to
examine the needs and knowledge which will shape those future evaluations.
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Chapter 4.
Needs and Knowledge: Critical Child Health Problems
and Existing Approaches to Solve Them
Part 1.
Health Needs of Children
It may seem that I have strayed a long way from "planning child
health programs." Indeed, the preceding extensive examination of
the nature and limitations of evaluation may make planning seem like
either a hopeless or an arrogant activity. Evaluation,. however, is
only a synthetic activity. Behind it there is the reality of world
of children, both healthy and sick, and of a multitude of activities,
both deliberate and inadvertent, which affect these children. Ahead
of it is the reality of policy which does get made despite the lack
of data, laws which get passed for anything but scientific reasons,
and the actions and lives of us all which seem to go on whether they
are evaluated or not. In this chapter, the reality of child health
needs and programs will be introduced.
As viewed here, the prenatal period and the early years of a
child's life represent a series of "critical periods" in physical
and psychological development during which he or she is susceptible
to risks of impairment which may confer lasting disadvantage. The
task of minimizing those risks belongs partly to the family, partly
to professional health services (private or public), and partly to
non-health services (income, housing, safe air, safe highways, etc.).
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My concern will be primarily with organized health services. It
should be noted here that "critical periods" can reflect not only
risks with permanent consequences but also those whose long term
effect is negligible or unknown, but which are undesirable in their
own right and tend to occur at certain periods in the child's life.
For example, broken arms or legs rarely cause residual or permanent
damage but that is no reason why public policy or families should not
be concerned about the safety of playground equipment or with the
adequacy of emergency orthopedic services. Only the rationale for
the concern will be different.
Child Development and Child Health
This distinction between consequences is important because of
current emphasis on child development as an organizing theory to
conceptualize child needs and programs. In the Introduction, I
raised the question of whether child development was a useful or
limiting concept in evaluating and planning child health programs.
Without going into any detailed examination of child development,
I would like to suggest the outline of the argument here.
The issues of physical and psychological development are quite
distinct in some senses, completely intermingled in others. The
distinction is fostered by the fact that different knowledge, beliefs,
*
This argument is drawn from research I did for the Huron Institute
(1972), whose report, done under contract to HEW, is a thorough
compilation of our current knowledge about child development and
programs successful in nurturing it. The importance of the concept
is shown by the fact that the Government is currently funding another
major study focusing on child development by the National Academy of
Sciences.
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professions, and technologies are involved in dealing with them.
Different aspects of parental behavior are also involved in the
caretaking functions in each area. Despite these differences,
there is a strong present trend to mesh the two as child develop-
ment, and to design programs that can respond comprehensively to
problems of either physical or psychological development. There are
some good reasons for these efforts, because quite often both kinds
of support are needed in order for either intervention to be effective.
Psychological neglect of the child will often eventuate in health
problems: problems of malnutrition, plumbism, failure to thrive,
abuse, or emotional disturbance. Physical problems -- various kinds
*of handicap, mental retardation, chronic illness -- may make heavy
demands on the family's psychic care of the child and on the child's
social development. Because of this interrelation, there has been
a tendency in the last decade to try to construct programs marked
by "comprehensiveness" or "coordination", to bring together services
in education, health, and family work, and to stress "child develop-
ment" as an integrating concept.
Richmond & Weinberger (1970) present a concise history of the
emergence of child development as a focus in pediatric medicine.
Before 1900, pediatrics did not exist as a medical specialty. From
1900 to about 1925, pediatrics was in a "descriptive era of pediatric
nosology." An era of laboratory investigation, bringing with it
emphases on specific etiology and therapy and the first child develop-
ment institutes began in 1925, to be followed in the early 40's by an
era of pediatric therapy. Finally, about 1960, an era of child
development (based on developmental biology) and of prevention began
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and continues today.
In the development of health services, a system of
priorities emerges. In most cultures, the primary
concern is with physical health; mental health programs
generally must await the emergence of sound general
health and welfare services. As the physical health
of child-en has improved, there has concomitantly
developed an expectation that child health workers
will concern themselves increasingly with the
cultural, social, and psychological aspects of
child care. (Richmond & Weinberger, 1970, p. 24)
Because child development attempts to integrate parts of education
and medicine, it is important to point out some- differences between
these two disciplines and the contexts in which they operate which
have policy implications.
The primary goals of virtually all educational programs are
developmental. More accurdtely, the purposes explicitly stated and
evaluated are developmental in nature. Health programs, either in
general or for children, are concerned primarily with alleviating or
preventing conditions which, whether or not they have permanent
developmental consequences in a cognitive sense, are deemed undesir-
able--either for the individual or the society--and are considered
either curable or manageable. As a result, discussions and studies
of the developmental implications of various health problems (mal-
nutrition, lack of prenatal care, etc.) tend to be peripheral rather
than central to the core of health care literature and research.
What literature does exist tends to be less voluminous, more testi-
monial in nature, less replicated, and more idiosyncratic than the
corresponding literature in educational and behavioral science fields.
This trend is reinforced by the greater scientific "hardness" of
other health issues, such as the minimal dosage of medication to
ill
achieve results, development of simple but reliable tests for
diseases and conditions, precise surgical techniques, or monitoring
and life-support technologies. Whether this is bad money driving
out the good or not depends on one's values, but the fact remains
that developmental issues (except in strict anthropometric or
physiological terms) and psycho-social issues in general are not
widely accepted as completely proper topics for serious medical
research. (For an excellent development of.the counter-argument
for the necessity of behavioral science, an argument gaining strength
in medicine, focused directly on children, see Talbot, Kagen, and
Eisenberg, 1971, passim, and particularly Talbot and Howell, 1971.)
Most educational situations are focused primarily on children or
child-centered issues. That is, experts in the educational field all
accept a concern with the child and his development as most proper,
even if they disagree about goals or methods. In health, however,
pediatrics, child psychiatry, and even public health nursing (a
major source of preventive and maternal programs) are specialties
within much larger professional domains. It is not, therefore, pos-
sible to take for granted an uncomplicated dedication to child health
in those who will provide it, as it is just one part of their responsi-
bilities.
Finally, while education at the elementary level (and increasingly
at the preschool and day care levels) is overwhelmingly a public
function, health care is not. Public health efforts are in general
kept quite separate from other health activities and are definitely
something of an orphan in the medical professional and status hierarchy.
Even today, seventy per cent of all expenditures for child health care
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services are paid for by private means (out-of-pocket expenses or
through insurance plans), while twenty per cent are paid by state
and local governments, and only ten per cent by the federal govern-
ment. (Breslow, 1969, p. 328) There are several important
implications of this private, marketplace nature of health care
delivery:
a) Governmental leverage is likely to be less than
or at least different from that in, say, public
education.
b) The context of public programs and the independent
variables which they can affect are often quite
different from those. in educational programs.
c) The health care "system" is less of a system than
is the educational one. Except in some categorical
programs, there are no state-wide mandates, uniform
standards for quality of care or process organization,
or reporting requirements. The potential for large
scale evaluation studies with even minimally accept-
able control groups is thus limited.
d) Finally, the public accountability and visibility of
education, which it could be argued is a primary
reason for outcome evaluation efforts, is virtually
entirely lacking in health care, particularly in so-
called "mainstream" care delivery for non-indigent
persons.
At the present time, there have been no substantive, major studies
of the trade-offs between health programs and others specifically
intended for child development. But we do know ways in which health
or health care can interact with development and educational achieve-
ment, and some areas in which it seems probable that health and child
development programs could represent trade-offs. Scientific evidence
and logical sense suggest that the processes of physical growth and/or
impairment are distinct and separable from processes of cognitive,
emotional, and social development only in the formal schemes of
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professionals in those fields. Some brief, acute childhood diseases
or traumas (chickenpox, minor colds, broken arms) may be generally
considered as isolated medical events with no lasting implications.
However, for many children contact with the medical care system, with
the sick role, or especially with even brief hospitalization in early
childhood can have significant and often permanent effects on behavior,
attitudes, and later illness patterns and response. (Bergman, 1965;
Dimock, 1960; Spitz, 1945, 1946; Shaeffer &-Callender, 1959; addi-
tional bibliography in Shore, 1967)
Other evidence, comprehensively reviewed and synthesized by
Birch and Gussow (1970), strongly suggests that physical health is
a critical independent variable underlying educational performance
and intellectual development. (See also Richmond & Weinberger, 1970;
Gussow, 1970; Callahan, 1971; Chase & Martin, 1970; Elias, 1971; Kaplan,
1972; Kerr, G., 1972; Read, 1972, 1969; Werner, et al., 1971) Assess-
ment of biological risk, illness history, and current health status
in groups of children under study for evaluation of schooling or
cognitive stimulation programs would seem essential if the results
are to be meaningful. And yet this is virtually never done, and
the implications for rather gross false negative findings in educa-
tion research appear startling. For example, Christopher Jencks'
new and impressive reanalysis of the data on education and inequality
still does not examine or control for the health or nutritional
status of the children. This is not a trivial omission.
Children who had been repeatedly and excessively exposed
to biological risk, both before and after birth, were
unlikely to be dramatically helped solely by the applica-
tion of "more schooling," no matter how early it was
begun or how intensively it was pursued. (Birch & Gussow,
1970, p. 264)
i
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Birch and Gussow go on to point out that the physiological and
developmental impact of sub-optimal health or conditions of life
cannot be wiped out in a short period of time, and thus evaluations
may be further upset if they seek to draw conclusions about inter-
vention programs after a year or even a few years. For example,
the substantial evidence that the health and physical condition
of the mother, particularly during her own childhood and adolescence,
is one of the greatest risk factors for the-infant indicates that
one must wait until the next generation at least (and probably
longer) to see the ultimate developmental or learning effects of
improved maternal health status.
The evidence, however fragmentary; leads one to the conclusion
that biological Aisks, unfavorable e-nvironments and poor health
are not random occurrences in our society but rather tend to pervade
certain groups in such a way as to create widespread and rather
massive differences in development. Finding and analyzing such a
framework would seem to be vital in eventually settling, among other
things, the current debate over genetic potential as a causal factor
in achievement differentials.
Thus, although it is entirely reasonable to wish to know
more about the heritability of intelligence and learning
capability in human beings, the pre-condition for a serious
consideration of this question is the equalization of the
developmental environments of those who genetic make-up
we wish to compare. (Birch and Gussow, 1970, p. 266)
For example, comparisons in which current family income or social class
are used as control variables, thus apparently equalizing environment,
are simply not valid unless the past health and nutritional history
of those groups were also roughly comparable. And even a brief look
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at national income figures will show that very few black or other
non-white children live in families who have been out of poverty
for as long as their white middle class peers.
The area in which there is the strongest evidence of a trade-
off effect i:, that of early screening and treatment for handicapping
and chronic conditions. The Joint Commission on Mental Health of
Children (1970) estimated that comprehensive cars' until the age of
three could reduce chronic handicapping conditions by 20 to 30 per
cent. These conditions, if not remedied, generally require special
educational and/or physical rehabilitation services which are usually
quite expensive and therefore difficult to provide for all children
in need. An HEW Maternal and Child Health Program Analysis (1966)
reached similar conclusions, placing stress not only on detection
and treatment but also on preventive measures such as prenatal care
and family planning. There is also evidence, summarized by the
Huron Institute report (1972, Chap. 12), that early treatment in a
setting combining health and education will reduce the level of
handicap or lower achievement patterns of handicapped or retarded
children. Not only do educational evaluators weaken their programs
and findings by not measuring health status, but children who are
"claimed" by the medical profession may not have proper attention paid
to their educational needs. As Eliot Richardson, ex-Secretary of HEW,
has said:
The dimension of the handicapped pediatric population
is such that we can no longer isolate educationally
what are also complex medical problems. Follow-up
studies of children with cerebral palsy, myelomeningocele,
epilepsy, and profound deafness illustrated that these
children are seldom if ever prepared adequately for adult
life, and they may become victims of society in the broadest.
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sense...left without guidance, and no gainful occupation...
to give the patient self-respect and a place in society.
(quoted in Haggerty, 1970a, p. 86)
The whole notion of preventive health measures, which are
becoming very popular, is also that of a trade-off. Such programs
as rubella inoculations for children, genetic counseling and test-
ing of -parents and fetus, family planning, and abortion services
may--at reasonably low cost--reduce the number of unwanted,
neglected, abused or handicapped children who would otherwise
require special medical, educational, and probably family support
services.
Normal Patterns of Child Health
Issues of child health need to be put in the perspective of
national norms of health. Basically, childhood, after the first
year, is normally the healthiest portion of an individual's life.
The level of those norms of health are dependent upon the society's
general level of development, its investment in health resources
(medical schools, hospitals, biomedical research), and, as evidence
will show, the degree of income and standard of living disparities
in the society.
The American Academy of Pediatrics, in its excellent review
of child health needs and programs, Lengthening Shadows (1971),
summarizes the acute health problems of children (those lasting
no longer than three months) by separating them into four chrono-
logic subgroups:
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1) Neonatal Period*(0 - 1 mo.) 6, During this period the child
is at great risk from- many acute conditions, some the
result of perinatal complications or congenital defects,
and some due to the environment--the newborn nursery or
the home. Among the neonatal conditions are infections
acquired prenatally (rubella, congenital pneumonia),
during birth (herpes virus), and postnatally (staphylo-
coccal infection, pyoderma, sepsis, pneumonia, meningitis,
epidemic diarrhea of newborn). Other conditions requir-
ing quick diagnosis and treatment are hyperbilirubinemia
(which can either kill or cause brain damage), biochemi-
cal disturbances (such as hypoglycemia and hypocalcemia),
severe anemia, respiratory distress syndrome (still a
frequent killer), and malformations which may require
surgical intervention.
2) Infancy (1 mo. - 2 yrs.; this does not correspond to the
strict use of the adjective "infant" for mortality rates
which refer only to first year). This is the period of
most acute illnesses while the child is also achieving
greater control of immunological, physiological, and
biochemical functions. Some of the common acute con-
ditions may cause permanent impairment (or death) if
not prevented or treated speedily: acute respiratory
infections, otitis media (frequent cause of permanent
hearing loss in medically underserved.areas), acute
infantile diarrhea, pneumonia, pyoderma (if not treated),
and acute bacterial meningitis.
3) Preschool (2 - 6). Acute illnesses occur less frequently
in this period, partly because of the child's immunities
developed earlier. Acute contagious diseases (as the
child tends to mingle more with his peers), accidents, and
poisonings are all at peak frequencies, however.
4) School period and adolescence. Children are generally in
better health than earlier. Chronic diseases (rheumatic
fever, diabetes, etc.) often begin to appear now, but at
incidence rates much lower than childhood acute conditons.
Accidents are by far the leading cause of death, followed
by cancer.
*
Some definitions of the subdivisions of infancy may be useful:
prenatal: conception - birth
neonatal: birth - 1 mo. (28 days)
early neonatal: birth - 6 days
late neonatal: 7 days - 28 days (or 1 mo.)
postneonatal: 1 mo. - 11 mos.
infancy: under 1 year
perinatal: period surrounding birth; depending on study, may begin
with 20th to 28th week of pregnancy and extend from 1st week of
life (early neonatal period) to Ist mo. (neonatal period).
(Sartwell, 1965, p. 657)
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By definition, chronic conditions and handicaps do not display
the same patterns of age-specific immunity or frequency that acute
conditions do. Patterns seem, however, to be pointing toward an
increase in the number of children whose condition is congenital
or from birth, rather than acquired during childhood (e.g., con-
genital. blindness vs. blindness by trauma) and whose problems are
multiple. There is some indication that prevalence patterns in later
childhood -may be altered by screening and treatment in the early
years. (Joint Commission on the. Mental Health of Children, 1970;
Maternal and Child Health Programs, 1966)
In 1965, approximately one in every twelve children (aged 6 - 11)
had a speech defect; one in nine had defective vision; and less than
one per cent had hearing problems. The incidence of blindness among
children under 20 has remained steady since 1960. (White House Con-
ference on Children, 1970, pp. 30-31; see also AAP, 1971, pp. 51-27;
Richmond & Weinberger, 1970, pp. 37-39) While techniques for pre-
venting and detecting handicaps at an early age (such as amniocentesis,
preventive inoculations, Rh vaccine) are rapidly becoming universal,
there are other factors increasing their likelihood: expertise in
hospital deliveries which saves many infants who would previously
have died and the ever growing chance of iatrogenic or genetic
effects from the drugs administered to or taken by women during
pregnancy. (The average number taken is already four; Richmond
& Weinberger, 1970, p. 39.)
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Critical Factors for Child Health
In this section, I shall be looking at need from all of the
perspectives outlined in Chapter 1: as individually discovered
"crises", as conditions amenable to treatment by best available
expertise, and as systematically analyzed gaps or misfits in service
programs. There is a surfeit of information now available on the
subject, from all three perspectives. Most of my own research
and reading has been. in the third category, with forays into the
others.
The organization of the material has a three fold purpose.
First, to provide some substance to abstract models of evaluation:
to suggest those areas most in need of attention in order that the
feasibility of obtaining adequate evaluations in those areas
(according to the contraints laid out in Chapters 2 and 3) could
be assessed. Second, to demonstrate in its arrangement and presen-
tation my own attempt to force scientific evidence and moral commit-
ment as close together as possible. And finally, to persuade the
reader that the planning and execution of child health programs,
even in the face of incomplete knowledge, is neither a trivial
nor an escapable task for social policy in the seventies.
In the pages that follow, I first present in tabular form (Tables
land 2) what I have found to be either 1) the most commonly discussed
or 2) the most critical in impact of health-related risks to children
(primarily children under 15). I make a preliminary distinction between
independent risks (Table 1) and clustered ones (Table 2). Independent
risks happen either individually or in random combinations to children
(and to their pregnant mothers). Clustered risks, although not all
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Table 1.
Independent Risks
A. Biological Risks
1. Genetic
hemophilia
sickle cell anemia
male (across all income and racial groups, males have
higher infant mortality rates than female babies!)
2. Congenital errors (Rutter, Tizard, & Whitmore, 1970)
mal formations
mental retardation (of certain types)
cerebral palsy, other physically handicapping diseases
3. Maternal condition
nutrition (Scrimshaw, 1950)
iatrogenic effects (from tranquilizers, fertility pills,
etc.)
chromosomal. damage (from smoking, LSD, etc.)
congenital syphilis or heroin addiction
4. Reproductive complications (Schachter & Apgar, 1959)
5. Diseases (C.f. previous AAP categories for age specific
breakdown)
malignant diseases
childhood diseases for which no vaccine is available
acute respiratory syndrome
sudden infant death syndrome
rare diseases
diseases of the teeth
6. Prematurity (of some types; Drillien, 1964)
General references which have discussions of many of these risks are
Lengthening Shadows (AAP, 1971, pp. 10-88; 152-191); Profiles of .
Children (White House Conference on Children, 1970); "Critical Health
Needs of Children" in Chapter 6 of the Huron Institute report (1972)
(which incidently I did not write!); Richmond and Weinberger, 1970;
Haggerty (1970 a,b); and HEW (1966).
-- 1
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B. Social/Environmental Risks
1. Accidents (the leading killer up to age 15; 1/3 of all
deaths) (Wight, 1969)
motor vehicles
drownings
fires/explosions
2. Nutrition (Kerr, 1972; Scrimshaw, 1965; USDA, 1968)
Monosodium glutamate, other dangerous additives and
preservatives
empty calories ("the Pepsi generation")
obesity
3. Child abuse/neglect (Gil, 1970; HEW, 1968; Kempe, 1962;
Newberger, 1971; Silver, et al., 1959; Simons, et al.,
1966)
failure to thrive (Talbot & Howell, 1971; Talbot, 1963)
4. Mental illness (NIMH estimates that only 5% of* children
needing psychiatric care are receiving it; WHCC, 1970,
p. 29) (Joint Commission on the Mental Health of
Children, 1970; Rutter, Tizard, & Whitmore, 1970)
5. Abortion: to the extent that abortion is based on knowledge
of risk and reduces number of children born with congenital
malformations, etc.
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Table 2.
Clustered Risks
A. Biologic Risks
1. Maternal condition (Yerushalmy, 1938; Yerushalmy, et al.,
1940)
general poor health
poor nutrition (anemic, etc.) (Scrimshaw, 1965; Tompkins,
et al., 1955; Committee on Maternal Nutrition...,
high parity
age (teenage; over 30) (Menken, 1972)
spacing of children
2.. Reproductive complications (Knobloch & Pasamanick, 1966;
Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1960, 1966)
toxemia
anemia
miscarriages
prematurity (Drillien, 1964; Tompkins, et al., 1955)
postnatal asphyxia
3. Congenital errors
malformations
mental retardation (Kaplan, 1972; Read, 1969, 1972)
sensory deficits (Vernon, 1967)
4. Extreme low birth weight (under 1500 grams) (Drillien, 1961;
Glass, et al., 1971; Robinson & Robinson, 1965)
5. Infectious diseases (if generally controllable: pneumonia,
influenza, diarrhea, gastroenteritis)
6. Cavities; missing teeth
7.- Infant mortality (Hunt, D., 1969; Hunt, E., 1970; Shapiro,
et al., 1968)
8. Maternal mortality
9. Nutrition (Chase & Martin, 1970; Christakis, et al., 1968;
The general references most useful here were Birch & Gussow (1970);
Gussow (1970); Richmond and Weinberger (1970); American Academy of
Pediatrics (1971); Hellmuth (1967); HEW (1966); Werner (1967); and
Werner, Bierman, & French (1971).
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Citizens' Board of Inquiry, 1968, 1972; Fomon, 1970;
Gutelius, 1969; Kaplan, 1972; Owen & Kram, 1969;
. Sandstead, 1971; Scrimshaw, 1965; Woolsey, 1971)
iron-deficiency anemia
malnutrition
hunger
B. Social/Environmental Risks
1. Non-medical status (Wagner, 1970; North, 1967)
poverty (Rider, et al., 1955; Sandstead, 1971)
non-white (esp. black, Indian, Chicano)
(Adair & Deuschle, 1970; McDermott, et al., 1972)
rural or inner city
migrant (Siegal, 1966)
2. Accidents (Wight, 1969)
lead paint poisoning, ingestions (Smith, 1964)
traffic
falls
3. Infections
unsafe water
inadequate heat
rat bites
poor nutrition (Scrimshaw, 1965)
4. Medical system gaps (Collver, et al., 1967; de Vise, 1969;
Lesser, 1965; Madison, 1969; Monahan & Spencer, 1962;
Strauss, 1967; Yerby, 1966)
no prenatal care
no well-baby care
no regular dental care
missing immunizations
unattended illness
no health insurance
5. Psychological/behavioral correlates (Callahan, 1971; Elias,
1971; Gussow, 1970; Read, 1969, 1972; Kaplan, 1972;
- Sandstead, 1971)
poor school performance
inattention
apathy
lowered intelligence, cognitive ability
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proven to be dependent or linked causally can be shown to occur
non-randomly. Independent risks are not synonymous with chance
occurrences. A mother who is a carrier for hemophilia will have
hemophilic sons; one who is not a carrier will not. But there is
no evidence that that mother will also bear retarded or premature
babies or that she will be unable to feed them adequately.
Similarly, families who abuse their children may present clear
psychiatric syndromes (abuse by their parents, extreme stress,
uncontrolled anger, etc.), but those syndromes do not predict rates
of tuberculosis or cerebral palsy in the children. For this reason,
the entries on the "independent risks" charts bear little similarity
*
to each other.
On the other hand, it is difficult to list the clustered risks
on separate lines without drawing arrows between and among them.
There are three types of linkages in the clusters. First, among
the biologic risks there are the risks of multi-problem children,
those who are. deaf, mentally retarded, and epileptic for example.
These children tend to have chromosomal damage (from rubella, for
example) and previously would probably have died. Second, there
are the biologic risks of high-risk pregnancies, from mothers too
young, too old, or with other such dangerous conditions. And
finally there are those linkages between environmental/social
risks with biologic risks in a two-way relationship.
*
I do not mean to imply that the conditions here are never part of
larger syndromes or associated with clustering risks; certainly
sickle cell anemia, for example, is usually associated with poverty
and virtually always with blacks. But blackness and poverty (the
core source of the clustering) are only circumstantially linked,
while sickle cell anemia is genetically linked.
125
The clustered risks are not really different from the independent
ones in this regard. Most of the independent conditions could be
depicted as the result of or the -nexus of a cluster, of biologic
and environmental events. Cancer, for example, is often related
to levels of carcinogens in food and air.' Because this is not a
medical paper, I am not going into such etiological and epidemiological
richness. These linkages are either too clear (e.g., the spread of
typhoid from unsafe water) or too contested. (e.g., the role of child-
hood cholesterol or salt intake on adult disease) to merit new policy
action. The linkages demonstrated by the clustered risks, however,
are more interesting because they suggest the complex interaction of
health care and other variables with the health of the individual
and the sadly prominent reality of the social etiology of childhood
disease and poor health. This social confluence, however, does offer
hope that many child health problems, because they are not independent
risks, may be alleviated by the same health or health-related programs.
In the outline, references will be noted for some of the health
risks. Following the outline, I discuss some of the most important
problems or clusters of risk. I should note here that I have not
completely organized the risks into "critical periods" or temporal
sequences. This would require far greater sophistication in pediatrics,
and developmental biology, and developmental psychology than I possess.
Some clear evidence or critical ages for serious insult is presented
in the discussion of specific risks.
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Infant Mortality: Its Causes and Correlates
The United States infant mortality rate (deaths under one year/
1000 live births) was 22.4 in 1967 (the latest figures available).
The rate ranged from 16.6 in Utah to a high of 35.5 in Mississippi,
with individual areas going above and below those state figures.
The discrepancy between rates for whites and non-whites (there is
no direct measure of poor vs. non-poor) has been growing in recent
years; in 1967, the national rates were 35.4 for non-whites and
19.6 for whites. In 1950, the non-white rate was 66% higher than
the white rate; by 1965 it was 85% higher. Overall infant mortality
rates are highest for blacks and American Indians. (White House
Conference on Children, Profiles of Children, 1970, pp. 48-49;
hereafter referred to as WHCC) Put in terms of life chances, a
non-white child runs a risk one and one-half times greater than a
white child of death in the first month of life and a risk more
than two and one-half times greater in the first year. (Huron
Institute, 1972, Vol. 1, p. 371)
The leading causes of infant mortality, according to a study
by Diana Hunt (1969), include:
1) postneonatal death which occurs largely as a result
of infectious diseases, particularly influenza, pneumonia,
diarrhea, and enteritis;
2) prematurity;
3) failure to obtain prenatal care;
4) failure to identify and care for high risk pregnancies; and
5) the total environment.
According to Profiles of Children (WHCC, 1970), more than 50% of infant
deaths are accounted for by premature births, congenital malformations,
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and postnatal asphxia. (p. 50)
The evidence for the effect of prematurity on survival chances is
generally indirect. Because all women do not receive early pre-
natal care or determine the exact date of conception, it is some-
times hard to determine whether a baby is in fact early, on time,
or late. The usual proxy measure is birth weight, with low birth
weight (under 2500 grams or 5 lbs. 8 oz.) being highly correlated
with prematurity and strongly with risk of death. Some studies
(c.f. Werner, Bierman, & French, 1971) have separated low birth
weight from actual prematurity and compared their separate and
combined effects. They found that there are some normal, full-
term infants who are of below average weight; these infants
show little residual damage or risk'to survival. There are
also premature infants, who tend to be under normal weight, but
between 1500 and 2500 grams; these infants, if raised in a
nurturing environment, catch up with their full-term,.full weight
peers, although a poor environment or other health risks may
prove more damaging to these fragile children. Finally- there are
the infants of very low birth weight, usually very premature
and often with other problems; these are the infants who exper-
ience great risk of death in the early weeks and months of life
and who frequently demonstrate irreparable damage in several
areas--health, size, mental ability, psychological functioning.
This risk is vividly shown by the figures on infant mortality
rates by birth weight.
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Birth Weight Infant Mortality Rates/
1000 Live Births
1000 gms. or less
(2 lb. 3 oz. or under) 919
1001 - 1500 gms.
(2 lb. 4 oz. - 3 lb. 4 oz.) 548
1501 - 2000 gms.
(3 lb. 5 oz. - 4 lb. 6 oz.) 207
2001 - 2500 gms.
(4 lb. 7 oz. - 5 lb. 8 oz.) 58
2501 - 3000 gms.
(5 lb. 9 oz. - 6 lb. 9 oz.) 19
3001 - 4500 gms.
(6 lb. 10 oz. - 9 lb. 14 oz.) 9
4501 gms. or over
(9 lb. 15 oz. or more) 13
Source: National Center for. Health Statistics
(1960), Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (As cited in WHCC, pp. 41
and 90)
There is a significant difference in the epidemiology of the neo-
natal and postneonatal and infant mortality rates. There is less
difference along socioeconomic and racial lines in neonatal rates.
Death rates in the first week of life (early neonatal) have declined
much more slowly than those in the first year of life .over the last
forty years. (WHCC, p. 49) The dynamics appear to be thus: the
early neonatal mortality curve is asymptotic and is practically at
its apparent asymptote in all of the Western countries. It has
remained virtually constant in the U.S. since 1950. As more and
more of our population becomes urbanized and hence has access to
hospitals, this rate (which represents the limit of modern tech-
nologic and medical control) has given up as much ground as it is
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going to. The late neonatal and postneonatal curves, however, are
much more influenced by environmental conditions (their first major
reduction, as Dubos (1959) has pointed out, being during the Sanitary
Revolution of the 1800's) and socioeconomic status. It is these
rates in the United States which account for most of the difference
in white and non-white death rates. This is shown most sharply in
Indian infant death rates: early neonatal rates are better than
the national average, but those for late neonatal and postneonatal
(7-28 days and 28 days-1 year) are significantly worse. (AAP, 1971,
p. 153) Much of this mortality is due to infectious diseases such
as tuberculosis and trachoma, which are no longer real threats to
middle class children. In the hospital, care can protect the new-
born child from disease; there is no genetic susceptibility or
weakness. But when the child is living in the hogans in which
everyone including livestock lives and eats on the floor and the
standard of living is pitifully low, the impact of health care is
much less. A study of a six-year Navajo-Cornell Field Health
Project comments:
The effectiveness of contemporary medical technologies is
far more dependent on the socioeconomic circumstances of
the recipient in the case of the infant than it is in the
case of older children....-Modern medical technology has
relatively little to offer infants who are located in an
unprotected home environment. (McDermott, et al., 1972,
p. 29)
Rural and semi-rural areas in general report death rates at least
10% above the national average. (Hunt, E., 1970) This is probably
due both to environmental conditions (poverty, poor housing,
infections, etc.) and also to a residual elevation of the early
neonatal rate because of the lack of access to hospitals and of
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unattended home deliveries. A combination of largely black, rural,
poor populations explains the geographic concentration of excessive
death rates in the southern states. Over 50% of all non-white
births in 1967 occurred in just 16 southern states and Washington,
D.C.; the 15 southern states with above-average rates also have
the highest concentration of families with incomes below $2000
a year. (Huron Institute, 1972, Vol. 1, p. 380)
Childhood Mortality
The risk of death in the first year of life is higher than in
any other year until 65. (WHCC, p. 95) Even if the infant rate
were equivalent to the early neonatal rate of 15.0 (i.e. if the
only deaths occurred in the first week), the risk of death would
still be higher than every other year until age 55. But once
past this critical year, childhood mortality is an extreme and
rare occurrence. The lowest average death rates are for children
ages 5-14 (0.4), with the second lowest for ages 1-4 (0.9). (WHCC,
p. 95) In characterizing the patterns of these rates, Richmond and
Weinberger (1970) say, "In general, the patterns of leading causes
of death among non-white children tends to resemble the pattern
among white children at least a decade earlier." (p. 27) Leading
causes of deaths between ages I and 4 are:
1) accidents, by a wide margin; rate much higher for non-
whites
2) congenital malformations
3) flu/pneumonia (for non-whites);cancer (for whites)
4) cancer (for non-whites); flu/pneumonia (for whites)
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5) meningitis (WHCC, p. 64)
Of the accidents, 33% are from motor vehicles and 22% from fires
and explosions, both situations over which medical science or
health care has virtually no direct control.
Childhood Morbidity
Many of the traditional diseases of childhood--infectious
diseases, tuberculosis, pneumonia, gastroenteritis--have been
virtually eliminated except for the poor and the non-white,
who still do not receive basic immunizations or live in healthy
environments. The rates of tuberculosis for non-whites are four
to five times higher than for whites at the same ages. After a
dramatic drop since 1959, both cases of and deaths from diphtheria
have slowly risen since 1965--startling evidence of slippage in
basic immunizations and disease control. (All data from WHCC,
pp. 26-7; also see Huron Institute, 1972, Vol. 1, p. 411; North,
1967; and Siegal, 1966)
I would like to discuss an important concept about infant and
childhood morbidity. The concept, of a continuum of physical and
psychological insult from infant death to mental retardation and
other non-fatal deficits, was first proposed by Knobloch and
Pasamanick in their work on the epidemiology and sequelae of
reproductive casualty. (Knobloch & Pasamanick, 1966; Pasamanick and
Knobloch, 1960, 1966) Noting the association between pregnancy
complications and fetal and neonatal deaths due to brain injury,
they hypothesized that among the survivors
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...there must remain a fraction so injured who do not die,
but depending on the degree and location of trauma, go on
to develop a series of disorders extending from cerebral
palsy, epilepsy and mental deficiency-through all types
of behavioral and learning disabilities resulting from
lesser degrees of damage. (Pasamanick and Knobloch, 1960,
p. 304)
This is probably the single most important hypothesis and organizing
concept in child health care today. It is enabling researchers
and practitioners to gradually bring together a wide variety of
factors, syndromes, illnesses, and environmental conditions into
a systematic model of the epidemiology, etiology, and process of
morbidity in children. Needless to say it is not completely accepted;
nor is it able to deal with all of the problems of child health. It
is important as a policy tool primari.ly because of the overwhelming
evidence, some of which has been presented above, that many reproduc-
tive complications and causes of infant mortality are associated
with social conditions and inequities: poverty, race, lack of pre-
natal or regular medical care, poor nutrition (of both mother and
young child), and unsafe living conditions. As one major review of
knowledge about child health and development recently stated:
Although the figures become vaguer and less easily definable,
it should be obvious that with a higher level of perinatal
mortality, goes a greater degree of morbidity. And, one
can safely assume that the long-term effects of perinatal
morbidity--though not precisely documented--must be taking
a considerable toll in human potential. on the survivors.
Longitudinal studies of the detrimental effects of pre-
maturity on physical development, psychologic and
intellectual growth are reported in the literature.
"It appears that the non-white infant is subject to
an excessive continuum of risk reflected at its extremes
by perinatal, neonatal and infant death, and in the
- survivors by a reduced functional potential." (Richmond
& Weinberger, 1970, p. 29; they quote Birch, 1968)
Studies cited in the Huron Institute report (1972) provide evidence of
higher levels of visual and hearing defects among premature infants,
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differences on psychological tests between low birth weight and
normal children (with greatest impairment at the lowest birth
weights); the impairments appeared to be linked to neurological
defects.
...in identifying that segment of the general popula-
tion which is subject to the highest rate of infant
loss, we are, in effect, defining a group in whose
surviving children we can expect to find not only a
high incidence of present poor health, but a higher
than average prevalence of primary neurological
damage representing the aftermath of excessive
exposure to hazards of gestation, birth, and early
life. (Birch and Gussow, 1970, p. 13)
One primary example of neurological damage is mental retardation.
Between 100,000 and 200,000 mentally retarded babies are born each
year. (There are now about 2.5 million retarded children under 20
in all.) Seventy-five per cent of these children are mildly
retarded (educable); 15% are moderately handicapped (trainable);
8% severely (many trainable); and 2% are profoundly retarded (unable
to care for themselves). (WHCC, p. 51) One fourth of these cases
can be linked to genetic abnormalities, infections such as German
measles during early pregnancy, birth accidents, or postnatal
infections or traumas, events which also are prime causes of infant
mortality. Suspected causes for the others include inadequacies of
prenatal and perinatal care, nutrition, child rearing, and social and
environmental opportunities. (Ibid.) (See also Joint Commission on
the Mental Health of Children, 1970; and AAP, 1971, pp. 60-6)
This primary neurological damage is usually confounded by the
undue effects which adverse conditions have on premature children.
The most serious effect of this continuum of harm has already been
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shown in the elevated postneonatal mortality rates of premature infants.
One of the most damaging conditions appears to be poverty. The
Kauai study (Werner, et al., 1971; Werner, 1967) of children with
varying degrees of birth complications concluded that even severe
complications (such as prematurity) could be compensated for by
a good postnatal environment, but for the poorest children the
cumulative effect of birth complications and environmental risks
resulted in lower IQ scores. Drillien (1964) reaches similar con-
clusions, except that he reports noticeable handicap in infants of
very low birth weight (under 3 1/2 lbs.) regardless of the family's
socioeconomic status or the mother's "competence." Another factor
which he also found to affect premature infants (or ones with
other kinds of perinatal stress) was family stress.
The chances of this residual damage being promptly discovered,
treated, or possibly offset by extremely advantageous conditions
of growth in the early years is severely diminished when one con-
siders that prematurity and low birth weight are both more frequent
occurrences in non-white and poor families to begin with, with each
factor contributing separately to the correlations. (See Huron
Institute, Vol. 1, pp. 398-404) (See also Birch & Gussow, 1970;
Werner, 1967; Werner, et al., 1971; Vernon, 1967; Drillien, 1961;
Glass, et al., 1971, Robinson & Robinson, 1965)
The issue of cognitive deficits as the result of prematurity and
low birth weight is a very complex one. I do not have enough knowledge
of education, intelligence tests and child development to enter that
debate directly. According to Wiener (1962), only one ,of eighteen
studies done since 1940 failed to find premature children lower in
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IQ at some point. Others, such as Werner, Bierman, & French (1971)
and Drillien (1964) find differences depending on socioeconomic back-
ground, family environment (e.g., education of mother, presence of
books in the house, stable family), and whether the birth weight was
only marginally below normal or extremely low. It would seem that,
just as we cannot really determine whether the fact that race is
correlated with prematurity rates even when socioeconomic status is
controlled for is due to geneti-c differences or the generational
impact of poor health, poor nutrition, and poor living, so too we
cannot expect to isolate the separate contributions of prematurity or
other birth risks and of later environmental factors on cognitive
development and performance until we have a sufficiently large number
of high-risk infants who are not raised in high-risk environments.
My own suspicion is that much of the correlation will disappear. To
suggest why this might be so, I will now examine two sets of causes
for low birth weight, prematurity, or death, which will both be shown
to be primarily socioeconomic in origin.
Maternal Condition and Risk of Reproductive Complications
The general health, nutritional status, and physical history of
the mother are related to the risk of reproductive complications, which
are in turn associated with damage to the fetus resulting in death
or illness. Birch and Gussow (1970), in their comprehensive review,
show that almost every complication of pregnancy and birth (such as
toxemia, anemia, prematurity, and postnatal asphyxia) that is
potentially damaging to the infant is more prevalent among the poor
and the non-white. The Huron Institute report (1972) also summarizes
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these findings. Briefly, all of the following conditions of the
mother have been linked, to greater or lesser degrees, with chances
of reproductive complications, usually measured by the variables
of prematurity, low birth weight, or infant death:
1) Maternal age. The handful of large-scale studies have con-
sistently shown "that the mortality rate is extremely high
for mothers younger than 15, declines to a minimum in
either the early or late twenties, and increases fairly
sharply thereafter." (Menken, 1972, p. 47) "The increased
risk of prematurity may be the most important medical
aspect of teenage pregnancy... .Whether because of biologic
or environmental factors that affect the infant directly
or indirectly through prematurity, the infant born to a
teenage mother has a much higher risk than infants of
somewhat older mothers of suffering specific severe
handicaps." (Ibid., pp. 49-50)
2) Parity. The risks of pregnancy increase with the number of
children or the number of pregnancies a woman has had.
Infant mortality tends to increase after the third birth
in all but the highest socioeconomic class, where it
increases after the fourth birth.
3) Spacing of pregnancy. The risks associated with many
pregnancies are increased if the births are close together.
Huron (1972) cites data showing that "high parity and youth-
fulness are also associated with a high risk of mental
deficiency in the child, with the highest risk mothers
being under twenty at third parity." (Vol. 1, p. 386)
Again because of their earlier age at first pregnancy
and their larger families, low-income mothers are more
likely to be in these high risk groups.
4) Other conditions. There is some ambiguous evidence that
short stature of mothers is associated with low birth weight
in infants. (C.f. Birch & Gussow, 1970; Huron, 1972, Vol. 1)
There are also the obvious medical risks associated with
pregnancy for hypertensive, diabetic, obese, and anemic
women, as well as those who, along with their husbands,
possess dangerous or harmful gene combinations. The impact
of nutrition on reproductive complications is discussed
below.
Because large-scale studies with sufficient numbers of women in
each category to assure statistical significance are difficult and
rare, it is hart to determine the extent to which actual pregnancy
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factors or environmental ones are responsible for the ultimate health
problems of the child. For example, Menken (1972) believes that
"fetal, perinatal, and to a lesser extent, neonatal mortality appear
to be caused primarily by factors related -to the pregnancy itself,
while postneonatal mortality is attributed more often to environmental
causes." (p. 47) Likewise, the factors of maternal age and parity
can be interpreted biologically to indicate the woman's full physical
maturity and capacity to give birth, the declining effectiveness of
her reproductive system, or its degree of previous stress. These
factors may also be interpreted sociologically to indicate the
preparedness of the mother to accept either a first or a fifth or
sixth child, the readiness of the society to accept her pregnancy
(particularly for young, unmarried girls, but also for women having
a child very late in-life), and the capacity of the family to accept,
nurture, provide for, and love the new child. This dual interpre-
tation of ultimate outcomes seems quite plausible for many of the
sequelae of prematurity.
Nutrition and Child Health
The role of nutrition in human health and development and its
causal relation to an hypothesized continuum of permanent damage
beginning with fetal and infant deaths, is probably the most
exciting and prominent topic in early childhood studies. Of primary
concern are the impact of the mother's nutrition, both over her
lifetime and during pregnancy and nursing, on the potential of the
child for survival and optimal growth; the infant's nutrition during
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the critical period of brain development and myelination; and the
impact of childhood nutrition on growth, health and intellectual
achievement. References to some articles are made in the listings
above; of the general references, those most concerned with nutri-
tion questions are Birch and Gussow (1970), the leading spokesmen
in the field; Gussow (1970); Profiles on Children (WHCC, 1970);
and Richmond and Weinberger (1970).
This is a huge topic, one which deeply fascinates and concerns
me. I am doing continuing research and writing in the area, and
hence it is hard to stop in mid-sentence and summarize. One way
to begin is to briefly summarize some critical definitions. Merrill
Read (1969) has put them well:
In considering this problem it is important to define mal-
nutrition and to distinguish it from hunger. Malnutrition is
viewed as a condition characterzied by an intake of one or
more nutri.ents so insufficient that specific clinical signs
appear or retardation in physical development is observed.
The term severe malnutrition refers to a clinical syndrome
arising from long-term protein-calorie malnutrition in
early childhood. This is called kwashiorkor and results
in extreme stunting of growth accompanied by edema, skin
ulcers, and hair discoloration. Specific syndromes of
malnutrition may result from consumption of diets inadequate
in certain nutrients such as protein, vitamins or minerals;
anemia, rickets, and vitamin deficiencies fall into this
classification. Demonstrable growth retardation may or
may not occur. Hunger, on the other hand, is the state of
insufficient food intake required to provide a general sense
of well-being and to meet immediate energy needs. If suffi-
ciently prolonged and serious, hunger may develop into mal-
nutrition. The damaging effects of hunger and malnutrition
are more devastating in the child because he is a growing
organism. Hunger may be easily and immediately relieved
with food, whereas malnutrition requires prolonged rehabilita-
tion. (Read, 1969, p. 1)
What I would like to do here is to develop the argument for the
importance of nutrition in its most powerful, overarching, and hence
most controversial form: the direct link between malnutrition and
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mental deficiency. The argument as presented follows that of
Bonnie Kaplan (1972) who has done the most comprehensive review
and synthesis of current research which I have found. Her work
is particularly interesting because she directly confronts the
issue of what would constitute "direct evidence" of this linkage,
evidence which she contrasts with that from studies which examine
related or intervening variables such as prematurity rates, birth
weight, and so on.
An adequate model for a research design to answer the
question, "What is the effect of malnutrition on mental
development?" should strive to fulfill the following
criteria:
1. Both the duration of malnutrition and the extent
of physiological and psychological effects should be
assessed.
2. The approximate period in life during which the
malnutrition was experienced should be consistent across
subjects.
3. All other physiological variables--prematurity,
chronic disease, congenital malformations--should be
carefully controlled.
4. Environmental factors--family income, socioeconomic
class, diet, parents' education--should be carefully controlled.
5. Mental development should be assessed with a variety
of measures: tests for IQ, for cognitive development, for
perceptual and motor skills, and perhaps for emotional and
personality development.
6. Tests of psychological development should be given
periodically over a decade or more, to examine the permanency
of the effects. (Kaplan, 1972, pp. 327-8)
She examines several major studies which have attempted to answer the
question posed, none of which meets all of the requirements of her
model. This, she says, "does not justify ignoring the research.
Several of the studies [one of them is Chase and Martin (1970), cited
above in the list].. .present relatively thorough methodologies and
very convincing results... .The definitive study to prove causality and
to study the significance of timing, environmental compensation, and
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so on, has not been done; it cannot be done because of the ethical
restrictions on experimentation with human subjects." (Ibid., pp. 328,
330) Kaplan is not bemoaning this fact at all. She proceeds directly
to summarize the partial evidence which we do have for a continuum
of casualty. Again I quote at length:
Nutrition begins to affect the life of a baby long before
it is born. Intergenerational data.. .demonstrated that
the nutrition of the baby's mother, grandmother, and per-
haps other ancestors can influence his own chances for
unimpeded physical and mental development. One mechanism
by which the intergenerational factor expresses its
influence appears to be via the mother's stature, par-
ticularly the structure of her pelvis....
Another way in which nutrition affects a child pre-
natally is through intrauterine environment.. .. multiple
births,. .. the mother's consumption of critical nutrients,
...income....correlated with income level. This relation-
ship is easy to understand,.. .especially since high protein
foods are always more expensive than starches and other
carbohydrates.
After a baby is born he is still vulnerable to the
effects of nutritional deficiencies, some of which are
reversible...The timing of the rehabilitation [is] crucial;
the earlier the treatment, the greater [is] its effect.
...It is most helpful to imagine a continuum of
casualty, to borrow the term used by Knobloch and Pasamanick.
Beginning 6 months before birth and lasting until 6 months
after birth, cell division is providing rapid growth of brain
tissue. Nutritional deprivation during this period can
severely retard psychological development, and it is
probably irreversible unless treatment begins before cell
division ends. From 6 months through the first or second year
of life the rate of brain growth is still very rapid,
mainly by protein synthesis, but nutritional rehabilitation
still can be partially effective. Beyond this point the
rate of brain growth is significantly slower, and [one study]
found negligible effects of treatment on IQ scores beyond the
age of 4 years. (Kaplan, 1972, pp. 330-331)
Very similar conclusions on the effects of malnutrition in childhood
have been drawn by Dr. Charles Lowe, research director of the National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development, in his testimony
before the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Related Human
Needs, Jan. 28, 1969 (as quoted in Richmond and Weinberger, 1970,
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p. 33). Lowe notes an additional barrier aside from ethical con-
straints, to proving childhood effects from nutrition: that studies
of adult populations have been the backbone of the science of
nutrition and that the science has therefore failed to recognize
"that nutritional needs of the infant are unique and bear only
tangential relations to those of the adult." (Ibid.)
Elias (1971) has also summarized evidence on the behavioral
consequences of malnutrition in infancy. Despite the problems with
the studies which Kaplan has outlined (particularly the omission
of data on the onset and duration of malnutrition), she found that
there is evidence of major environmental differences, such as
family disturbances and housing conditions, between malnourished
children and controls from the same social class which suggest that
it may not be either poverty or biological insult which is the
crucial factor in the linkage. Further, the prolonged hospitaliza-
tion which may be required in cases of moderate or severe malnutri-
tion may itself have a retarding effect on the child's development.
One model of the effects of nutritional stress suggests how
the organic and social factors probably interact to create outcomes
attributable to neither along. It has been proposed by Birch and
Cravioto (C.f., Birch, 1968) who have both been involved in a long
term, and still continuing, research and action project in Guatamala
on nutrition and human development. The model is depicted below.
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The left hand chain illustrates the type of sequence which Kaplan
(1972), Elias (1971), Chase and Martin (1970), Sandstead, et al.,
(1971), and Read (1969, 1972) are primarily concerned with. The
right hand chain illustrates the effects of nutrition on learning
through three indirect mechanisms:
1) Loss of learning time. Because poorly nourished children
are more susceptible to infections and illness, they may
miss more days of school.
2) Changes in concentration or motivation. The malnourished or
hungry child may be distracted from learning by the actual
physical pain or at least discomfort of an empty stomach.
3) Loss of the social interaction involved in meal times.
Parti-cularly for children whose world contains so little
cultural and social stimulation, stability, or sharing
already, the loss of the social setting ofmealtime is not
a trivial one. (Kaplan, 1972, p. 331; See also Gussow,
1970; Callahan, 1971; Read, 1969, 1972)
Birch notes that the overall effect is to make the malnourished child
a second-class citizen in his ecological environment:
Children who are ill-nourished are reduced in their
responsiveness to the environment, distracted by their
visceral state, and reduced in their ability to progress
and endure in learning conditions....Consequently...there
is a reduction in the profit which a child may derive
from exposure to opportunities for experience. (Birch,
1968, p. 596)
Elias (1971) reviews one hypothesis which suggests a circular
relationship in which the malnourished child is also apathetic
and makes fewer demands on his mother and in turn receives less
attention, less stimulation andless food, thus becoming more
malnourished and apathetic. Hence failure to thrive or maternal
neglect, usually considered as psycho-social problems (c.f. Talbot
& Howells, 1971), may have an organic root in a child's hunger.
Even if I had more faith than I do in the impact of education
on life chances or human development, I would not want to leave the
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impression that the only justification for concern about maternal and
childhood nutrition is their effect on the learning process or brain
development. Certainly if malnutrition can cause permanent brain
damage it should be avoided at all costs. The trouble with arguing
from this standpoint about American children is not so much that
we can't prove the linkage with mental deficiency, but because the
levels of malnutrition in this country are generally well above
those suspected of causing permanent harm.' This is not to say that
there are not some American children who in fact do have kwashiorkor,
marasmus, or other severe nutritional conditions, particularly in
parts of the South, in urban ghettoes, and on Indian reservations.
(Citizens' Board of Inquiry, 1968; Kotz, 1969; AAP, 1971)
To return to the world of policy for a moment, there is at least
one serious program implication of this current focus on nutrition
as a part of a complex syndrome of critical insult to child develop-
ment. If one does not accept the reasonableness of the evidence
outlined above as sufficient for program action, basing policy on
scientific child development grounds may hamstring policies arguable
for other purposes. As Birch and Gussow have forcefully put it:
It would be misleading, if one were to conclude.. .that
malnutrition and illness were significant hazards to
children only in early infancy or only as a consequence
of their "permanent" effects. It must not be overlooked
that the child's present hunger and illness also immediately
affect his level of attention, his interest, his motivation
to learn--in short his achievement in the classroom. Un-
less we intend to feed children today it may be interesting,
but unimportant to their prospects, to decide whether the
effects of yesterday's hunger will continue to affect their
mental development tomorrow. Since mental development is
a process, perhaps only relatively more vulnerable to
interruption at one point than at another, it is difficult
to imagine that anything in the environment which inter-
fered for a significant time with learning could fail to
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affect mental development. The real children in our
classrooms are not like animals in the laboratory who
can be rehabilitated at times appropriate to their
development and convenient to a researcher. In the
real world it may actually be quite unimportant whether
the effects of nutritional stress are organic, bio-
chemical or emotional. Whether or not damage is
permanent must be irrelevant in the face of a depriva-
tion which is; the same children whose mothers were
ill-fed and unready for pregnancy, who are born into
poverty and survive an infancy of hunger and illness
are seldom miraculously saved in the third act.
(Birch & Gussow, 1970, pp. 262-63)
But there is considerable subclinical malnutrition which can also
have serious effects on children. To understand this malnutrition
and hunger, one needs to shift focus from outcome measures of mental
deficiency to epidemiological measures of nutritional deficits or
gaps of various kinds. The argument behind this approach has been
well put by Young (1971):
The present state of knowledge does not permit establishing
quantitative functiional relationships between nutrition and
the achievement of outputs in health, education, and other
important areas. Thus, for purposes of a preliminary
analysis at least, it is expedient to assume that nutri-
tional deficiencies (failure of people to consume required
quantities of essential nutrients) are harmful per se, and
that a sufficient objective is to attempt to eliminate these
deficiencies. (Young, 1971, pp. 8-9)
I would differ with Young only to say that it is more than expedient
to make such an assumption. It is equitable and just to make it
since the majority-of Americans, who are well-fed, do not need to
justify their own consumption of food on grounds other than that
it is better to eat than to go hungry. Let me now turn, then, to
what we know about the nutritional needs of American children on the
basis of equity.
To begin, there are a group of studies which compare the nutri-
tional status in different socioeconomic groups (primarily in England).
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Kaplan summarizes them as follows:
In virtually all such studies the following relationship
seems to hold: Relatively poorer women, when compared to
women of higher economic classes, have less nutritious
diets and give birth to babies who are more often of low
birth weight or perhaps premature, are' less healthy, are
more likely to have congenital malformations or serious
diseases, and have a somewhat lower probability of living
beyond a few months. (Kaplan, 1972, p. 323)
Although stress could also be a factor explaining this difference,
studies in which dietary supplements have been given to low-income
women have had significant effects in producing healthier babies.
(Ibid.) Protein deficiencies seem both the most related to income
and the most harmful to the fetus. Maternal malnutrition, often
over several generations, is an important part of the continuum of
damage suggested by Pasamanick and Knobloch and central in the
clustered risks which I have listed, even at levels observed in
the United States.
It would seem obvious that except in times of brief nutritional
deficits (such as the Dutch famine for 18 months during World War
II due to deliberate Nazi policy (Stein, et al., 1972) or the
shortages in England during the war) it is unlikely that the child
of a malnourished mother is himself going to be well-nourished in
early childhood. As long as the child is being nursed, he can act
as a rather effective parasite on the mother's nutritional reserves
and can gain quite adequate nutrition from her milk. But after
weaning, his nutritional status may decline precipitously. Malnu-
This is possibly one of the environmental reasons why children in large
poor families tend to display lower intelligence or greater risks; if
the children are closely spaced, the safe time of nursing is cut short
when the next sibling comes along.
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trition in infancy and early childhood has been shown to be associated
with increased susceptibility to infectious diseases and higher rates
of mortality from diseases not usually fatal. (Huron Institute, 1972,
Vol. 1, p. 408; Scrimshaw, 1965.) Moreover, infections frequently
depress an already poor nutritional status by interfering with
vitamin systhesis and nitrogen balance (Birch & Gussow, 1970), as
well as often just reducing the appetite.
The extent of malnutrition in the United States is not clear.
Hunger USA (1968) identified 256 counties in poor regions and in some
urban areas as hunger areas; 10 to 15 million people were estimated
to live in families eligible for food supplement programs. The
Department of Agriculture (1968) has estimated that while only
9% of families with incomes over $10,000 had what it called "poor"
diets, 36% of families with income under $3000 did. A "poor" diet
was one containing less than 2/3 of the recommended allowances of
one or more essential nutrients. Sixty-three per cent of the upper
income groups had "good" diets; only 37% of the poor did.
Probably the most widely used measure of the inadequate nutrition
is iron deficiency anemia. Fomon (1970) has shown that infants of
low birth weight and those born to malnourished mothers are among
those most likely to develop iron deficiencies. Hunger USA noted
that between 30 and 70 per cent of children in poverty areas suffer
*
There is some evidence that the majority of Americans are becoming
more poorly nourished; the percentages of "poor" and "fair", as
opposed to "good", diets at all income levels had increased since
the last survey!
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from some degree of iron deficiency anemia. Woolsey (1971) summarizes
evidence from several sources on rates of anemia among children of
different races, family income, and age. Rates and severity of
anemia are higher in very young children (under 2 years) with some
improvement even for poor children as they get older. Many people
have hypothesized that this is part of the "weaning syndrome"
mentioned earlier: that until the child learns to fend for himself
a little better in the world, he is at highest risk of insufficient
nutrients. (Gutelius, 1969) Huron Institute (1972) also summarizes
evidence on a variety of nutrient deficiencies and diseases (rickets,
scurvy, vitamin A and protein), all of which affect poor and/or non-
white children most severely. The Ten-State Nutrition Survey of
1968-1970 (originally the beginning of a national survey) was
concentrated in poor, mainly southern states. It found that among
preschool-age children 51% of the boys and 56% of the girls had
substandard levels of vitamin A, while 21% of the boys and 27% of
the girls had low riboflavin levels. These low levels were income-
linked. Looking at vitamin C, they found that of 12-23 mo. old
infants, less than 10% of those from families in the highest income
quartile had low levels, while 40% from the lowest quartile did.
Similarly, for children aged 2-6 less than 4% from high income
families were deficient while over 30% from the lowest income homes
were. (Cited in WHCC, pp. 65-66.)
Finally, there is evidence of general retarded growth among low-
income children which can presumably be linked to inadequate nutrition.
Owen and Kram (1969) found that in a sample of Mississippi preschool
children the poor were on the average smaller than the more affluent,
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and at greater nutritional risk. Among migrant workers' children in
upstate New York, 38% were in or below the third percentile for height
as compared to norms standard in pediatric practice. (Richmond &
Weinberger, 1970, pp. 33-34) These latter authors go on to note a
subgroup difference.
In fact as many as 25 per cent of the children in, the age
group from one to three years were in the third percentile;
and 13 per cent of the total were below the third percentile.
Those most affected were from two to three years of age;
the number below the third percentile was ten times the
number predicted.
..Bergstrom [who did the original study] suggests that what
is noted may relate primarily to nutritional intake--the
young infant is most often provided with his nutrition by
his mother, and the older child is better able to fend
for himself; whereas at two to three years of age, he is
no longer being fed, is being weaned from the bottle, and
is not quite able to "compete" for the available food.
.He suggests the possibility that "catch-up growth"
occurs between age three and five in these children.
(Ibid., p. 34)
What we do not yet know, from this or other studies, is the extent to
which that catch-up growth actually wipes out the deficits of the
intervening years. The fact that the older children are still below
height norms in unexpected numbers suggests that this recovery is
not complete; on the other hand, it is not quite clear how directly
height is related to health, IQ, or performance in later life.
I have focused this discussion on the clustered risks associated
with malnutrition in young children. There are several other nutri-
tional issues which many consider as important as outright malnutrition
or potential developmental damage on the health and welfare of
children. First is the controversy over the role of cholesterol
and high-fat diets in childhood on adult cholesterol levels,
atherosclerosis, and heart disease. Second is the role of high
149
salt diets on later hypertension and heart disease. And finally there
is the growing problem of obesity among all Americans but especially
among children.
These problems affect all American children. They are independent
risks since many Americans choose to eat high cholesterol, over-
processed diets of empty calories or simply to eat too much for the
exercise they get. They are also clustered risks to the extent that
high-starch, high-fat diets are cheaper and easier to prepare with
limited facilities than balanced, higher protein ones. These are
risks which have just recently begun to attract research interest
and money; we do not yet know very much at all about their causes
or seriousness. It is -likely that they will remain with us after
the basically social problem of malnutrition has at last been dealt
with.
Concluding Remarks
Many of the risks listed at the beginning of this section have
not been explicated or even defined. Space does not permit me to
examine such vital problems as dental health (whose most significant
aspect Richmond and Weinberger (1970, p. 34) term "the sheer
magnitude of the problem"; 25% of all children ages 5-14 have never
visited a dentist); child abuse and neglect; accidents; other
environmental risks (lead poisoning from paint or automobile exhaust;
rat bites, substandard housing, radiation); and the whole range of
mental health problems. The gaps in references on the list of risks
do not correspond to the relative volume of research in each of
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those areas, but rather to the uneven coverage which I have given
to them in my research. This is not in way of an apology, but
only to reemphasize that this chapter is n ot meant to be a com-
prehensive or authoritative picture of child health needs. Rather
I hope to have suggested in several of what I do regard as central
areas of need the types of knowledge which we have about child health,
the implications of that knowledge for policy issues, and the ethical
judgments inherent in any interpretation of the data and testimony.
The next part of this chapter will provide a broader analytic frame-
work in which to understand those needs which I feel to be the most
pressing, those clustered risks of cumulative and often geometrically
increasing harm.
Part 2.
Impact of the Health Care System
I discussed the developmental and individual health consequences
to the child of both biological and environmental health risks in
early childhood, risks which tend to cluster together. A full
picture of the dimensions of disadvantage and risk means also look-
ing at the ways in which the health care system itself--its structure,
content, and operations--interact with the child and his health.
These systematic effects of health care delivery are particularly
relevant to a discussion of public policy options since most large-
scale programs (either service or financial) cannot be delicately
monitored as to their effects on all individuals, but they can be
studies for broader impact (frequently expressed in statistical terms).
What we are interested in is how programs (e.g., Medicaid, Maternal
151
Infant Care) or structures (e.g., private fee-for-service medicine)
themselves determine the outcomes of illness in groups of people.
Some of the following discussion will stray beyond specific impacts
on young children. This reflects a first systematic disadvantage
to children: our methods of health care delivery and financing
underinvest in children and their health needs. Hence data are
frequently not analyzed specifically in terms of children.
According to a special analysis of the federal budget for
fiscal 1973, federal health outlays for children will amount to
$2.1 billion in FY 1973, one-half for indigent children (primarily
the estimated 11 million to be covered under Medicaid). However,
this represents only 10% of the federal health budget, of which 60%
goes to those over 65 and the remaining 30% to persons 22-64.
(0MB, 1972, p. 169) Even if one accounts for the higher rates of
hospitalization and generally poorer health of the elderly, the
figures are not nearly comparable. This six-to-one advantage for
the elderly is greater than the generally accepted ratio of need
(elderly-to-general population) of four-to-one. Looking at the
figures from another perspective, according to recent SSA figures,
the federal government pays for only 16% of total health care costs
for children, but 54% of total costs for the aged. (It pays even
less--ll%--of costs for those 19-64.) The basic reason for this
difference is that national policy has accepted provision of a
minimum level of health services as a right for all Medicare bene-
ficiaries. Such a right does not exist for children. (See Table 3.)
Since extending similar coverage to children is essentially a question
of belief or political expediency, there is no sort of evidence or
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Table 3.
Estimated Health Care Expenditures by Population and Income Groups
(in millions of dollars)
1973 % of
estimate total
Total, all recipients 19,915 100%
Aged (65 and over) 11,772 59%
Other adults (19-64) 6,042 30%
Children and youths (0-18) 2,100 11%
Indigent, total 8,867 100%
Aged (65 and over) 4,586 52%
Other adults (19-64) 3,224 36%
Children and youths (0-18) 1,057 12%
Nonindigent, total 11,048 100%
Aged (65 and over) 7,187 65%
Other adults (19-64) 2,819 26%
Children and youths (0-18) 1,043 9%
Does not include foreign nationals receiving health care services
outside the United States
Source: U.S. Office of Management
and Budget, Special Analyses,
Budget of theUnited States
Government, 1973, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
Office, 1972, p. 169.
(Percentages added)
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testimony which would be persuasive as to why it should be done; but
certainly there is no evidence that coverage for children would be
anywhere near as expensive as coverage for the elderly on a per
capita basis.
In order to examine this and other disadvantages, we have
broken the system effects of care down into three categories:
Access to Care, Appropriateness, and Quality.
Access to Care
Access can be a significant variable in determining the health
risks of childhood. It would be part of structural and impact
evaluations. Its impact can be divided into five subcategories:
geographic, financial, psychological, legal, and group.
Geographic Access
The well-established facts of the uneven distribution of
physicians and of health resources in the United States have special
implications for children. Seventy-five per cent of pediatric
care is given by general practitioners. Pediatricians have remained
at about 3-5% of practicing physicians since 1949 (American Academy
of Pediatrics, 1971). In addition, pediatrics is still an almost
regional specialty: one-third of all pediatricians practice in
New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Since the increase in
the number of physicians in general has kept pace with the population,
pediatricians themselves are not in shorter relative supply today,
but due to the decline in the number of general practitioners, primary
physicians for children are. Primary physicians include pediatricians
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and one-fourth of the general practitioners (studies have shown that
is the average amount of their time devoted to children). Combining
these groups yields a ratio of one primary physician to 2,248 children
under 14 years of age in 1969, as opposed to a ratio of 1 to 1,483
in 1949. (AAP, 1971)
As with all specialties, pediatric practice is not attracted to
areas of scarce population (a pediatrician needs a much larger popula-
tion base to yield a profitable practice than does a general practi-
tioner) and/or economic deprivation.
The causes [of maldistribution] are not peculiar to
pediatrics, but the problems are intensified because,
as a general rule, the geographic areas with the
highest proportion of children are also the most
remote or most unattractive or most poverty stricken.
(AAP, 1971, p. 216)
To take a pavticularly extreme example: 47% of the American Indian
and Alaskan native population (a group for whom the government has
assumed full responsibility for care from the private sector) is under
15 years of age (vs. a national figure of 31%). Yet in 1969 there
were only 20 pediatricians among the 390 physicians in the Indian
Health Service. (AAP, 1971, pp. 152-6)
Within urban areas, poor children, like their parents, may be
isolated from private practitioners and can obtain clinic care only
via relatively expensive and time-consuming public transportation routes.
Very rarely are such networks designed to facilitate access to health
facilities by their clients.
A new kind of geographic access problem has sprung up with
increasing government intervention in the delivery system. If a
child is poor or otherwise defined as at risk, his access to
Maternal and Infant Care and Children and Youth Programs is
dependent on whether a large array of external forces have moved
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so as to locate an operating program in his locality. Although all
the states receive money for maternal and child health and crippled
children programs under the formula grants of Title V of the Social
Security Act, the usefulness of those programs for the individual
child depends on how his state has implemented the program: whether
it has put the money into service delivery instead of basic research
or manpower training and whether the service programs are in his
area.
Flouridation, a public health measure which has consistently
reduced dental caries among children by about 60% where it has
been introduced into public water supplies, is again a geographic
variable beyond a family's control, usually being dependent on a
community both large enough to have a public water supply (thus
denying its cheap benefits to rural children) and politically
willing to enact enabling ordinances.
Financial Access
The issue of financial access is basically one of equity. Our
society values health and accordingly treats health care as a
valuable, scarce good. It also treats it as basically a private
good. In general medicine is practiced privately, hospitals are
controlled privately (whether non-profit or for profit), and care
is financed by private insurance (although government's contribution
continues to rise) or direct payment by the private individual.
Thus access often becomes a function of the ability to pay for
services. Thirty to 40 million persons in the country do not have
access to adequate health care because of inadequate income. (Somers,
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1971, p. 63) As the ,costs of health care have skyrocketed, some form
of health insurance has become almost essential- to permit sufficient
and necessary utilization of services without severe economic hard-
ship. In 1968, about 80% of the civilian non-institutionalized
population had some amount of hospital insurance (coverage of ordinary
hospital charges for inpatient care); 78% had surgical insurance
and 65% had medical insurance (for inpatient physicians' services).
These percentages tend to overstate actual coverage, which may vary
from total service benefit provision to a very limited indemnity,
with deductibles, co-payments, and other limits. In 1968, only
36.0% of total consumer health expenditures were covered by health
insurance (up from 27.7% in 1960). Furthermore, the gap in coverage
is largest for those who can least afford to meet their medical
expenses. While only 8% of the under-65 population with family
income of $10,000 or more do not have hospital insurance, 64% of
those with family income under $3,000 lack such basi c protection--
and as noted above, this is the most prevalent type of insurance.
(All of these figures are from HEW.) This relationship holds true
for women covered for obstetrical services and hospitalization.
(White House Conference on Children, 1970, p. 32)
These figures refer to the entire population. While specific
breakdowns for children are not available, the structure of our
health insurance system suggests some special disadvantages for
children. Insurance in general covers less than 40% of total
consumer health expenditures; the largest gap in this coverage is
for preventive, ambulatory care (routine office visits not related
to a specific illness, non-hospitalized diagnostic tests, .outpatient
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drugs, dental care of all kinds, and psychiatric care). The American
Academy of Pediatrics estimates that 90% of child health care is
delivered in an outpatient setting and that about one-half is for
health maintenance, not care for acute illness. Hence current pay-
ment mechanisms stressing inpatient coverage mean that "payment for
quality comprehensive child care is grossly inadequate." (AAP, 1971,
p. 233) In view of this, the recent extension of compulsory Medicaid
coverage to include diagnostic screening services for children under
21 is extremely important, although the regulations are not yet being
enforced.
One of the greatest failures of child health programs to this
date has been their inability to provide real alternatives to
welfare medicine for the poor or disadvantaged. There may be a few
new Maternal and Infant Care centers and so on, but for the most
part what is available is still indigent medical care in which,
as Yerby noted, "patients are forced to barter their dignity for
their health." (Yerby, 1966; see also Kosa, et al., 1969; de Vise,
1960; Duff & Hollingshead, 1968) Breslow (1969) has summed up
the issue well:
Perhaps more important than the relatively small total
amount which the federal government allots to child health
is the disproportionate amount which goes to forms of
care that are increasingly unacceptable to the American
people and to the medical profession. Less than one
fourth of the present federal funds for child health go
to maternal and child health and OEO programs that are
being designed to overcome older patterns of second-rate
care based on the "means test." (p. 329)
By far the largest program providing funds for child health
services is Medicaid, a state-controlled program which, unlike
Medicare, is a part of the welfare system. Medicaid pays for care
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for about 1.5 million children. An analysis done for the OCD Child
Health Care Policy Task Force (Minnesota Research Systems, Inc., 1972,
p. 7) reports the following estimates of Federal Medicaid expenditures
for children (i.e., not including state matching funds):
FY 71 $0.7 billion
FY 72 $1.0 billion
FY 73 $1.3 billion
Looking back at Table 3, two things are evident. First, the bulk of
all services to poor children are clearly coming through Medicaid.
Second, one of the estimates is off since Medicaid appears to be
paying out more than the Federal totals in Table 3. Since the
figures in the Task Force document are unpublished ones, we would
tend to consider them high. (They may also include pro-rated admin-
istrative overhead and non-service payments, which the OMB figures
do not.)
In summary, certain children are at special risk simply because
their families are poor in a society of fee-for-service, privately
insured health care which has not yet fully resolved those inequities.
Furthermore, such inequities in some areas place children at special
risk--because the reimbursement system has not been designed to meet
their special needs.
Psychological Access
The general literature on the indignities and inconveniences
associated with being poor and seeking medical care is extensive
and persuasive (e.g., Duff and Hollingshead, 1968: Strauss, 1967)
Psychological barriers may be interpreted in at least two ways. One
theory, along the lines of a "culture of poverty" argument, suggests
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that the poor or the disadvantaged place a low priority on health
care, are less aware of illness in themselves and their children,
and hence utilize services less and in less appropriate ways
(breaking appointments, waiting until the last minute, using
emergency rooms, etc.). The problems inherent in using utiliza-
tion data to draw conclusions on preferred behavior in a system
of pervasive financial and geographic inequities in access are
still not recognized by some health analysts. I have previously
discussed this problem which can be accurately summed up here in
a statement by the American Academy of Pediatrics:
There is little evidence of general apathy or of
different attitudes or expectations toward the
importance of health care, and most or all of the
observed variations in utilization can be explained
in terms of barriers imposed by the institutional
arrangements for health care of lower socioeconomic
groups. (AAP, 1971, p. 28)
The second interpretation of psychological barriers, and the one
which I am most impressed by, is that medical care systems are often
not designed or operated in ways which make them attractive, accept-
able, and open to certain people. Required means tests before delivery
of care, refusal of many non-profit private hospitals to admit (even
in emergency rooms) indigent patients, lack of bilingual personnel in
non-English speaking areas, hours of service which are not convenient
for the users, and staff and space inadequate to avoid crowding and
excessive waiting--all of these circumstances are going to have sig-
nificant impact on the willingness or ability of poor people to use
medical care until it is absolutely necessary.
Such circumstances may arise from a variety of causes: racial
prejudice, lack of sensitive training for personnel, inadequate resources
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of health institutions. One of the most important causes is the lack
of fit between the system's goals and attitudes and those of its
clientele. The emergency rooms and outpatient departments of large
teaching hospitals are the major source of. ambulatory care for many
disadvantaged children and their families. While these institutions
treat most people who come in the door, their main function is not
a service one, but an educational and research one. The system's
goals are maintaining a steady and adequate flow of "teaching material";
there are rarely staff arrangements facilitating continuity of care
by one physician over time. These are clearly not the mothers' goals;
"psychological distance" is one way of describing that misfit in
expectations. Another important misfit is that between a welfare
mentality which is primarily concerned with keeping chiselers off
the rolls and helping only the "deserving poor," and the demand for
service by a family requiring medical care through no fault of its
own.
Evidence exists that changes in the systems involved can result
in vast improvements in psychological access. The evidence from
neighborhood health centers, the Cornell Medical School Medicaid
experiment in New York, and the prepaid group practices of H.I.P.
and Kaiser-Portland in covering poverty groups supports the notion
that patterns of usage are to a great extent influenced by the ways
in which care is given. (Sparer and Johnson, 1971; Goodrich, Olendzki,
and Reader, 1970; Bellin & Geiger, 1968; Colombo, Saward, and
Greenlick, 1969) The evidence suggests that outreach efforts,
new types of personnel with less professional distance (e.g.,
pediatric nurse practitioners vs. pediatric residents), and strong
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consumer/community participation in health care systems are important
variables in improving psychological access. (Notkin and Notkin, 1970;
Silver, Ford, and Day, 1968; Patterson, et al., 1969)
Legal Access
Health care is generally not a legal right in this country.
Certain groups directly under the "protection" of the federal or
state and local governments (Indians, armed forces, and institu-
tionalized persons) usually have some legislated provisions for
health care. With the exception of the armed forces, these "rights"
are often unmet and untested. (See for example AAP, Lengthening
Shadows, 1971, pp. 152-156, for brief summaries of levels of care
for Indian and institutionalized children.)
For the rest of the population, legal access to payment or
reimbursement for health care is increasingly available through
employee-employer or individual contracts for health insurance,
through federal entitlement (Medicare), state entitlement (Medicaid,
workmen's compensation, institutions for the mentally ill, etc.).
Within the private sector, entitlement to continuance of care by
a physician, once initiated, and protection against incompetent
care are provided by civil law (and criminal in the case of some
malpractice suits) under medical ethics statutes. However, at this
time, there is no legal right to services per se. For example,
a county cannot be required to provide a hospital unless it decides
to do so; the last doctor in a rural area cannot be prevented from
leaving even if his departure means no medical care for the residents.
Recently, the federal government has taken a major step by proposing
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new regulations which would require all hospitals and nursing homes
receiving money under the Hill-Burton program to provide a specific
amount of free care for the poor, at the risk of otherwise losing
federal funds. Other recent suits are attempting to force private
non-profit voluntary hospitals to open up their doors to the poor
or lose their tax-exempt status as charitable institutions.
Special Groups
Much of the evidence previously cited on developmental and
environmental criteria has emphasized the effect of race on health
risk, health status, and utilization of health services, independent
of income, education, or geography. This gap in access, in other
words, seems to be in certain ways identifiable by group membership.
Haggerty (1970a) charges that one of the most important weaknesses
of the present health care system is its inadequate care for the
disadvantaged. He includes among the disadvantaged: "The black,
the American Indian, the poor, the rural, the poorly educated, the
agricultural migrant, the physically and emotionally handicapped,
and high-risk -groups, such as children born out of wedlock"; as
well as the growing number of suburban middle-class children without
medical care. (p. 78) The American Academy of Pediatrics (1971)
has also reviewed evidence that membership in these groups is
statistically a predictor of not only suboptimal health status
but also access to health care. The Academy also includes another
special risk group: children not living with their families (i.e.
children in foster care, in institutions for the mentally retarded or
disturbed, or in various detention centers).
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I have suggested the importance of prenatal care, especially for
high-risk pregnancies.
...on purely obstetric grounds, certain groups of the
population should receive the highest available levels
of maternity care. There are primigravidae, ... grand
multiparae, women with a poor obstetric history, young
mothers with rapidly recurring pregnancies, women of
short stature and poor physique and health, mothers
having illegitimate pregnancies, and the socially under-
privileged... (Birch and Gussow, 1970, p. 156)
Yet several studies have shown that poor mothers, those most likely
as a group to be at risk, are the least likely to receive adequate
prenatal care or indeed any at all. (Lesser, 1964)
The implications of such gaps can be seen in terms both of special
risk and of equity. Migrant workers clearly live lives of much greater
risk than most of us do: of accidents, epidemic diseases (gastritis,
schistosomiasis, etc.), malnutrition, tuberculosis, parasitic
infestation; yet they receive even less health care. A 1966 study
(Siegal) found no migrant children with complete immunizations; the
AAP in 1970 estimated perhaps only one-third had any .immunizations
and one-sixth had reasonably complete ones. (AAP, 1971) In 1969,
after six years-of the Migrant Health Act, two-thirds of the 900
counties where migrants live temporarily still had no grant-assisted
programs. And combining all sources of funds for those programs, the
average per capita expenditures were $12 annually. Special efforts
to meet the special needs of these groups are not adequate. But in
addition, migrant workers are frequently denied equal access to more
general care programs. In most states, they are ineligible for state
general assistance (which carries with it eligibility for some minimum
or even ample amount of medical care) or Medicaid (via welfare
eligibility) because they do not meet residency requirements.
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Dr. E. S. Rabeau, Director of the Indian Health Service, has pointed
out the dimensions of a problem whi.ch applies not only to the Indian
population but also to migrant workers and to a large portion of the
black and rural poor populations. His remarks emphasize that these
groups live under unique conditions which will require special, broadly
defined health measures to assure them of even token equity in achiev-
ing healthy lives.
[There is] a continuing need for added emphasis to
achieve acceptable health levels for Indians and
Alaskan natives and comparability to the general
population....The inferior health status.. .is
largely due to lack of basic sanitary facilities,
unsafe water supplies, gross unsanitary practices,
poor and crowded housing, inadequate nutrition,
emotional problems inherent in a transitional
culture, impoverished socioeconomic status, and
limited education. (Quoted in AAP, 1971, p. 156)
In other words, the healing effects of even the "Sanitary Revolution"
of the 19th Century which Dubos (1959) described as the underlying
cause of our good health has not yet reached all Americans,
Appropriateness of Care
Access is fundamentally an economic function, having to do with
the supply and distribution of scarce resources. Even certain kinds
of psychological access can be improved merely by economic changes
(increasing the staff or floor space of facilities, hiring more
bilingual personnel), although full access is certainly non-economic.
Appropriateness, as we shall use the 'term, is a non-economic,
qualitative function, having to do with the content of those
resources, the fit between what medical science and the health care
system find appropriate practice and the needs of young chil-
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dren. We have identified three subcategories of appropriateness
which have a major impact on children.
Medical Science
One way to evaluate appropriateness is to ask: are medical efforts
being directed at the most critical risks for children. Those risks
include poor prenatal environment, low birth weight, infant mortality
and morbidity, sensory and neurological deficits (especially if
undetected early), child abuse, accidents, dental problems, and mal-
nutrition.
The large gaps which presently exist in even basic prenatal and
and maternity care for all mothers and for detection of sensory and
neurological deficits seem to stem not from a lack of medical interest
but from problems of access, of providing the benefits of medical
science to all mothers and children in ways they can afford and use
easily. On the other hand, for the abused or neglected child, the
child with certain congenital problems (such as sickle-cell anemia),
lead paint poisoning, nutritive diseases or deficits, or with
multiple handicaps, there is frequently little in the medical or
health system of use to him. Pediatric medicine has not taken
some of these critical areas as its own first priorities; nor have
the wider systems which also have impact on the child. Recently,
the problems of sickle-cell anemia and lead paint poisoning have
begun to be dealt with more realistically and adequately. There is
also growing concern about child abuse and redefining the boundaries
*
See the earlier discussions in Chapter 3 of how appropriateness (also
called "accountability," "Scope and importance," etc.) has been incor-
porated into some evaluation designs. Two of the best real-life
examples are Geomet (1971) and NAS (1972).
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of it and other social illnesses of childhood. However, the other
areas remain inappropriately unexplored.
No theory has been developed to predict the effects of
changes in nutrient intake on the overall performance
of an individual....The lack of a scientifically estab-
lished relationship.. .makes a definitive nutrition
adequacy standard an unattainable goal at the present
time. (Segal, 1970, pp. 18-19)
Perhaps the most important deficiency is lack of a
clear-cut national commitment and policy that care
of the handicapped child is an integral part of
total responsibility of the government to its popu-
lation. Unless the problem of the handicapped child
is viewed as a humanitarian obligation--as a concrete,
important domestic problem, requiring adequate economic
and technical support--the creative programs required
will not be forthcoming. (As quoted in AAP, 1971, p. 58)
In other words, the system of health care does not always direct
its resources in ways that reflect the rates of incidence, prevalence,
and severity of childhood risks. Thus some children may end up being
at greater health disadvantage than others not because they are
sicker or poorer but because resources have not been devoted to
their illness or problem. We are talking not about rare child-
hood diseases, but common ones.
Manpower
While the American Academy of Pediatrics estimates that 90%
of child health care is ambulatory and 50%.of that care is for
health maintenance (AAP, 1971), the allocation of pediatric resources
often reflects a more acute illness, inpatient, physician care
pattern. We do not suggest that this threatens the child when care
is in fact given (although the evidence strongly suggests that
American children undergo unnecessary tonsillectomies and adenoi-
dectomies; Perrott and Chase, 1968). But, going back for a moment
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to an economic analysis, money spent building unnecessary hospitals,
or hiring only doctors instead of mixing them with pediatric nurse
practitioners, at some point will mean that a child (probably a
poor, high-risk one) will not have free or inexpensive outpatient
care, screening facilities, or immunizations .available. In those
circumstances, the consequences of his illnesses or handicaps will
be more serious than if the system had been organized differently.
In addition the specialty of pediatrics is not yet really willing
or able to serve all children.
Pediatrics remains a predominantly urban, white, middle-
class and upper-class phenomenon. The poor, non-white
and rural dwellers have had to utilize other resources.
(AAP, 1971, p. 100)
The number of medical students who choose pediatrics as a specialty
is, in our system, an uncontrollable variable, since there are no
national quotas or even recommendations for such distribution. Since
pediatrics is one of thelowest paid specialties, this aspect of our
free enterprise medical care system probably works against children;
it i's no accident that while there are not enough pediatricians in
the U.S., we have twice as many neurosurgeons per capita than other
western countries.
Appropriate. manpower may also mean improving psychological access
by increasing the numbers and responsibilities of community workers in
health facilities. Of particular importance to -children might be
workers who could assist mothers in taking care of their own and their
children's nutritional needs and serve as advocates to obtain safer
environmental conditions if necessary.
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Delivery Modes
We have touched on this broad area by noting the misfit between
the ratio of preventive to acute care services which children need'
and the actual ratio of such services. Several other aspects are
important:
a) Although what developmental evidence we have suggests the
critical nature of the first four years of life, the health
(and educational) systems do not facilitate systematic
access to children below school age. Particularly in the
case of chronic physical disease and handicapping condi-
tions, early detection and treatment may be critical to
enable the child to develop to his full potential.
(AAP, 1971, pp. 56-7) Achieving this early access has
been one of the major goal s of Head Start heal th programs.
b) Because of their isolation in the Department of Agriculture,
the federal food supplementation and school lunch programs
are not oriented either toward delivering the most possible
food to hungry children and families or to best identifying
such people and their actual needs. Furthermore, it is
difficult to use food programs either as trade-offs
against other programs (e.g., treatment of nutritional
diseases) or as a part of a comprehensive community health
program, because HEW lacks jurisdiction over them.
c) In general, the present health care delivery system is
disorganized and frequently cannot deliver comprehensive,
coordinated care to children and their parents. Some of
the relevant studies of comprehensive or family-care
programs will be discussed briefly in Part 3 of this
chapter.
It might be useful, however, to note here some findings from a
major review of evaluations of.prepaid group practice which relate
specifically to the needs of children and mothers. The review cites
strong evidence that prepaid group practice:
--tends to increase utilization of preventive health
services (general check-ups, prenatal and postnatal
- care), especially for usually underprivileged seg-
ments of the membership (non-white and Puerto Rican);
--tends to increase readiness (and reduce delay) in
seeking care;
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--tends to reduce substantially the disparity between
high and low socioeconomic groups in. the use of
services;
--tends to increase the use of specialists for children
and for childbirth; and
--clearly leads to decreased premature birth rates and
rates of perinatal mortality (standardized to age of
mother), for both white and non-white populations.
A slight lessening of the gap between white and non-
white rates was also reported. (Donabedian, 1969)
The importance of the findings on specialist care is suggested by
results from a comparative evaluation of OEO Neighborhood Health
Centers and other providers in which the performance of solo general
practitioners in obstetric and pediatric cases was clearly inferior
and "woefully inadequate". (Morehead, Donaldson and Seravalli, 1970,
pp. 9-11)
Difference in the quality of care, when added to the problems
of finding one's way through our complex, pluralistic system, suggests
that the burden of private medicine, increasing specialization, and
multiple public programs weighs most on those families whose children
are frequently most in need of comprehensive care.
This fragmentation (of preventive and restorative services
and institutions) imposes a much larger coordinating burden
on parents in poverty than is imposed on better situated
parents. (AAP, 1971, p. 29)
Quality of Care
The issues of whether outpatient department care is really worse
than the services of a private physician, whether pediatricians give
better care than non-specialists, of whether "charity medicine" on
the wards of teaching hospitals or county hospitals is dangerous
as well as demeaning, and of to what extent a good doctor-patient
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relationship (implying both continuity and mutual respect) improves
one's chances of cure or comfort--all these issues are both of
critical importance and without clear answers. In fact, there
are few analytically useful definitions of the terms used in the
questions. Although the work of Duff and Hollingshead (1968),
Strauss (1967), Kosa et al. (1969), and Goodrich et al. (1970),
among others, has looked seriously at the issues of an inequitable
distribution of quality of care, with rather dismaying findings, the
implications for policy are not easy to draw. There is no evidence,
however, that children suffer any more risks from poor quality care
than the population at large, and hence I will leave the issue
unresol ved.
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Part 3.
Major Federal Health Services Programs for Children
To succinctly and systematically characterize current health
programs for children proves to be a remarkably difficult task.
A recent study of federal programs for disadvantaged children
lists 65 whose activities in some way involve health and/or
nutrition. (Huron Institute, 1972; this listing owes much to
the prior work of the Appalachian Regional Commission, 1970.)
These programs run from the multi-billion dollar Medicaid program
(Title XIX of the Social Security Act) which covers indigent and
medically indigent persons of all ages in every state, to categorical
grants for demonstration Children and Youth projects (59 in all), to
dental health research fellowships not directly targeted at children,
but potentially valuable to them.
Of the 65 programs, approximately 24 are service programs: seven
for special medical problems (immunizations, family planning); eight
for comprehensive medical care for special groups such as Indians,
migrants, mothers and infants; seven nutritional or feeding programs;
and two multiservice programs of which health is one component.
(Actually one of these "programs" includes all Office of Child
Development efforts: Head Start and Parent-Child Centers, both
multiservice programs, and Health Start, a comprehensive medical care
experiment.) Two of the 65 programs (Medicaid and Aid to the Blind)
provide financial support to children. Of the remaining programs,
16 are for research, 11 for training (of both service workers and
professionals), five for technical ass.istance, and seven for other
functions (construction of facilities, information dissemination).
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Two of the service programs, Maternal and Child Health Services and
Crippled Children's Services are block grants to the states to be used
at the latter's discretion for services, research, training, and
facilities. Virtually none of these programs, as far we have been
able to determine, have been evaluated or monitored in ways approach-
ing the model presented in Chapter 3. Several major evaluations are
presently under way, but findings have not yet been published. The
dearth of evaluations is not fully explained by the weaknesses of
current evaluation tools; there is little doubt that better studies
could be carried out given the methodologies and constraints of today.
The purpose of this thesis is not to describe and document the
activities of these programs. But most of the major programs
initiated in the 60's with explicit "arguments" promised the applica-
tion of knowledge to the needs of more children (primarily poor ones)
and the extension of knowledge by documenting the positive effects of
social service programs on the health of mothers and children. The
extent to which these promises have been or are being fulfilled should
provide some indications of both the rightness of the arguments and
the limits of our ability to determine that rightness. Hence, some of
the major programs are discussed here, from the standpoint of what
they have proven about the impact of health services on the health of
disadvantaged children. I have not examined more indirect programs,
such as manpower training, research on child health, various scholar-
ship and fellowship monies, or technical support. These represent
39 of the 65 programs, or 60%, although they account for a far
smaller percentage of funds appropriated.
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Maternal and Infant Care Program
This program, funded under Title V of the Social Security Act,
operates 60 projects across the country. It was established in
1965 and had $42.7 million appropriated in FY 72. As paraphrased by
Weckworth, its broad legislative mandate sets its goals as the "reduc-
tion of incidence of mental retardation and other handicapping
conditions caused by complications associated with child-bearing,
reduction of infant and maternal mortality, particularly in areas
with concentrations of low-income families without access to pre-
natal care, infant care and family planning services." (Minnesota
Research Systems, Inc., 1972, p. 13) We do not know to what extent
the program has lived up to those goals. One large-scale evaluation
of the subgoal of reduction of infant and maternal mortality rates,
done by the University of Maryland, has completed the data collection
phase and is in the process of analysis and release of final results.
Preliminary information indicates that the projects are having the
anticipated effect on mortality rates. (HEW, 1970)
In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1971,
the following indirect evidence was presented showing the drop in
infant mortality rates in selected cities with large Maternal and
Infant Care projects.
Infant Mortality Rate/1000 Live Births
Calendar Year % Decrease
1966 1968
National Rate 23.7 21.8 8.2
Major M & IC
Projects:
Miami 23.7 21.5 9.3
New York City 24.9 23.1 7.2
Detroit 28.0 26.8 4.3
San Juan 37.6 28.6 23.9
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Source: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations.
Department of Labor and HEW appropriations; 2nd
Congress, 1st session. p. 3356.
After presenting similar data for metropolitan sub-areas in which
drops in infant mortality rates relative to city-wide or comparable
statistics followed establishment of large maternal and infant care
and family planning programs, Arthur J. Lesser, head of the Maternal
and ChildHealth Service, noted that
while the reasons for the dramatic change...have not been
established in a cause and effect relationship, the only
new contributory factors that have been identified are
the rapid increase in family planning among the poor and
comprehensive maternal programs focused on the most
vulnerable population. (Lesser, 1969, p. 895)
According to the testimony of Dr. Vernon E. Wilson, HSMHA Administrator,
on-July 19, 1971, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Maternal and
Infant Care centers have helped reduce the national infant mortality
rate from 24.7 per 1,000 live births in 1965 to an estimated 1970 rate
of 19.8, a reduction of 20% or four times the rate of decrease of the
previous ten years.
As Haggerty (1972) notes in presenting these same data, this was a
period in which "several special programs were introduced to deliver
better maternal and child health care," and that one can only interpret
the data as showing that "on the national scale, there is evidence
that input of medical care plus all other factors do affect infant
mortality." (p. 107) He raises a methodological issue which suggests
why more precise evidence may not be forthcoming even with better studies:
One of the problems of proving the benefits of overall
care is the large population needed. For example, to
show a 7 per cent change in child mortality (a statis-
tically significant change) one would have to study 6.25
million children. (Haggerty, 1972, p. 107)
Eleanor Hunt (1970) used another method to demonstrate the inverse
relationship between infant mortality rates and M & IC projects. She
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groups states by the patterns of their infant mortality rate decreases
before and after 1965 and then compared that ranking with the number
(and average years of operation) of M & IC projects in each group.,
Her positive findings still do not, of course, control for possible
simultaneous effects of Medicaid, other new health programs, or
indeed OEQ in general on those rates.
M & IC projects were also expected to lead to a reduction of
mental retardation and other handicaps. These goals are more complex
and require long-range longitudinal studies of cohorts of patients,
offspring and controls, since reliable tests for retardation and
estimates of the permanence of some handicaps are not applicable
until the children are older. Furthermore, such studies require an
examination of the entire process and organization of the projects
and the milieu in which they are located, since the possibility of
exogenous variables affecting apparent rates of increase or decrease
is very large andcausal linkages extremely difficult to establish.
To our knowledge, no such studies are underway or being contemplated.
At the present time, the projects are so few and so varied in their
environments (some being completely independent and free-standing, and
others existing almost only as a legal funding source for certain
patients in a community comprehensive care project) that such a com-
prehensive evaluation would be able to derive few universal conclusions
about effectiveness or optimal organization.
Concerning the final goals of targeting the projects on under-
served, primarily poor groups, we do have some data which are not
too favorable. The Child Health Care Policy Task Force found that
only 33, or 55% of the 60 Maternal and Infant Care projects are in
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the states with the highest infant mortality rates (Child Health Care
Policy Task Force, 1972, p. 11) The Task Force identified 42 counties
as being high-risk by using a measure of excess infant deaths (400
or more deaths over the U.S. average; this measure excludes sparsely
populated rural districts). Of these 42 counties, 21 had no Maternal
and Infant Care project (11 had no federal health care project at
all). Furthermore, the coverage of the projects has remained stable
for the last several years at around 129,000 mothers and 43,000 infants
per year (many of the women receiving only family planning services).
While some projects are surely located in cities or specific areas
which are high-risk even though the state does not fall below the
median rate, this is still not a very good record for what is, if one
uses the proxy measure of infant and maternal mortality rates for risk,
the easiest objective to put into programmatic terms. Part of the
failure is undoubtedly political: the art of grant-writing and grant-
awarding has never been known as a fully equitable, even-handed matter;
this is true in virtually any categorical grant-in-aid program. Part
of the failure, however, is due to the workings of the medical care
system and illustrates one of the difficulties with federal inter-
vention in child health. Merely announcing that money is available
for new programs, and even going so far as saying that the money
can only be obtained in certain listed areas, does not guarantee that
programs consistent with the legislative intent will be set up. If
an area is without health resources, there is no one to sponsor the
project; if the local medical establishment opposes such "socialized
medicine" it can prevent funds from coming in. We point this out not
because it is unique to Maternal and Infant Care centers, or even
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always true for them,*but to remind the reader of another of the
differences between health and education programs: lack of control
and reduced ability to target categorical, conpensatory programs
when they are being imposed not on a universal framework of
reasonably similar proportions (i.e., public education systems)
but on a vastly heterogeneous, private market with pockets of
public responsibility.
Children and Youth Projects
This program, begun at the same time as Maternal and Infant
Care, is designed to provide comprehensive care centers for children
age 0 to 18 who are poor or medically underserved. (Close, 1969)
There are presently 59 such projects with a FY 1972 appropriation
of $47.4 million. The program has been operating at a fairly stable
rate for the last few years, serving 464,000 children, but was due
for partial defunding in 1973 as projects were supposed to become
self-supporting. Its future is presently unclear.
Children and Youth is probably developing the strongest data base
of any existing federal child health program. An extensive report-
ing system has been developed by Vernon Weckworth of Minnesota Systems
Developmental Project. (Weckworth, 1971; de Geyndt, 1969) The model,
discussed in some detail in Chapter 3, attempts to plot the progress
(or regression) of individuals through the Children and Youth system
with a goal of having every eligible child at a level of health
maintenance. There are masses of data being generated on a quarterly
report basis: number of centers with lead paint screening, number
*
In fact, although there are no data on the issue, we would suspect the
opposite to be the case--maternal and infant care is probably the least
political or objectionable of any health program.
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with community boards, number and types of personnel trained, number
of new registrants, and so forth. The analytic uses to which this
data will be put remain to be seen. The present form of the annual
summaries is too raw to be useful as a basis for broad policy con-
siderations, although they are useful, apparently, for project
management evaluation of outcome.
Children and Youth Projects potentially cover the complete range
of critical child health needs because of their eligibility base.
It is interesting, therefore, *to note the age distribution of the
registered children (Lesser, 1969, p. 897):
less than 1 year 41%
1 to 9 years 57%
10 to 18 years 2%
It may seem surprising that so many of the children are infants. This
would suggest that expanded Maternal and Infant programs could handle
40% of the present cases. This is important because in many ways Chil-
dren and Youth makes little sense as a separate program. Although
such projects are aimed at comprehensive, interprofessional care and
are trying many innovative programs ("Children & Youth Projects,"
1971; American Academy of Pediatrics, 1971), they are in opposition to
several theories of health care. They isolate the poor into a separate
care system; they isolate the child from his family; and they are so
few in number that they set up new access inequities by not always
being located in areas of the highest need or by not being able to
handle all who need care. (Child Health Care Policy Task Force, 1972)
And, as I have already said about patterns of child health, aside from
the early infancy years, there is nothing in the nature of most
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critical health needs of children that clearly requires that they be
treated in a separate care system. That is, the organizational mode
for a child's health services might ideally be his inclusion in a
comprehensive health care delivery system.
Early Screening and Treatment
Screening is a loosely used term. In the strictest sense, it
is differentiated from a physical examination or diagnostic examina-
tion because it (a) consists mainly of routinized or even automated
testing procedures which can be performed by non-professional health
personnel (blood tests, vision tests, hearing tests, chest X-rays,
etc.); (b) is frequently designed to test for only one or a few con-
ditions of special concern (lead paint poisoning, sickle cell anemia,
etc.); and (c) must usually be supplemented by referral to other medical
services if abnormalities are detected.
The most popular version of screening now advocated for adults is
"automated" mnltiphasic screening. This format, which incorporates
a battery of tests of physical conditions and frequently includes a
psychological questionnaire to help locate functional disease or
stress, is seen as a modern triage system to separate the hetero-
geneous masses of people seeking care into those who are truly sick,
the "worried well," and so forth. (Garfield, 1970)
For children, however, screening has been advocated for two slightly
different purposes. First, it has been used in Head Start and other
such programs to provide access for children who would not otherwise
have been brought for medical care. The screening should find any
undetected diseases, handicaps, and conditions (such as untreated
dental caries) which will hinder the child's development if left
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unattended. Frequently, however, such programs are operated without
the close linkages to follow-up treatment typical of adult screening
programs.
Screening has also been advocated for young children as a combined
physical-behavioral operation. It is this type of screening which
has the greatest implications for child development. Information on
the child is gathered on physical, mental, and behavioral factors
and combined into an individualized diagnosis and suggested treat-
ment pattern. The importance of such screening is that early
detection of handicaps, either physical or mental, can significantly
reduce their later severity in mnay cases. For example, one of the
first recommendations of the Joint Commission on the Mental Health
of Children, following family planning and systematic prenatal care,
was comprehensive pediatric and mental health services for children
under three. The Commission was very concerned about the current
tendency of children to "disappear" medically between. departure from
the hospital after birth and school or preschool entrance. These are
critical years of rapid development; many conditions (such as metabolic
disorders) undetectable at birth become recognizable and treatable.
Corrective measures for children with hearing, motor,
speech, and visual handicaps can often prevent inter-
ference with learning which leads to retardation in
mental development and which may be complicated by
emotional problems. Estimates indicate that about
20 to 30 percent of chronic handicapping conditions
of childhood and later life could be prevented by
by comprehensive health care to age five, and approx-
imately 60 percent if health care were extended to age
fifteen. (Joint Commission, 1970, p. 33; emphasis added)
The first step in such care must be an -early screening and diagnostic
effort.
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The Kauai study (Werner, Bierman, & French, 1971) found that
diagnoses of serious handicaps (physical, mental, or both) at age
2 were generally confirmed by reexamination at age 10. (Evalua-
tions were done by a special team which also used information
previously gathered about the children.) Although the study team
found that the physicians of Kauai had done rather well in detecting
defects generally considered to be recognizable in newborn infants
(29 children), and ingetting the children into special treatment
before age 2 (37 children), the special examinations done by the
team picked up 75 additional children with handicaps requiring
special diagnostic and treatment services. (p. 44) Furthermore,
in the area of mental retardation, although most severely retarded
children who also had physical defects had been recognized by
family physicians, the two-year special examinations were responsible
for first recognizing the mentally retarded children without other
handicaps. (p. 45) Even slightly discounting this last finding due
to the ambiguity of IQ test scores at age.2, it is clear that a
concerted effort to screen all children at age 2 had a substantial
payoff in detecting handicaps. The findings are even more important
when one considers the fact that Kauai is a stable community, with
maternal and health care for all classes substantially more accessible
than that in inner city areas or many rural locales.
In recommending at least one good medical and developmental examina-
tion for every child in early childhood, the Kauai investigators note
that the
.need for closer cooperation between the various professions
attending the birth and care of the child is indicated in
order to spot early developmental failures in children
suffering from deleterious perinatal conditions and to
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provide them with a supportive and stimulating environ-
ment to minimize the effects of early damage.
Hospital, birth, and physicians' records contain
information about the newborn indicating potential
trouble--information that is seldom available to
community agencies for utilization in planning with
the family for the special needs of high-risk infants.
(Werner, Bierman & French, 1971, p. 138)
The value of screening and follow-up on a universal
basis, utilizing the registry concept, is already
widely accepted in other countries. In Europe,
especially the United Kingdom and Sweden, there is a
general belief that early case finding must depend
on universal screening of developmental progress,
followed by detailed assessment of all children who
show developmental delay. (American Academy of
Pediatrics, 1971, p. 56)
A major maternal and child health program analasis done several years
ago (HEW, 1966) estimated that a program of case-finding and treat-
ment (done at several ages--0, 1, 3, 5 or 6, and 9) would prevent
or correct 30% of chronic handicapping conditions. The first screen-
ing could be performed in the hospital; the last two could be carried
out through the schools. However, 1-year olds and 3-year olds are
generally unreachable. Head Start and its Health Start offshoot have,
been attempts to reach at least part of this preschool aged population,
with an emphasis on screening. (North, 1967, 1970; Hunter, 1970)
Health Start was begun as an experimental program by QCD in the
summer of 1971 with two major components: health services and health
education. Services were aimed at low income children under 6; 28
projects were funded at a total level of $800,000. Screening and
testing of all children was to be followed up by appropriate treatment,
plus health education; the latter goal was supported by a new Bio-
dynamics health education curriculum package.
An interim analysis of the Health Start program (Nay, Vogt, &
Wholey, 1972), begun in the summer of 1971, gives some interesting
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figures on screening and examinations. The 28 Health Start projects
used a variety of techniques to detect health problems, from multi-
phasic screening to full physical exams; the eligible children were all
under the age of 6 (and over 52% were between 3 and 5). Of a total
of 6,432 children for whom data were published, 69% had received
medical examinations by December 1971 and of those, 66% required no
medical treatment.
In their report, the authors note an unresolved issue in the Health
Start program which is a critical one for all "screening and treatment"
programs aimed at disadvantaged groups. They ask about the relative
priorities among possible goals:
(1) returning children with health needs to a status of basic
health,
(2) developing ways to ensure continued access to health
services for children,
(3) developing ways of coordinating HEW health service and
delivery programs.
It would appear that the particular value of screening (or some
sort of general examination or testing) at the present time relates
to goal (2). Goal (1) requires a full-scale comprehensive health
program, while goal (3) is more of a regional administrative matter.
Without clarification of these goals, evaluators cannot be expected
to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the program.
But clear goals might not have helped. The funding cycle was
so short that few children were kept in the program long enough to
expect much effect. Furthermore, a key source of funding for
services, the new Medicaid regulations making payment for diagnosis
and needed treatments mandatory for children under 21, has never been
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effectively implemented.
Family Health Programs
Concurrently with the move to provide special programs directed
toward critical health problems or high-risk groups, there has been
a trend in federal health programming toward comprehensive health care
delivery systems which not only include all ages and all conditions
but also all income levels. This trend is usually accompanied by a
call for family-centered care and frequently for team practice or the
use of new health personnel.
I will not enter here the debate over Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMO's), prepaid group practice, medical foundations, or area'
wide management networks. Several federal programs serving large
numbers of children fall within these categories. (Madison, 1969)
They include the OEONeighborhood Health Centers, comprehensive
centers funded under section 314(e) of the Public Health Service
Act, some Model. Cities health programs, and the new program replac-
ing QEG and 314 (e), Family Health Centers.
The evidence from these programs, many of which are among the
most thoroughtly evaluated in the health field, strongly indicates
the impact that they are having: on changing the health status of
users, and particularly of non-white users (Geomet, 1971; Donabedian,
1969; Sparer and Johnson, 1971; Shapiro, et al., 1960); on the
acceptability of medical care delivery to the users (Bellin and
Geiger, 1968; Elinson and Herr, 1970; Geomet, 1971; Colombo, et a.,
1969); and on the quality of care being delivered (Donabedian, 1969;
Morehead, et al., 1970). (See also Greenberg & Rodberg, 1971; Peterson,
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1971; Saward, et al., 1968;- National Advisory Commission on Health
Manpower, 1967.)
Intellectually, this movement toward family-centered health care
which incorporates both poor and non-poor into one system is quite
solid. There is very good evidence from non-federal programs that
family medical care is more effective in treating each family member
because of the increased knowledge available to providers. (Silver,
1963; Beloff and Weinerman, 1967; Beloff and Willet, 1968; Alpert, et
al., 1970) These studies also report high levels of satisfaction by
users, both poor and non-poor. (Freidson, 1961; Goodrich, et al., 1970;
Bellin and Geiger, 1968; Alpert, et al., 1970)
There are several arguments against comprehensive family care that
should be dealt with here. Gordis and Markowitz (1971) attempt to show
in a controlled experiment that comprehensive and continuous pediatric
care has no effect on health and on medical care utilization. They
measured effect by looking at the completeness of immunization, utiliza-
tion of medical -resources, morbidity and mortality and, in a separate
study, compliance with drug-giving recommendations. They found no
significant differences after one year between a control group and
those children and mothers who were offered a comprehensive program
provided by a team of professionals. However, their original groups
were chosen (randomly) from primiparous adolescents (under 18) who
had come to the hospital (Sinai Hospital of Baltimore) for prenatal
care. Virtually all of these girls were non-white, and most were
unmarried and poor. They are precisely the group most unlikely to
receive prenatal care. The level of motivation of all the girls in
the sample (who did seek this care) was probably quite high, and
hence they could be expected to continue to seek well-baby or illness
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care for their infants even if they had no single, convenient source
of care. In effect, the controls would seek the services provided
to the experimentals. In the second study, the children studied
(77) were receiving oral penicillin for rheumatic fever. They had
been under treatment for at least one year before the experiment,
as compliance tests were made during that time. It seems quite
possible that parents, having established compliance patterns for
a long period of time, are not likely to radically shift behavior
due to a program not specifically directed at that behavior.
This possibility is supported by evidence from Alpert and his
co-workers. (Alpert et al., 1968; Alpert et al., 1970) Based on a
three year study of users of an experimental comprehensive pediatric
care center in a Boston pediatric medical center, they found sig-
nificant differences between users and two control groups on measures
of satisfaction, utilization patterns, and planned response to
selected medical problems. However, they found no changes in
general health attitudes or in planned responses for adult problems.
This specificity of attitude and behavior change impressed the investi-
gators: "The fact that the changes are selective and rather specific
suggests that the range of services provided will determine the range
of attitudes affected." (Alpert et al., 1970, p. 505)
This abbreviated discussion suggests the tremendous impact which
family-centered comprehensive care could have if made generally avail-
able. It seems particularly relevant to the needs of children since
so many of their needs are .in fact the outcome of family living
patterns or family resource deficits.
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Nutritional Programs
Of the 65 federal health and nutrition programs compiled by Huron
Institute, 12 are purely nutritional or food distribution programs
(including 3 non-service ones), and 8 more have nutritional components
(provision of meals, service or education) among their secondary or
optional mandates. None of the primary programs are administered by
HEW; except for an OEO-CAP Emergency Food and Medical Services program,
they are run by the Department of Agriculture. (See Table 4)
We cannot fully explore the workings of all of these nutritional
programs. Many major programs are not designed primarily as nutri-
tional programs at all, but rather focus on food surplus control and
price stability; the USDA "has not traditionally had any general wel-
fare objectives that go beyond the agricultural community." (Segal,
1970, p. 70) Since evaluation is a process of comparing stated
objectives with results, it is not surprising that few federal studies
of nutrition programs deal with social or health objectives.
The largest programs by far are not targeted directly at children--
Direct Food Distribution and Food Stamps. There is no breakdown on
what portion of the funding for these programs serves children.
The National School Lunch Program is the largest nutritional program
directed specifically at children. A school lunch program, however,
has no direct impact on those children shown to be at greatest risk
of damage from undernutrition, those aged 0 to 2. It could have an
indirect impact by freeing family resources to purchase more food for
the younger siblings of school age children, a dubious and "filter-
down" process. This is a serious stumbling block for which no
programmatic answers have yet been supplied. The Special Milk program,
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Table 4.
Federal Nutrition Programs Affecting Children
Family and Child Feeding Programs 1973 Expend. (est.)
Federal Share
(millions of $)
%Estimated
in need being
served
Food Stamps (USDA)
Direct Distribution (USDA)
Nutritional Supplements (USDA)
(for mothers and children)
Emergency Food & Medical Services .(OEO)
General School Lunch (USDA)
Assistance for Free or Reduced Price
Lunches (USDA)
School Breakfast (USDA)
NSLP Equipment Assistance (USDA)
Special Food Service Programs (USDA):
day care centers (year-round)
recreation programs (summer)
Special Milk Program (USDA)
2,500.0
323.3
16.1
30.0
274.7
587.7
52.5
16.1
74.0
97.1
49%f 58% to
8%
N.A.
N.A.
84%
20-34%
N.A.
24%
27-46%
N.A.
Programs with Secondary or Optional Nutritional Components
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Office of Education, HEW)
(under Title 1, Migrant Children, Handicapped Children sections)
School Nutrition Demonstration Projects (OE, HEW)
Head Start, Health Start (OCD, HEW)
Follow Through (OE, HEW)
Indian Children (Interior Department)
Model Cities (HUD)
Indian Health (HSMHA, HEW)
Migrant Health (HSMHA, HEW)
Maternal & Infant Care Projects (HSMHA, HEW)
Maternal & Child Health Services (formula grants : HSMHA)
Children & Youth Projects (HSMHA)
Source: Huron Institute. Federal Programs for Young Children,
Vol. 2 (1972), p. 304, Table 11.1; Citizens' Board of Inquiry.
Hunger U.S.A. Revisited (1972), pp. 10, 12, 49-52.
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plus the spotty nutritional components of maternal and infant care
projects and state maternal and child health services, are an attempt
to provide perinatal supplementation; but the coverage provided by
these programs is too uneven to be nationally or even regionally
effective. It would seem that food stamps or other indirect routes
are the only realistic way to reach these children at present.
Another concern with nutrition programs, especially lunch programs,
is that the simple eligibility standard of income may be an insufficient
proxy for a more logically sound, but more pragmatically complicated,
nutritional status standard. One study has found that between 25% and
42% of children with nutritional deficits (as measured by hematocrit levels
and/or weight and height) were being denied free lunches in low income
schools because they fell above the income cut-off lines.
By ignoring simple medical indices in favor of family income
or impressionistic considerations by school officials, many
nutritionally indigent youngsters are excluded from partici-
pating in the school feeding program. (Paige, 1971a, p. 261)
The policy issue is whether free lunches are primarily an equity program
for poor children (justifying an income scale), a nutritional/health
program (justifying a physiological scale), or a combination effort.
Estimates of need in nutritional terms are very difficult. (Segal,
1970; Elias, 1971) The "recommended daily allowance" figures are non-
specific in their derivation (i.e., they are usually set well above
laboratory testing levels of damage; Woolsey, 1971). Knowledge of
It is interesting to note that this same dilemma has emerged in the
M & IC program, where an original attempt to reach mothers and infants
"at risk" both because of low income per se and because of medical high-
risk conditions has evolved into a simpler definition of "high-risk" as
"poor".
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this inaccuracy tends to conservatively bias policy-making, since it
is difficult to justify the standards rigorously. It would appear
at this point that the new Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
(HANES) now being completed by the National Center for Health
Statistics (due to report preliminary findings in December, 1972)
should generate valuable baseline data on the nutritional status
of the population, particularly those served by federal programs.
Participation in such programs will be studied; comparisons of
nutritional status between participants and non-participants will
be possible. These data will hopefully provide more analytically
sound directions for Federal nutrition policy, although, since they
are based on the effects of the current fragmented system, they
will still not provide much evidence supporting a shift of nutri-
tion and food supplementation programs to HEW or into more compre-
hensive programs. Although we have not examined the methodological
procedures of the study and the following may be a moot point
because of better design, we do raise a caveat about an under-
estimation of need, despite the margin of error in the standards,
because of survey methods.
It would appear, then, that the really poor children,
like their pregnant mothers, are not included in nutri-
tion studies or "national samples" because they are not
seen by doctors, because their families move about, or
because their mothers either do not supply reliable data
or do not return questionnaires at all. (Birch and
Gussow, 1970, p. 23)
Another problem with surveys and full assessment of nutritional
need is the extremely political nature of the inquiries. Hunger USA
Revisted (Citizens' Board of Inquiry, 1972) documents in astonishing
detail the furor raised by the testimony of Dr. A.E. Schaefer, director
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of the Ten-State Nutrition Survey before the Senate Select Committee
on Nutrition and Related Human Needs--a furor which resulted in the
muzzling of Schaeffer, his ouster as director, the removal of the
Survey to the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, and the can-
cellation of the planned expansion of the Survey. Similar episodes
are documented by Nick Kotz (1969) in Let Them Eat Promises: The
Politics of Hunger in America. The greatest concern on the part of
those administering and funding the programs seems- to be to avoid any
acknowledgement of real hunger in America.
In uncovering the thinking that had tailored all the
government's food programs, Senators Kennedy and Clark
discovered, as others had before, that these programs were
designed and controlled by people who never even considered
how their clients were effected. 'Most of all, the
Department of Agriculture bureaucrats never considered
the rights of the poor, their personal desires, or their
possible knowledge about the problems of poverty. The
School Lunch Program, for example, received no Con-
gressional examination for fifteen years except for
appropriations subcommittees whose influential members
flatly opposed more food aid for poor school children.
Agriculture Department food administrator Rodney Leonard
admitted (after he left office) that department bureaucrats
never felt challenged to think about the programs in terms
of service to children. (Kotz, 1969, p. 63)
The School Feeding Programs
One of the questions which could have been asked of nutrition
programs more frequently is their impact on learning. Evidence
concerning the potential brain damage and permanent developmental
consequences of maternal or early infant malnutrition has been sur-
veyed above. (Elias, 1971; Birch & Gussow, 1970; Kaplan, 1972; Read,
1969, 1972) It is highly suggestive but not conclusive. Extending
the argument, Birch and Gussow (1970) go to great lengths to develop
linkages between perinatal stress, subsequent malnutrition, and learn-
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ing disabilities. On one level, they would agree with Charles Lowe
of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
(Lowe, 1971) that, "There is a sound scientific basis for the hypothe-
sis that the relief of malnutrition is a key element in modifying the
incidence of mental subnormality." (p. 651) They go further to
suggest, with others (Garvue, et al., 1971), that functional learning
behavior (paying attention, being alert, even attending school
regularly), may be much influenced by a child's hunger or under-
nutrition. The only nutrition programs of which I have been able
to find any pertinent studies are the large school -feeding programs.
It is difficult to keep these issues in focus when studying federal
food programs. Since the latter have rarely been studied at all, it
is relatively easy to hypothesize all sorts of potential effects. In
fact, however, there are several reasons why feeding programs will
not bring about overnight changes in school performance or health.
...Environmental equalization must be viewed as a longer
term process, stretching across two or three generations
at least, and we must not expect to overcome within a single
.lifetime the entire consequences of 15 generations of sub-
o timal conditions of life, (Birch & Gussow, 1970,. pp. 268-
.9
They stress (as Young (1971) also does) the need to separate nutritional
goals at least partially from developmental, educational or wider
social ones, and to argue the case for programmatic action without
incontrovertible scientific evidence or an expectation of quick
results:
The health of children and theirnutritional status can be
immediately improved. It does not matter whether such
action produces an immediate improvement in educational
performance, since the likelihood that it will hurt
performance is zero. (Ibid., p. 272)
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The National School Lunch Program (NSLP) reimburses public and
non-profit private schools for up to 25% of the cost of student lunches
of authorized quality; up to 15 cents per lunch additional is avail-
able to help defray the cost of free or reduced cost meals for indigent
students. Because of this low matching ratio, free meals are often
difficult for local school districts to finance. In fact, recently
only 10.9% of school lunches were sold at reduced prices or provided
free. (Segal, 1970, p. 93) The School Breakfast Program, although
much smaller in budget and coverage, operates in a similar fashion.
A recent analysis of the National School Lunch Program (Young,
1971) contains data which make one cautious about the potential
impact of current food programs. Young found that the percentage
of all poor children participating in NSLP in 1968 (21.1%) was less
than the percentage of non-poverty ones (25.6%). In other words,
the program is not even reaching the neediest children--those to whom
the nutritional value actually makes a difference--to the same, rather
meager extent t6 which it is reaching the non-poor, for whom it usually
only replaces calories and nutrients which would otherwise be obtained
from a home-prepared box lunch. Determination of need is left to
local schools; there is no nationally uniform test or scale. (Segal,
1970, p. 93)
Young goes on to use rather simplified but comprehensive models
to analyze NSLP in the general context of national child nutritional
needs--i.e., the extent to which NSLP supplies total child-RDA days
(RDA is the Recommended Dietary Allowance, as set by the Food and
Nutrition Board of the National Research Council, National Academy of
Science.). He develops various models for program operation, varying
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the degree of participation and of free lunch provision. He finds clearly
that the present NSLP is not even the optimal federal program, given the
current allocation level. Providing meals free to all poor children
in NSLP schools would result in increasing the number of RDA's pro-
vided at less net cost. If, he concludes, one assumes unmet nutritional
needs are worthy of being filled per se, then
In terms of output per dollar it appears that the most
effective program would be one requiring 100% participa-
tion of all schools and free meals for all poor children.
This is contrasted with the present program which reaches
about 33% of school-age children, of whom 13% receive free
or reduced-price meals, i.e., only 2.4 million of the
nation's 8.6 million poor school-age children are served.
(Young,- 1971, p. i)
Young's findings are reinforced in an earlier work by Kahn (1965),
who recommended providing free hot lunches to all children. He cites
the Swedish experience, where the administrative complexity and
undesirable stigma found in a selective program led to a change to
a universal meal system.
There are limits, however, to what one can expect even from a more
comprehensive lunch program. First, as Young neatly diagrams it, if
one looks at the total RDA'.s per child per year (one day's RDA X 365
X number of children), the NSLP provides only 4% of that total.
Fifty-two per cent of the RDA's are allotted to non-school days;
two-thirds of the remaining RDA's (= 32% of total) are not provided
by NSLP because ,they represent breakfast and dinner requirements.
Even if all children in school received NSLP, this would account
for only 16% of their total annual RDA; a school breakfast program
could increase that percentage up to a maximum of 32%.
There is some additional evidence that school meal programs can
consistently improve the diets of pupils aged ten to thirteen
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(Christakis, 1968); one could expect similar results for younger school-
age children also. They also may improve attendance rates and pupil-
teacher relations. (Garvue, et al., 1971) Paige (1971b), studying
anthropometric and biochemical (hematocrit) changes in undernourished
children given school lunch versus a control group, also undernourished,
found no significant improvement. He suggests however that the one-
third of the RDA represented by lunch is not a sufficient critical
mass to overcome deficiencies; the length of the test may have also
been too short. Additional evidence and testimony are reviewed by
Woolsey (1971); Elias (1971); and The Food Research and Action Center
(1972).
To regard a Head Start or school lunch program as though
it were going to modify the nutri'tional circumstance of
the family is to be self-deluded. The nutritional cir-
cumstances of the family can be~changed only by a funda-
mental social modification of food practices, coupled with
food availability and understanding by the community. (Birch,
1970, p. 879)
While we share Birch's sense of the ultimate need for broad social
reform in order' to alter nutritional circumstances, we would only
note that part of that long-run improvement begins with each day
that a child is better fed in some way than he was before. Joan
Gussow has made the point eloquently.
There is, of course, one last argument which can be
advanced against the notion that the schools should provide
for children's physical needs--that is that we can't prove
it will help them learn. The success reported by a few
are, in scientific terms, merely anecdotal assertions that
good health does make a difference. The hard scientific
evidence to support the notion that children's present
biological condition correlates with their learning is
- best described as fragile. There are a few studies--one
fairly old one linking blood levels of Vitamin C to IQ,
two more recent ones evaluating the effect of iron-
deficiency anemia on various measures of functioning.
For what it is worth, they have all tended to show that
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children who were better nourished did better. But
the fact remains that there are, so far as I have been
able to determine, no controlled studies which show
whether the child who is very hungry is unable to work
as well in school as one who is not hungry--or even
whether he is just unwilling to. We have no convinc-
ing evidence to sustain the notion that too little sleep
or too many cavities actually hinder the learning process.
That is to say we cannot at the moment prove, on the
basis of scientific evidence, that children would profit
educationally if they were provided with all the health
and nutrition services which they needed.
This being the case, there is one question we need
to ask. Is it rational (or humane) to attempt to teach
anything at all to a child who is hungry or sick or
tired or all three? If it is not, then we shall probably
have to go ahead and feed hungry children breakfast, and
put sick or exhausted children to bed, and take care of
the eyes and ears and teeth and other broken parts of
children whose health has been neglected, just because it
seems like the only sensible thing to do, and not because
we are convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt that such an
approach will result in a 23.6% improvement in their SAT
scores. At the very least we will then be teaching these
children--and their parents--that someone cares about their
hunger, their fatigue and their illness-which is much more
positive than some of the things they are learning now.
(Gussow, 1970, p. 12)
One type of study which is urgently needed is a comparison between
direct food programs of any sort and income maintenace as to their
relative effectiveness in altering food purchasing patterns and
nutritional status. There is a trade-off which needs to be measured
between the universal coverage and freedom of choice which an income
program would provide (e.g., reaching children aged 0 - 5 without
requiring some new institution or intervention program) versus the
directedness and immediacy of food programs.
Efficiency and philosophy support the idea that in-kind programs
are an inappropriate method of helping low-income households
to improve their living standard...But because economic oppor-
tunity programs are not capable of immediately attacking the
problem of inadequate diet, and because the poor may lack the
motivation or knowledge to obtain a fully adequate diet, either
with or without more income, it could be argued that even
though food programs restrict freedom of choice, they are
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necessary as stop-gap measures to save young children
from permanent physical and mental damage and to provide
older children and adults with diets which give them the
best chance of remaining healthy, alert people. The
dangers of malnutrition may justify the temporary
restriction of choice as a means to insure the recipients
are healthy enough to take advantage of programs aimed
at permanently improving their opportunities to choose.
(Segal, 1970, p. 73)
Medicaid and Financing Plans
Medicaid, by far the largest federal contributor to child health
in terms of dollars spent, is a financing mechanism, not a service
one. It also covers many people other than children, and data are
not readily available pertaining to young children. Medicaid served
around 9,000,000 children in 1972. Some of these may have received
complete thorough care; others may have been covered only for an
emergency room visit. Medicaid cannot guarantee coverage or
quality of care; furthermore, the scope of the program, in terms
of services covered and eligibility strictness, varies considerably
from state to state. A full discussion of Medicaid belongs in an
analysis of financing systems and insurance programs. The Child
Health Care Policy Task Force (1972) has reviewed the pros and cons
of Medicaid and proposed national health insurance schemes. I have
noted that health insurance coverage, which presumably would be of
most benefit to those without resources to meet medical emergencies,
is in fact a function of familj income; those most in need are most
likely to be unprotected. And although the evidence is not completely
consistent, there is every indication that the poor are also ill more
seriously and more often.
Thus simple equity would seem to require that any federal subsidized
insurance should provide benefit coverage at least as liberal as that of
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the middle-class. On this score, it is disheartening to read the Task
Force's discussion of the benefits proposed under the Administration's
health insurance proposals: the Family Health Insurance Plan (FHIP)
and the National Health Insurance Standards Act (NHISA)--the former
primarily for indigent families and the latter for employed persons
and their families. Neither FHIP nor NHISA (the more liberal of the
two plans in its provisions) propose to cover the following services
which would seem vitally important to achieve comprehensive care for
children:
psychological or psychiatric services
nutrition services
speech therapy
vision and hearing screenings as needed
eyeglasses
hearing aids
prosthetic devices
physician nurse and allied health personnel services
supportive social services
outreach services.
In addition, FHIP does not cover the following items covered by NHISA:
prenatal care for and birth of first child
catastrophic health insurance protection
The Task Force estimates that it would cost only $50 million to make
those two NHISA benefits available to the child population of FHIP, a
group most at risk of perinatal complications, lack of access to pre-
natal care, and congenital problems (often requiring huge medical
investments). The group makes no estimate of the cost to include
any or all of the other needed services. By comparison, the "welfare"
medicine of Medicaid seems comprehensive and liberal. Similarly,
existing programs under Title V (Maternal and Infant Care, Child and
Youth, etc.) and Section 314(e) have much greater potential for
comprehensiveness despite their relatively few numbers of users.
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Other Federal Health Programs
Maternal and Child Health Services, Crippled Childrens Services. These
two programs, which amounted to a total of $121,000,000 of federal formula
grants to states in FY 1972, are clearly of vital importance in providing
health services to children. They have only minimal. guidelines, and
are state-controlled programs for which no reliable national data exist
on coverage, eligibility requirements, program content, or outcomes.
An attempt to develop a uniform data base and analysis of these programs
is underway by a group at George Washington University. Such lack of
accountability is difficult to justify when every health dollar is
being claimed by numerous programs. We are particulary concerned that
some, if not most, of the funds (at least in MCHS) might not be better
spent in expanding the coverage of programs with more demonstrable effects
on child health--such- as Maternal and Infant Care projects or Neighbor-
hood Health Centers.
Dental programs have been omitted due to the pressures of time, not
because we consider them unimportant. When only half of all children
under 15 have even visited a dentist, the level of need is enormous,
and present levels of federal support are woefully inadequate; in
FY 1972 comprehensive dental care projects were expected to reach only
15,000 children.
Indian Health and Migrant Health programs have also not been dis-
cussed. Again, the lack of evaluation studies, or even comprehensive
descriptive ones, hampers program analysis. In this case, the over-
whelming impression one receives of these programs is their inadequacy
in the face of tremendous need (American Academy of Pediatrics, 1971;
Adair & Deuschle, 1970). What is needed first is sufficient funding
to reach enough children in a concerted way to make outcome evaluation
meaningful.
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Chapter 5.
Conclusion
Health of mind and body is so fundamental to the good
life that if we believe that men have any personal
rights at all as human beings, they have an absolute
moral right to such a measure of good health that
society and society alone is able to give them.
Aristotle
I went down into the underworld of London with an
attitude of mind which I may best liken to an
explorer. I was open to be convinced by the
evidence of my eyes, rather than by the teachings
of those who had not seen, or by the words of those
who had seen and gone before. Further, I took with
me certain simple criteria with which to measure the
life of the under-world. That which made for more
life, for physical and spiritual health, was good;
that which made for less life, which hurt, and
dwarfed, and dist rted life, was bad.
Jack London,
The People of the Abyss
(Quoted in Stansky and
Abrahams, The Unknown
Orwell, pp. 231-32)
There are millions of Americans living in hidden places
whose faces and names we never know. But I have seen
the children starving in Mississippi, idling their
lives away in the urban ghetto, living without hope
amid the dispair of the Indian reservations. These
conditions will change, those children will live,
only if we dissent.
Robert F. Kennedy
(Quoted in Kotz, Let Them
Eat Promises, p. TT
It must be remembered that evidence is never complete,
that knowledge of truth is always partial and that to
seek certainty is to await eternity
J. Bowlby
(Quoted in Talbot & Howell,
1971, p. 1)
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Any plant growing in the wrong place is a weed. For some plants
there are very few "right" places, and they are weeds to all of the
people all of the time. But even the most beautiful flower can
become a weed if it grows outside the boundaries customary to it.
Evaluation is not a beautiful flower by anybody's standards, but
neither is it the planning equivalent of crabgrass, always out of
place and beloved of no one. Much serious and honest belief is
placed in the necessity and value of systematically analyzing and
measuring our societal efforts at social improvement. Sincerity and
conscientiousness, however, are no guarantees of beneficence or
rightness. What I have attempted to do in this thesis is explore
the boundaries surrounding evaluation and the related policy tools
of needs and knowledge which demark the flowers from the weeds. In
particular I have sought to outline the extent to which evaluation
of child health care programs is a worthwhile and ethically sound
enterprise. Three sets of boundaries appear most important:
boundaries of health care, boundaries of evaluation itself, and
boundaries of scientific knowing.
The boundaries of health care are the limits of what we can
effectively hope to do to meet recognized health needs through medical
intervention. One determinant of these boundaries is our collective
definition of health. If we define health as the absence of disease
or certain conditions, then there may be precious little we can do
if chronic conditions or diseases are our major health problems. If,
on the other hand, we define health as a level of functioning and
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expand health care to encompass rehabilitative, care-taking, and
preventive services, then health care can be expected to make much
greater improvements in health.
Health care is also limited by our technical and biomedical
capacity to detect needs and to devise methods (be they curative,
preventive, or maintaining) to meet them. Both the discussion of
evaluation infrastructure in Chapter 2 and the presentation of
critical child health problems in Chapter 4 are relevant here.
Some of the limits of health care for children presently most in
question are those concerning handicapping conditions (Can we detect
them prenatally or early in infancy? Can we prevent them with
adequate prenatal care, family planning, etc? What can we realistically
expect for the growing numbers of multiply-handicapped children?);
nutritional inadequacies (What are dangerous levels and periods of
nutritional stress? Can effects be reversed? How does the social
environment cause or perpetrate inadequacies? Can we reach young
children and mothers even if it is desirable to do so?);and prenatal
and other preventive care (How much can we improve the survival chances
of babies of poor or high-risk mothers? Can we provide care through
new types of personnel, less extensively trained, with less narrowly
medical orientations?).
Another general boundary of health care has figured prominently
in the preceding discussion: the relationship of underlying social
conditions, not controllable by health care, to health status. I
have shown that poverty is associated with poor health, poor chances
for survival, and limited access to health care. If health care can
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remove those relative differences (even if this means greater efforts
or "compensatory" programs), then providing the care will improve
health and thus remove one of the inequities of poverty; in a sense
it will make the poor less poor or unequal. But if the health care
only "works" if the patient lives in a sufficiently life-supporting
environment (e.g., is above the poverty line), then poverty must be
alleviated before health care will show many results. There is grow-
ing evidence that the effectiveness of health and nutrition programs
alone in the face of otherwise unchanged social environments has been
oversold. As Haggerty (1970a) has said, "There is no doubt--the
greatest disease of the poor is poverty. (p. 78) In a more dis-
criminating analysis, McDermott and his colleagues (1972) found in
studying the impact of technological health care on the children of a
Navajo community that
depending on their biologic nature, diseases vary
enormously in their susceptibility to medical manage-
ment in slum conditions... .The two conditions that did
not require changes in household practices for their
control--otitis media and the transfer of tubercle bacilli
--were significantly influenced, whereas the two [diarrhea
and pneumonia] that did M require such changes were not.
(pp. 28,29)
Lowe (1971) has also suggested that any government strategy to combat
malnutrition must include policies of economic action to reduce the
poverty which is the root of the problem.
Interest in enlarging the scope of "health care" to enable it to
address and affect a wider range of var 4ables is growing. These
attempts can be broadly classified as ecological in outlook. Rene
Dubos (1959) and others (c.f. McKeown, 1965) have argued that
historically the great advances in health indices were primarily
204
the result of improvements in basic living conditions. Inherent in
this outlook is a rejection of the current medical model of single-
factor etiology and disease-specific cures. Although some pediatricians
(Haggerty, Richmond, Talbot, to name a few) have explored this area,
the greatest efforts have been made in mental health.
In the past ten to fifteen years, psychiatrists have begun
to recognize the relationship of disease to society. They
have.begun to move from the concept of single causality to
a more comprehensive, ecological approach to mental health.
...toward broader sociobiologic concerns.. .To operate in
the broader system, the psychiatrist must become concerned
with developmental processes rather than disease--with
preventive mechanisms rather than symptom treatments....
This means that the society itself must be educated so that
those human values that promote mental health begin to exert
pressure in the decision-making process. (Duhl & Leopold,
1968, pp. 3, 5, 15)
In a provocative article, Bloom (1965) has called for a reconsideration
of the long scorned "miasma theory" model of disease, which stressed
prevention of diseases and treatment as an arrangement of optimal
conditions for the patient to help himself, and did not believe in
germ theory or other precise diagnoses. "The major technique for
disease prevention was to attempt to modify the environment by
removing the sources of the miasma." (p. 336) Bloom presents the
theory as having particular relevance to community mental health,
but it. can be extended to encompass other needs of children. An
excess concern with exact etilogy and precise diagnosis. may prevent
medical personnel from designating certain children as "patients" for
care or from diagnosing a syndrome which incorporates non-medical
factors. Along these lines, Wagner (1970) reports a syndrome found
in children resistent to a cognitive stimulation program which
included "increased frequency of infections, increased frequency
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of child abuse, decreased maternal interest in the child, and marked
irregularity of meals provided to the child." (p. 869) The inter-
vention strategies suggested by such a syndrome clearly must address
issues that go beyond medical science or the individual child.
We need to know a great deal more than we do about the bio-social
interactions that affect children. Chapter 4 has shown trends in both
basic knowledge and programs toward more ecological, comprehensive,
and interdisciplinary conceptions of children and of child health.
Still unexplored are the limits of this ecology. How much of the
reality of childhood morbidity is included (ie. how do we handle
presently unpredictable genetic conditions or rare diseases which
are not part of patterns we can discern)? To what extent will medical
practice be able to change? Does the ecological approach suggest
new ways of helping children or only new conceptual frameworks for
the same events? Do programs so organized show greater effectiveness?
The second level of boundary definition I have dealt with concerns
evaluation as a policy tool. Evaluation should be a primary method
to illuminate the boundaries of health care suggested above, i.e.
it should tell us which interventions work, on which conditions, on
what range of outcomes (mortality, functioning, morbidity, learning
capacity, etc.), and over what time span. I have discussed at length
the degree to which evaluation as presently practiced rarely addresses
those questions in a manner broad enough to really guide policy.
There are two types of limits involved. First, the methodological
tools of evaluation may not be able to assess ecological or multi-
dimensional models of health care in real-life; for example, we can
measure infant mortality rates, but not the interaction of nutrition
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and maternal stimulation on infant development. Second, the theoretical
underpinnings of evaluation may not be adequate to synthesize data
into such causal or relational models. In regard to the latter limit,
both impact evaluation and systems-orierted models of evaluation seem
particularly significant theoretical contributions. In regard to the
former, it is my conviction that better evaluations--ethically responsible
and methodologically respectable--could be done now, along the lines of
the Geomet (1971) and National Academy of Sciences (1972) studies. In
other words, we could greatly extend the number and types of evaluation
studies of child health programs without creating "weeds". (I am not
concerned here with other limits on evaluation such as costs, adequate
manpower to carry it out, or administrative cooperation.) I have dis-
cussed some of the characteristics of child health needs and measures
of them which make child health care a relatively attractive and
promising candidate for evaluation.
There are aspects of methodologic boundaries, however, which are
more troublesome than underutilization of good methods. I am not
competent to discuss the intricacies and specifics of many of these
issues, but the outlines of the debate seem to be as follows. There
are those who argue that rigorous experimental research methodologies, in
particular random assignment of control and experimental groups, not
only can but should be utilized whenever possible (a circumstance much
more common than detractors of the methods claim), because they provide
the most reliable and valuable data for policy making.
The major function of a controlled randomized experiment is
to obtain data in a way which is conducive to making a judg-
ment about the efficacy of a treatment program. Experimental
appraisal of social programs can therefore be reasonably
expected yield information which is useful for decisions in
207
a more direct and unequivocal way than other data collec-
tion strategies. (Boruch, 1972, p. 1)
Campbell suggests an ethical, as well as a scientific rationale for
such rigorous designs. He calls for a wider
recognition of randomization as the most democratic and
moral means of allocating scarce resources (and scarce
hazardous duties), plus the moral imperative to further
utilize the randomization so that society may indeed learn
true value [sic] of the supposed boon. This is the ideology
that makes possible "true experiments" in a large class of
social reforms. (Campbell, 1969; in Caro, 1971, p. 248)
We need to know more about the limitations of experimental and quasi-
experimental designs in specific situations (c.f. Campbell & Stanley,
1963), and about the possibilities of achieving randomized treatment
and control groups. In particular, we need to know whether experi-
mental techniques can work for program evaluation which must have
policy implications, for Boruch's optimism is not widely shared. In
a methodologic review of the Coleman Report on compensatory educa-
tion programs, Cain and Watts make a two-pronged critique:
Little or no theoretical justification is offered for the
election of explanatory variables, for their functional
form, or for the inclusion or exclusion of variables under
different specifications of the model ... We have no way of
knowing, for example, whether a variable directly represents
a policy instrument or is only indirectly related to policy
through some other unmeasured (or partially measured) relation-
ships.
.Second, the criterion used.. .to assess or evaluate the
statistical performance of the variables is inappropriate.
Instead of providing information about the quantitative
effect of a variable in altering educational achievement
--information which would enable the reader to assess the
feasibility and costliness of operating on the variable--
the Rerort provides information abcut a statistical
measure of the variable's performance.. .which gives no
clear guidance for translating the statistical findings
into policy action. (Cain & Watts, 1970, p. 229)
As I have discussed, methodologies can always be attacked by critics
of findings or of programs. What needs to be done more carefully
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(Boruch's work is a hopeful step in the right direction) is a sort-
ing out of real issues and weaknesses from those which may be
academically real but which do not affect the policy implications
of evaluations.
Leaving aside methodological limitations, one realizes in
studying the definitions and descriptions of evaluation the degree
to which both theory and practice have remained aloof from and
leery of real decision-making situations. Part of the problem is
an insufficient conceptual base.
One of the major reasons evaluation is in difficulty is
that knowledge of the decision-making process and of
the methodologies for relating evaluation to decision-
making is woefully inadequate. (Stufflebeam, et al.,
1971, p. 16)
This is no trivial inadequacy when one realizes that evaluation,
as opposed to social research, was developed as a key input into
decision-making.
Evaluation is a decision-making tool. Its success or
failure must be measured therefore in terms of its
impact on changing program policies and resources
allocations. (Wholey, et al., 1970, p. 46)
Concern with policy implications highlights the second, or ideologic
limit on evaluation: its proper role in assessing the overall importance
and ethical acceptibility of programs. Here the common stress on the
value-free nature and scientific objectivity of evaluation (and indeed
policy analysis techniques in general) tends to blur crucial questions,
to mask problems in apparent success by partial statistical measures,
or to create failures where none exist. This latter situation has been
discussed at length in the text. We need to be more aware of the
interactions of evaluation with other political system variables.
Advocacy and actionability evaluations are an attempt to do this. The
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other side of the coin, the over-generalization from incomplete measures
has not been as thoroughly discussed. Once "progress" can be shown,
it becomes more difficult for reform movements to keep pressure on
administrators or legislators for further action. We Americans have
a great faith in our ability to solve problems and a short attention
span for complex, half-finished business. The Citizens' Board of
Inquiry into Hunger captures the essence of the problem in their
assessment of the progress made toward relieving hunger in America
in the four years since their first report:
If we were reviewing here a matter such as increased highway
construction, or any other materially-centered government
project in which statistics provide the only measure of
success, failure or commitment, we would take pride in this
data, and look with confidence and composure at the job
still to be done.... But we are considering something
infinitely more complex, more profound. We are consider-
ing hunger and its debilitating effects on human personality,
hunger and development, considerations deserving the highest
priority in a civilized nation. And, what is at issue,
as much as the will of this administration, or any adminis-
tration, to take action, is the humanity of and the swift
ability of our methods. (Citizens' Board of Inquiry, 1972,
p. 9)
The very bases of evaluation for complex social programs such
as those we are concerned with may be unique. If this is so, then
transferring methods either from social science research (where only
single variables or controlled sets of a few variables are generally
studied) or from management and operations research (where non-human
resources and non-social goals are manipulated.) may be both an
inappropriate and indeed a dangerous overstepping of boundaries.
Campbell suggests that the political dangers of evaluation ("Specific
reforms are advocated as though they were certain to be successful.
For this reason, knowing outcomes has immediate political implications.")
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and also its tendency to kill off reform with negative findings could
be eased by a shift in political posture
from the advocacy of a specific reform to the advocacy
of the seriousness of the problem, and hence to the
advocacy of persistence in alternatie reform efforts
should the first one fail. (Campbell, 1969, p. 234)
We should be especially concerned with methodologies or models
which separate ethical and pragmatic or scientific measures: "Humane
grounds (social value) for providing care are not invalid grounds.
They merely fall outside the purview of the special competence of the
economist." (Herbert Klarman; quoted in Sparer & Johnson, 1971,
p. 932) If the economist (or the psychologist or the sociologist
or the planner) is not going to claim competence to elucidate the
social value of the social programs he studies, then they will
have to be directed by someone who can interject that perspective.
But policy analysis is replacing raw politics as the socially acceptable
ideology of power, and policy science (be it PPBS or another variant)
also pretends to be value-free, to make objective, rational choices
among alternatives on clear grounds of evidence or cost and benefit.
The individual moral judgment of the voter is rarely able to express it-
self in the enormity and administrative anonymity of modern government.
Are we truly ready to transcend morality and ethics? Or are we only neg-
lecting them?
To discuss evaluation any further, the boundaries of knowledge
itself must be examined. For evaluation is inextricably tied to our
cultural beliefs in the power and indeed the necessity of scientific
knowledge. We hate above all else not to know, oot to be able to make
the world explicable, replicable, and preferably graphable as well.
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That which we cannot measure or reproduce we put out of mind. In medi-
cal science "miasma theory", vitamin E, faith-healing, and many psycho-
somatic complaints are considered less than real; only those diseases,
syndromes, treatments, and cures approved by the A.M.A. and amenable to
research at NIH are granted full public acknowledgment.* The scienti-
fic approach becomes a "dichotomization of life and knowledge, knowing
and living," based on the notion that
there is an objective world with knowable laws, that can be
determined through various empirical testing procedures.
Given knowledge of these laws and facts, man can then decide
how to live. They are assumed to be separable: scientific
knowledge first, then morality... .Science implies that man
learns about his environment only through objective study.
(Ted Butz; quoted in Sackrey, I1973, p. 75)
Wolin discusses the correlates of this split in political
theories of organization and bureaucracy, or what he terms "the sub-
limation of politics." Referring to one of the fathers of modern organ-
izational theory he captures the dreams of scientific rationalism in
public affairs:
Saint-Simon's vocabulary "organization" connoted far more
than a simple condition of social harmony and political
stability. Organization promised the creation of a new
- structure of power...."Men shall henceforth do consciously,
and with better directed and more useful effort, what they
have hitherto done unconsciously, slowly, indecisively,
and too ineffectively. (,Wolin, 1960, p. 377)
In a rather frightening essay entitled "The Cybernetic State,"
Allen Schick (1970) explores the implications of the post-bureaucratic
stage of government, when systematic rather than functional form is
* Adair and Deuschle (1970) provide a fascinating account of the more
reasonable ways of the Navajo of accepting and utilizing modern medi-
cine. In cases where it works, such as drug treatment for tuberculosis,
the medicine men have acknowledged the superiority of modern medicine
and send people to hospitals; where it has no greater success than
traditional medicine, as for psychiatric disorders or chronic conditions,
they have held their ground--and their patients.
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adopted for the goal-directed government, which acts as a "servomecha-
nism, concerting the polity and the economy to achieve public objectives."
In this world, planners and systems engineers have replaced those with
functional specialties (whose "interests get in the way of the results")
and the right of free speech has become gradually eroded as the speaker
has "little ability to challenge the dominance of the experts and...
little ability to sway the course of public policy [much of which
becomes automatically linked to changes in social indicators] by his
vote." (p. 278) He notes the increased overlap between public and pri-
vate spheres.
For example, can the state compel an individual not to
smoke? Can it require adults to work? Can it force
mothers to send three-year-olds to school? None of these
issues is distinctly new; but what is new is the ground on
which they are being fought and will be decided. Prohibi-
tion was a moral issue; but smoking is already a
scientific one. (Schick, 1970; in Gelb & Palley, 1971, p. 279)
With aminocentesis and related techniques already enabling doctors
to detect many fetal abnormalities, the issues are not in the future
but in the present. Can the state compel the pregnant woman to have
an abortion if the family will be unable to support a multiply-handi-
capped or retarded child, or if chromosomal patterns associated with
criminality are found? What is frightening about the reality of such
decisions (for the woman if not for the state) is that they are so
often couched in scientific jargon which hides the moral complexities
involved. I don't have much in common with opponents of abortion re-
form, but I deeply respect some of them because they at least recognize
that the argument is a moral and ethical one, not one which is purely
political, social, or reducible to hard evidence on the safety of the
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procedures or the numbers of illegitimate or unwanted births each year.
To practice "normal science" is to be tempted into a
personal style whereby one increasingly narrows one's
range of inquiry and increasingly refuses to consider
the moral implications of what one is doing. (Sackrey, 1973, p. 76)
In such cases, too much knowledge can be a dangerous thing.
But there are few simple, untrained minds among us,
and they have little voice. Many of us have been trained
too well, it seems. We lead our lives as if we only knew
what the tests show. Our minds are anchored to statistics,
and so to the present....
We love our technical solutions so deeply that we
refuse to acknowledge the over-riding problems they create.
We know what we know with such allegiance that our very
loyalty betrays our purpose. (Gerzon, 1973)
When we go this far in our reliance upon and faith in our powers of
knowledge and certainty, then the flowers have become weeds. Science
should not blind us to our own humanity, to the trustworthiness of our
own eyes and ears, to our unaugmented powers of reason, or to the ir-
reducible complexities and uncertainties of life. While not all of us
possess the opportunity or the empathetic perspicacity of a Jack London
or a Bobby Kennedy, we need to develop those latent talents in our-
selves before they indeed atrophy as we know the unused intellect does.
The present work has certainly not provided answers as to how to
"systematically" go about doing this. But part of the process must
certainly be a more thoughtful analysis and evaluation of not only pro-
grams of social action but also the means by which those programs come
to be, come to die, and by which we learn about them. That analysis
will not be simple or conclusive. It is paradoxical to expect to know
precisely the limits of our knowledge. We need to be more tolerant of and
sensitive to the boundaries of social institutions and concepts, without
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falling into the existential despair of saying that nothing matters or
is any better than anything else. Child development, for example, is
a powerful synthesizing and intellectually-expanding construct for
understanding and arguing for children and their needs. But it can also
be a limiting idea, if by depending on it too heavily, we slight pressing
needs for which we can demonstrate no future developmental impact. Like-
wise, evaluation techniques are an essential part of modern society,
but they can be made trivial, ludicrous, or life-threateniflg by misuse.
If evaluation is used in the service of reason and not as its technolo-
gic or cybernetic replacement, it is a powerful means of acquiring
knowledge, or monitoring the goodness of our social assumptions and
actions, and of revealing the value conflicts ( or consensus) which lie
behind them.
I am not trying to argue for "moderation in all things," but rather
for a sensitivity and depth of understanding which obviates the need
for such quickie rules-of-thumb: for a perpetual openness of the mind
to the full range of possibilities and implications of human social
endeavors. Nick Kotz (1969) ends his absorbing and shocking expose of
the politics of hunger in America with some words which have a balanced
(but not middle-of-the-road) quality rare in muck-raking journalism
and which express the type of approach I am seeking.
Perhaps these questions have to be asked because we have
accepted too much at face value about ourselves; we have
accepted too many assumptions about the essential benevo-
lence of our institutions, without re-ally analyzing how
they really operate and how they affect all Americans.
The politics of hunger in America is a dismal story of
human greed and callousness, of immorality sanctioned
and aided by the government of the United States. But it
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is also a story that does provide hope that men can
change things, that men do care about fulfilling this
country's highest ideals and do care about their
fellow human beings. (Kotz, 1969, p. 246)
To the extent that this openness and honesty of analysis take place,
planning and humanitarian goals need not be antithetical and indeed
may enrich and foster each other.
I am told that as a young child I loved to help tend my family's
vegetable and flower gardens. My technique was to pull up any question-
able plants (they being numerous as my horticultural knowledge was
limited) and bring them to my mother or father, asking, "Dis a weed?"
At which point the question was moot; whatever it was was dead. I
have become more selective in my uprooting in more recent years and
hence wreck less havoc on the tulip population. But I still think
that the question is a damn good one to ask.
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